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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Background for the Study
According to Hopwood, budgeting now occupies a central position
in the design and operation of most management accounting systems.
Further, he notes:
Budgeting is being seen in much wider terms than a mere tech-
nique and procedure. It Is being seen as part of a process which
both Influences, and in turn is influenced by, managerial and
employee attitudes and behaviors. The need for . . . the parti-
cipation of the lower members of the organization is viewed as a
vital feature of these more modern approaches to budgeting.^
This subordinate participation in the budgeting process is the general
concern of this study.
Subordinate participation in the budgeting process is a complex
phenomenon and its operation and effects are not well developed in the
accounting literature. DeCoster argues that a host of assumed opera-
tional and motivational benefits underly the use of this participative
budgeting process. A major assumption is that participation leads to
increased subordinate morale and more favorable attitudes toward the
budget which, in turn, leads to increased aspiration levels and moti-
-'-Anthony Hopwood, Accounting and Human Behavior (Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1976), p. 39.
^Ibid,. pp. 73-74.
Don T. DeCoster, "An Intuitive Framework for Empirical Research
in Participative Budgeting," paper presented to Accounting Research
Convocation, University of Alabama (University, Alabama, 1975), pp. 7-10,

2vation for improved performance. In his view, this assumption cannot
be accepted without further examination. Hopwood notes there have been
few systematic investigations specifically concerned with participation
in the budgetary process.^
Justification for the Study
The observations of DeCoster and Hopwood are taken as justification
for the present study. Given the central role of the budgeting process
and the assumed operational and motivational benefits associated with
subordinate participation in this process on the one hand, and the few
systematic investigations concerning the operation and effects of parti-
cipation in budgeting on the other, research in this area is considered
particularly appropriate. A systematic approach to the investigation
of participative budgeting may provide evidence to substantiate or refute
its assumed benefits, which ultimately may have important implications
for organizations considering the use of such a process for budget
development.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study is to develop a general model of parti-
cipative budgeting and to initiate a systematic exploration of its
operation and effects. The general model is developed to operate in
any organizational setting. However, Hopwood notes that both managers
and employees influence, and are influenced by, the budget and the
assumptions underlying the rationale for participative budgeting suggest
a broad range of interwoven questions. Thus the initial exploration of
' ibid
. , p. 20. Hopwood, op. cit., p. 74.

3the model operation concerns only the upper levels of management and the
investigation of its effects concern only the questions about the linkage
between subordinate manager participation in the budgeting process and
more favorable attitudes toward the budget.
Major Questions
The assumed linkage between subordinate participation in the
budgeting process and more favorable attitudes toward the budget raises
two major questions: first, whether more favorable attitudes actually
result from participation; and secondly, if they do result, how these
attitudes emerge from the participation process. The first question
concerns whether participation produces attitudinal results different
from the lack of such participation. The second question concerns
whether participation involves other identifiable results that relate to
the emergence of these attitudes. The approach to these questions is
based on research concerning the communication process and its effects.
The Approach of the Study
A participative budgeting model is developed based on an interac-
tive communication process involving top management and subordinates in
the development of the budget. The model is limited to the planning
function and is comprised of three phases. These phases are: orienta-
tion, in which the interactive communication involves discussion of the
facts of the budgeting situation; evaluation, in which alternative ideas,
opinions and suggestions are discussed; and joint decision making, in
which consensus is reached on the final budget. This model is then used
in a laboratory setting to examine the question of whether participation,
defined as the allowed interactive communication, leads to favorable

4attitudes of subordinates toward the budget. Some other effects of this
interactive communication are also utilized as a means to determine how
these favorable attitudes arise in the participative budgeting process.
This approach to the investigation of participative budgeting is
unique in that it is the first attempt to explicitly consider both the
operation of the communication process and its effects in addressing
participative budgeting questions. The approach draws on the consider-
able support for a communication process view suggested by prior research
to provide the missing explanatory link between the activity of partici-
pation and its effects. Because the communication process is a complex
one, attention to the operation of the process is limited to its mechani-
cal aspects while major emphasis is placed on its effects.
Report of the Study
The study is reported in the next five chapters. In these chap-
ters a basis for the communication process approach is identified and a
participative budgeting model is developed. Then an experiment designed
to assess hypothesized participation-attitude linkages in terms of the
operation of the model is described and the results of the experiment
are reported. The major conclusions, implications, limitations, and
extensions of the study are then discussed.
In chapter two the prior participation-related research is examined.
The review identifies and discusses two major approaches to viewing
participation; subordinate influence on decisions, and shared control in
decision making between manager and subordinates. The discussion indi-
cates that this research strongly suggests a communication process
approach, but no study has rigorously examined both the activity of
participation and its effects in terms of such a process.

5In chapter three the participative budgeting model is developed.
Then research from communication theory is used in conjunction with
participative budgeting research to hypothesize that subordinate atti-
tudes of satisfaction, commitment and perceived correctness toward the
budget result from participative budgeting. A communication effects
model is discussed as the basis to hypothesize that subordinate under-
standing, accuracy, congruency and agreement comprise the means through
which these more favorable attitudes result.
The design and methodology of an experiment to test the hypotheses
aredescribed in chapter four. A laboratory simulation of a budgeting
situation based on a management game is described and related to the
model of the study. Particular attention is given to internal validity
considerations to permit an unambiguous determination of whether the
communication effects and subordinate attitudes resulted from the
experimental treatment of interactive communication.
The statistical methodology and results of the analysis are dis-
cussed in chapter five. Analysis of variance procedures are used to
determine that the communication effects of increased subordinate
accuracy, congruency, and agreement and the favorable attitude of per-
ceived correctness resulted from the interactive communication in the
experiment. Correlation analysis shows that many of the communication
effects are significantly related to the attitudes toward the budget.
In chapter six the research is summarized. Then conclusions
and implications from the experimental findings are related to the
prior participation research and establish the viability of the
communication process approach to further study of participating
budgeting questions. The limitations of the research are noted, and

6extentions of the study are suggested to both budgeting and other
areas of accounting research.
The appendix provides the procedures and instruments used in the
experimental sessions to conclude the report of this study.

CHAPTER TWO
THE BASIS FOR A COMMUNICATION
PROCESS APPROACH
Much of the conceptual basis for studies of the participative
budgeting process stem from the research concerning subordinate partici-
pation in the decision making process. The purpose of this chapter is
to demonstrate that both this prior research in participation and in
participative budgeting suggest the viability of a communication process
approach to the systematic investigation of the participative budgeting
process.
In the discussion below, the communication process is considered
the transmission of information from a source to a receiver through a
channel linking the source with the receiver. Four major elements of
the process; the source, the receiver, the channel, and the information
transmitted can interact to make communication a complex phenomenon.
Consequently the specific relationships among these elements suggested
by this research are identified in the analysis.
Participation Research
The examination of the participation research begins with its
origins to show that the early research strongly suggests the use of
a communication process approach. Subsequent studies provide additional
Raymond J. Chambers, Accounting, Evaluation and Economic Behavior
(Houston: Scholars Book Co., 1974), p. 166.

8support and are classlfed into two major approaches that deal with
subordinate involvement in the decision making process; influence by
the subordinates on the decision made, and the sharing of control of the
decision process by the manager with subordinates. The studies com-
prising the influence approach have at times apparently assessed the
effects of a communication process but no study has explicitly tied
the operation of such a process to the obtained results. The studies
classified under the shared control approach suggest the use of alterna-
tive communication processes and varying information exchange as the
means to the sharing of decision making control. Again, however, no
study has systematically linked the alternative processes and variations
in information exchanged to the observed results.
Early Participation Research
Lewin Studies
The genesis of research concerning participation and its effects
2is generally traced to Lewin. Hampton, Summer, and Weber state:
Since the imaginative and influential research of Lewin
most students of organizational behavior have come to accept that
a person's participation in setting a goal increases the likeli-
hood that he will act to ensure that the goal is met. Presumably
when the follower has participated in determining what is to be done,
he should understand and agree that a certain course of action is
necessary and proper.
3
Of interest is that the results of participation are presumed to occur
Kurt Lewin, Resolving Social Conflicts; Selected Papers on
Group Dynamics (New York: Harper & Row, 19A8)
.
3David R. Hampton, Charles E. Summer, and Ross A. Webber,
Organizational Behavior and the Practice of Management (Revised;
Glenview, 111.: Scott, Foresman and Company, 1973), p. 153.

9by these authors.
Lewin reported a series of studies in which the effectiveness of
a procedure he named "group decision" was compared to the lecture method
of changing the food habits of housewives. The group decision method
was found dramatically more effective. However, Bennet pointed out that
what actually occurred in Lewin' s groups was group discussion about the
desirability of changing food preferences by each of the group members
as individuals. No group decision as such was made in any of his groups,
Bennet 's analysis suggests that Lewin contrasted the effects of a "one-
way" communication process with the lecturer as the sender of verbal
messages to the group members as receivers versus the effects of a "two-
way" process whereby individuals could be interacting verbally as both
senders and receivers.
The one-way versus two-way communication process can be depicted
in terms of channels linking senders and receivers. The one-way process
links the sender with the receiver and communication is only from the
sender to receiver. The two-way process allows communication in both
directions, and in a multiple person setting, all persons are alternately
senders and receivers linked to each other by two-way channels. These
characteristics are displayed in communication network form in Figure
2-1 using a typology originated by Bavelas and expanded by Leavitt and
Edith B. Bennet, "Discussion, Decision, Commitment and Consensus
in 'Group Decision'," Human Relations VIII (1955): pp. 251-273.
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Fig. 2-1. Coramunication Networks
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Guetzkow and Simon. ^ The lecture method is a "wheel" network while
the group discussion method is an "all-channel" network. Thus these
early studies in participation suggest the use of alternative communica-
tion processes.
Another aspect of the Lewin studies of interest concerns the
information communicated in the lecture and in the discussion group.
Unless the information in the two methods was highly similar, the nature
of the information transmitted was also a possible contributing factor
to the obtained results. Thus, investigation of this important element
of the communication process is also suggested by the Lewin efforts.
Coch and French Study
While the Lewin studies originated the participation issue, the
Coch and French study of a change in work methods in a clothing factory is
the first effort conducted in an organizational setting. Their research
dealt with 600 workers divided into four group types. These group types
were exposed to variations of democratic procedures as follows:
The control group was notified of a decision to change work
methods along with the reasons for the change.
The first experimental group was called to a meeting and the
top management staff explained the need for cost reductions.
General agreement was reached in the meeting that costs could be
reduced. No formal group decision was reached. A group repre-
Alex Bavelas, "Communication Patterns in Task-Oriented Groups,"
Journal of the Acoustical Society of America XXII (1950): 725-730;
Harold J. Leavitt, "Some Effects of Certain Communication Patterns on
Group Performance," The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology XLVI
(1951): 38-50; Harold Guetzkow and Herbert A. Simon, "The Impact of
Certain Communication Nets Upon Organization and Performance in Task
Oriented Groups," Management Science I (1955): 233-250.
/:
Lester Coch and John R. P. French, Jr., "Overcoming Resistance
to Change," Human Relations I (1948): 512-532.
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sentative was chosen to work out the new methods with top
management.
The second and third experimental groups went through the
same type of group meeting as the first experimental group.
Instead of selecting a representative, all the members in
these groups met with management personnel to design the new
jobs. Then the time and motion study personnel set the new
work standards.'
Coch and French found that all three of the experimental groups
significantly outperformed the control group with respect to the new
work standards. The control group, in turn, exhibited a greater turn-
over rate than the experimental groups. Based on these results the
researchers labeled the procedures used as participation and concluded
that learning is directly related to such participation, while turnover
and aggression toward management are inversely related to such partici-
Q
pation.
Examination of these alternative procedures suggests that Coch and
French allowed two things to vary related to the communication process.
First, the process itself varied from one-way for the control group to
two-way discussion for the experimental groups. Secondly, the informa-
tion transmitted through the networks within the processes varied.
The control group received only the managerial decision and reasons,
while the experimental groups exchanged information from both manage-
ment and subordinates prior to the groups receiving the managerial
decision. Thus the obtained results may have been due to either or
both of these factors.
While neither the Coch and French study nor the Lewin efforts
explicitly investigated the communication process, both clearly utilized
^Ibid., pp. 514-516. ^ Ibid ., pp. 530-532.
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it. Further, the descriptions of procedures strongly suggest that
alternative processes in terms of networks were involved and variations
in information transmitted through these networks occurred. However,
subsequent studies did not explore these communication processes and
information transmissions explicitly. Rather, studies concerned with
subordinate influence on decisions and shared control by management
with subordinates evolved from this early research.
Participation as Subordinate Influence on Decisions
Studies concerned with influence stem from a critique of the Coch
and French study. Lawrence questioned whether participation really
occurred in their investigation and asserted that participation was a
feeling on the part of people, not just the mechanical act of being
Q
called in to take part in discussions. Although Lawrence did not
specify the precise nature of this feeling, two closely related studies
established subordinate influence on the decisions made as the feeling
or perception of interest. These are the studies of French, Israel,
and As and Vroom.
The French, Israel, and As Study
French, Israel, and As noted that there was little conceptual basis
for the participation concept in the Coch and French study, and thus
replicated that effort in a Norwegian footwear factory. -^^ Their purpose
was to test a more precise theory of participation with more careful
^Paul R. Lawrence, "How to Deal with Resistance to Change,"
Harvard Business Review (May-June 1954), p. 40.
lOjohn R. P. French, Jr., Joachim Israel, and Dagfinn As ,




empirical methods. They defined participation as:
A process in which two or more parties influence each other in
making certain plans, policies, and decisions. It is restricted
to decisions that have future effects on all those making the
decisions and on those represented by them. . . The amount of
participation of [a participant] is defined as the amount of
influence on the decisions and plans agreed upon, or equivalently
,
the amount of influence that [other participants] accept during
the joint decision making process.
They also made a distinction between psychological and objective parti-
cipation:
The psychological refers to a person's perception of the amount
of influence on jointly made decisions, where [objective] refers
to the observed amount of influence (as determined by the social
scientist). Wherever perception is accurate, the amount of
psychological participation is equal to the amount of objective
participation. However, the two will frequently differ because of
the effects of the [participant's] needs on his social perception
and because of the inadequate or distorted information received
concerning [one's] own influence. 12
French, Israel, and As considered objective participation as a
discussion activity conducted by management representatives. Psycho-
logical participation was measured by subordinate responses to a question-
naire concerning degree of perceived influence. In discussions of pro-
duction activity, length of training, division of labor, and job assign-
ments within groups, the objective participation showed a stronger
relationship to improved worker-management relations than did psycho-
logical participation.
The effects of objective and psychological participation in this
study suggest support for the expected differences between perceived
participation and objective participation. Further, since both results
are obtained from the same activity, this suggests that the mechanism
through which perceived influence occurred was the discussion activity.
11 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 12jbid. ^^Ibid. , p. 17.
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or objective participation. However, these results are considered only
suggestive, because French, Israel and As did not control or measure the
information exchanged that comprised the discussion activity, and thus
did not explicitly link the activity to the obtained results. They
merely allowed discussion to occur or not to occur. Further, the
researchers point out that their study confounded the effects of the
opportunity to participate with the effects of taking part in the discus-
sion activity. That is, an individual could have been in a position,
and have had the ability, to exert influence without actually having
exercised this potentiality, and an increase in participation as discus-
sion involved a corresponding increase in this opportunity. They there-
fore concluded that this opportunity may have had the same effects as
14
actual participation. However, the results do suggest that explicit
investigation of the information transmitted within the discussion may
allow the determination of whether perceived influence results from
actual participation.
One aspect of the discussion activity for investigation is suggested
by French, Israel and As. They note that since the joint decision
making process involves the exchange of information, it provides the
opportunity for resolving differences of opinion. -^^ Thus, they not
only point to an element of the communication process, but suggest that
an explicit investigation of the opinions held and discussed by partici-
pants may lead to insights concerning the effects of participation as
discussion activity.






The conceptual basis for participative decision making advanced
by French, Israel and As was incorporated by Vroom in his study of the
relationships among personality variables, participative decision making,
and job related attitudes. 1^ Vroom noted that French, Israel and As had
made the distinction between psychological and objective participation,
and he therefore attempted to equate perceived influence by a given indi-
vidual with the perception by other individuals of actual influence.
He measured the amount of influence perceived by an individual on the
plans and decisions agreed upon, but could not confirm the equiva-
lence of this perceived influence and perceptions of actual influence
by the other individuals. Thus, he cautioned that the findings of his
study held only for psychological participation. Among the relationships
found were that perceived influence was positively related to favorable
attitudes toward the job and to motivation for effective performance.
Vroom' s measure of participation as perceived influence suggests
he was assessing the effects of information exchange in a communication
process. His psychological participation measure consisted of five
point Likert-Gcaled responses to the following questions:
1. In general, how much say or influence do you feel you have on what
goes on in your station
2. Do you feel you can influence the decisions of your immediate super-
visor regarding the things about which you are concerned
3. Does your immediate superior ask your opinion when a problem comes up
that involves your work
-'-"Victor H. Vroom, Some Personality Determinants of the Effects




4. If you have a suggestion for improving the job or changing the set-
up in some way, how easy is it for you to get your ideas across
to your immediate supervisor
These questions, in dealing with items such as "how much say," "ask your
opinion," and "get your ideas across," indicate the information exchange
aspects and link these phrases to influence. However, Vroom did not
investigate any specific communication process to allow an actual linkage
to either actual or perceived influence. Thus, an individual may or may
not have perceived influence when communication did or did not occur and
actual influence did or did not result.
The possibility that influence results from communication as both
the French, Israel and As and the Vroom studies suggest has been the
focus of much communication research in the field of persuasion.
Brembeck and Howell note persuasion, as communication intended to influ-
ence choice, is purposeful and must share the attributes of effective
communication in attempting to modify the intended receiver's attitudes
or behaviors in some predetermined manner. These attributes include a
clearly specified purpose, effective message construction in the oral,
written, or other visual language employed, and provision for a recipro-
cal process of interstimulation between the source and receiver. 1"
The French, Israel and As and Vroom studies thus suggest, in the
context of persuasion research, the viability of the communication process
approach to explicitly link the perception of influence by participants
to actual participation. In this context, participation involving
communication as persuasion is a process in which each participant
^^Ibid., pp. 77-78.
l^winston L. Brembeck and William S. Howell, Persuasion: A Means
of Social Influence (2nd. ed.; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
Inc.
, 1976), pp. 10--11.
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attempts to modify other's choices of attitudes or behaviors with
respect to the decisions to be made. By systematically investigating
the decision as the specified purpose and the nature of the information
exchanged in the discussion activity or two-way communication between
participants, the determination of whether an explicit linkage exists
between actual participation and influence of participants can be made.
Participation as Shared Control of Decision Making
The Coch and French study fostered a second stream of research
based on the democratic procedures in their investigation. These studies
view participation as the sharing of control of the decision making
process by the manager with subordinates. The efforts of Morse and
Reimer, Heller and Vroom and Yetton are classified under this approach.
The Morse and Reimer Study
Morse and Reimer viewed participation on a control dimension in
an eighteen month study of clerical workers in an industrial organiza-
tion. The researchers developed two programs that varied who actually
made the decisions. In the autonomy program group decisions were made
on work methods and procedures and some personnel matters by the clerical
workers as groups. In the hierarchical program all decisions were im-
posed on the groups by supervisory personnel. Morse and Reimer found
support for the hypothesis that the increased role in the decision
making process in the autonomy program increased the satisfaction of the
groups, but also concluded that the performance of groups, measured in
terms of cost reduction, was greater in the hierarchical program than




The Morse and Reimer study established the retention of control
through the imposition of the decision by management and the sharing of
control through the use of a joint decision making process. From the
discussion of early participation research, the retention can be seen to
involve a one-way communication process and the sharing of control, by
contrast, a two-way communication process.
The Heller Study
Heller reported a study which extended participation as influence
to include the control dimension in his Investigation of managerial de-
.21
cision making. He interviewed 260 senior business executives in
fifteen large organizations to assess how managers perceived they used
participative methods in making decisions and the reasons for using such
methods.
Heller based his view of participation on the French, Israel and
As concept, but used the following definitions:
Influence - A person exercises influence if, as a result of direct
or indirect intervention, his preferences are considered in the
process of arriving at a decision.
Power - A person exercises power when, as a result of his direct or
indirect intervention, his preferences are incorporated in the
decision process. (emphasis added)
20
Nancy Morse and Everett Reimer, "The Experimental Change of a
Major Organizational Variable," The Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology LII (1956): 120-129.
21Frank A. Heller, Managerial Decision Making: A Study of Leader -
ship Styles and Power Sharing Among Senior Managers (London: Tavistock,






He then combined these definitions to develop an influence-power con-
tinuum as a means to extend the democratic-authoritarian-participative
23
concept. This continuum has five points identified of alternative
styles of decision making:
1. Leader makes the decisions alone
2. Leader makes the decisions alone and adopts a formal method of
communicating the result
3. Prior consultation is used, but the decision is made by the leader
A. Decision is jointly made by the leader and the subordinate
5. Leader delegates the decision to the subordinate
The locus of control moves from the leader alone to the subordinate
alone over the continuum. Of interest is that point 2 suggests a one-
way communication process is used to impose the result as in the Morse
and Reimer study, while point 4, in using the joint decision making
process, suggests a two-way communication process. Thus this continuum
suggests the operational means to sharing control is through the use
of alternative communication processes.
Heller reports that managers in general cited the reasons for usin^
participative methods to be, in decreasing order of importance; im-
proving the technical quality of decisions, increasing the satisfaction
of subordinates, improving the understanding of the problem, training
and facilitating change. In particular, managers in his study con-
sidered the probable results of using joint decision making to be
improved decision quality and improved morale on the part of subordi-
9 /
nates, but it would take longer.
Heller makes an interesting observation by relating the manager's
^^Ibid., p. 27. 24];bid., pp. 74-75,
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cited reasons for using participative methods to the problem of psycho-
logical versus objective participation raised in the French, Israel, and
As study. He notes that the connection between participatory practices
and satisfaction of subordinates and improvements in productivity is a
strong temptation for managers to manipulate such practices. Because
participation is easily counterfeited, and may not be detected, such
"psuedo"-participation may lead to higher morale and therefore higher
output. But Heller asserted that if managers use participation to
increase the technical quality of decisions, improve understanding of
the problem, or train subordinates, success does not depend on pro-
ducing a feeling of, or perceived, participation; success depends on
the activity of participation itself.^ While he does not specify the
precise nature of this activity, his definitions of power and influence
and his continuum suggest that it is communication.
The Vroom and Yetton Study
Vroom and Yetton developed a normative model for the use of par-
ticipative decision making techniques based on an extensive analysis
of leadership and managerial decision making similar to the Heller
study. Basing their analysis on participation as influence, the focus
of the model development is:
Given the existence of a property such as participation that
varies from high to low, it should be possible to define leader
behaviors representing clear alternative processes for making




^"Victor H. Vroom and Phillip W. Yetton, Leadership and Decision
Making (Pittsburgh, Pa: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973).
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each process affords the manager's subordinates.^
Vroom and Yetton developed a taxonomy of decision processes as the basis
for their model, which is displayed in figure 2-2. This figure sum-
marizes the alternative decision styles a manager may consider in addres-
sing a problem or decision situation.
The descriptions of the decision styles in figure 2-2 crystallize
the use of the communication process and the extent of communication
within each style. The group problem column suggests the use of a two-
way communication process involving the all channel network for the
All and subsequent styles. The CI style varies the number of indi-
viduals in the network at any one time. The AI style, if used, suggests
that the one-way process using the wheel network would be used if it
were necessary to communicate the decision to subordinates. Moving
down the column also finds the manager increasingly involved as both
sender and receiver in the communication process with subordinates, and
importantly, the information transmitted in the process becomes speci-
fied. The information first concerns facts about the problem and then
ideas, suggestions, and alternative solutions concerning the problem
or decision.
Taken together, these studies concerning the concept of shared
control strongly suggest the use of one-way versus two-way communication
processes as the means to involve subordinates in the decision making
process with management. As seen earlier, these processes can be
depicted in terms of communication networks. Further, the Vroom and
Yetton taxonomy suggests variations of information exchanged within the




Fig. 2-2, Decision Styles Taxonomy
Group Problems Individual Problems
AI. You solve the problem or make the
decision yourself, using informa-
tion available to you at the time.
All. You obtain the necessary informa-
tion from your subordinates, then
decide the solution to the problem
yourself. You may or may not tell
your subordinates what the problem
Is in getting the Information from
them. The role played by your
subordinates in making the decision
is clearly one of providing the
necessary information to you,
rather than generating or evalua-
ting alternative solutions.
CI. You share the problem with the
relevant subordinates individu-
ally, getting their ideas and sug-
gestions without bringing them to-
gether as a group. Then you make
the decision, which may or may not
reflect your subordinates' influence,
CII. You share the problem with your
subordinates as a group, obtaining
their collective ideas and sugges-
tions. Then you make the decision,
which may or may not reflect your
subordinates' influence.
Gil. You share the problem with your
subordinates as a group. Together
you generate and evaluate alterna-
tives and attempt to reach agree-
ment (consensus) on a solution.
Your role is much like that of
chairman. You do not try to influ-
ence the group to adopt "your"
solution, and you are willing to
accept and implement any solution
which has the support of the entire
group.
AI. You solve the problem or make the
decision by yourself, using infor-
mation available to you at the time.
All. You obtain the necessary informa-
tion from your subordinate, then
decide on the solution to the problem
yourself. You may or may not tell
the subordinate what the problem
Is in getting the information from
him. His role in making the deci-
sion is clearly one of providing
the necessary information to
you, rather than generating or
evaluating alternative solutions.
CI. You share the problem with your
subordinate, getting his ideas
and suggestions. Then you make
a decision, which may or may not
reflect his influence.
GI. You share the problem with your
subordinate, and together you
analyze the problem and arrive
at a mutually agreeable solution.
DI. You delegate the problem to your
subordinate, providing him with
any relevant Information that you
possess, but giving him responsi-
bility for solving the problem by
himself. You may or may not re-




information variations appears appropriate. As these efforts were
field studies, it is not possible to unambiguously determine whether
the results obtained in these studies are due to either the variations
in the degree of shared control or to the variation in the nature and
extent of information exchanged within the joint decision making process,
Participative Budgeting Research
About the same time as the Coch and French study, Argyris assessed
the effects of budgets on employee attitudes in a field study of super-
visors in manufacturing companies, and concluded that:
Goals are more often accepted if the individual members can
come together in a group, freely discuss their opinions concerning
these goals and take part in defining the steps by which these
goals will be accomplished .^o (emphasis added)
The discussion of opinions and participation in definition of steps
by employees suggest that a communication process is central to
Argyris 's conclusion. However communication received only limited
attention in subsequent participative budgeting studies.
The Becker and Green Participation Concept
Becker and Green proposed a conceptual framework for the investi-
gation of participative budgeting. 2" They took the French, Israel and
As definition of participation as influence as a basis to consider
participation as:
not a single-value variable, but rather a concept encompassing
several explicit variables. . . It is conceptually divisible into
process and content. Process is the act of participating with the
TO
Chris Argyris, "Human Problems with Budgets," Harvard Business
Review (January-February, 1953): pp. 108-109
29Selwyn Becker and David Green, Jr.,




possible consequences stemming from the act; content is the
discussion topic toward which are generated the positive or nega-
tive attitudes. The act of participating enables the participants
to know one another, communicate and interact with one another
—
conditions that can easily lead to increased cohesiveness . It
is clear the content of participation should be directed toward
setting a new goal with discussion of a sort sufficient to enable
each participant to realize that the goal is accepted by others
in the group. ^^ (emphasis added)
Thus, they consider the participation act as one enabling communication
and they theorize that the effects of this process are cohesiveness
and, if properly directed, participant acceptance of the goals dis-
cussed as the content of the process.
A controversy in the literature developed regarding the Becker and
Green choice of the participation-as-influence approach on which to
base their concept. They stated:
We do not wish to enter the controversy over the relative
merits of various styles of leadership but merely wish to point
to some possible limitations on the use of participation. In order
to be successful, the participants must participate, that is, must
have influence on the adopted decisions. If participation can be
achieved under more or less authoritarian conditions, it is likely
to be effective, just as it can be undermined (by disregard) with
democratic leadership. Only management itself can determine whether
it is worthwhile to initiate or continue participation. . .
Thus, they suggest that participation as Influence may be limited by
the leadership styles which were seen earlier in the Heller and the Vroora
and Yetton studies. However, they chose not to incorporate the impli-
cations of these studies in the development of their conceptual frame-
work.
Stedry criticized Becker and Green for this lack of consideration
for leadership styles. He asserted that it seemed almost impossible to
advocate participation without entering the leadership controversy and
cited the results from several of the studies discussed above as support




Viewing the positions of Stedry and Becker and Green in terms
of a communication process suggests that to some extent they are on
common ground, and their real differences are empirical questions. The
shared control studies suggested that alternative leadership styles
can be viewed as involving one-way versus two-way communication
processes, and the influence studies involve communication as per-
suasion which requires a two-way communication process. Thus, Stedry 's
argument appears correct to the extent that the two-way process is
required for a leadership style that allows participation. On the
other hand, the shared control studies suggested that the degree of
control can be varied in terms of the information exchanged within
this two-way process. To the extent the exchange of information allows
the perception of influence by subordinates, the Becker and Green
contention that participation as influence may be achievable under
alternative leadership styles also appears valid when viewed in this
context.
Given the common ground of the two-way communication process,
the relative merits of the Becker and Green hypotheses versus Stedry 's
counterarguments appear to be an empirical issue. However, Birnberg
and Nath point out that the Becker and Green concept has gone un-
tested in a budgeting context. -^-^ Further, though their concept
^^Andrew C. Stedry, "Budgeting and Employee Behavior: A Reply,"
Journal of Business XXVII, no. 2 (1964): 195-202.
^-^Jacob G. Birnberg and Raghu Nath, "Implications of Behavioral




suggests a communication process approach, subsequent empirical
efforts have primarily utilized the influence or shared control
approaches of the prior participation research.
The Swieringa and Moncur Studies
Swieringa and Moncur conducted two studies of manager behavior
of interest. Their first study did not deal directly with partici-
pative budgeting, but some of its aspects emerged from their analysis.
They conducted research on thirty branch bank managers to assess
relationships between manager's self-reported budget related behavior
and selected attitude, position, size, and performance measures. Uti-
lizing Likert-scaled responses to a sixty-five item measure, the
researchers found four factors accounting for AA percent of the variance
in reported behavior. These factors were labeled as different budget
behaviors: the active participant; the involved exponent; the
reluctant victim; and the unconcerned recipient.-^
The questionnaire items loading high on the active participant
factor in this study are of particular interest. Persons labeled as
active participants saw themselves as influential in the activities
and interactions associated with the budget process. Among the speci-
fic items comprising the active participant factor were:
I participate with other brand managers and/or home office
people in preparing budgets.
3^Robert J. Swieringa and Robert H. Moncur, "The Relationship
Between Managers' Budget-Oriented Behavior and Selected Attitude,
Position, Size, and Performance Measures," Empirical Resear ch in
Accounting: Selected Studies 1972 , supplement to Journal of Accounting
Research X (1972): 193-209 (hereinafter referred to as "The Relation-





Home office people ask me about any special factors I wish
to have considered in the budget being prepared.
New budgets are introduced in carefully planned programs which
include talks or printed materials.
Special problems I mention to budget people receive special
treatment in the new budget.
My superior listens to my problems in budget matters.
My superior or home office budget people listen to my opinion
on budget matters.
I discuss budget items with my superiors or with home office
people whenever problems occur. -^^
Given that these items all loaded relatively high on the active parti-
cipant factor, the items suggest an association between perceived par-
ticipation and communication. The first item specifically mentions
participation, and all the others deal with various aspects of communi-
cation.
Swieringa and Moncur found that active participant behavior was
significantly related with confidence in the organization, job satis-
faction, job tension, and time spent with other managers; signifi-
cantly negatively related with time spent with customers; and unrelated
to any of the performance measures utilized in the study.
In their second study, Swiering and Moncur investigated the
effects of participative budgeting on manager behavior, where the
managers were subordinates of higher level managers.-'' While this
study was an exploratory and broad ranged effort, the company variable
35 Ibid ., pp. 206-207. 36ibid.
^^Robert J. Swieringa and Robert H. Moncur, Some Effects of
Participative Budgeting on Managerial Behavior (New York: National
Association of Accountants, 1975).
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utilized by the researchers as a surrogate for alternative budgeting
systems and their organizational contexts is of particular interest.
In describing budgeting systems, Swieringa and Moncur assert:
Companies differ dramatically in both the amount and form
of the participation and influence they afford their operating
managers in the budgeting process. First, near the low end of
the participation scale are the so-called autocratic methods
in which the top management of a company sets operating budgets
by itself, using information generally available to it at
that time.
Secondly, there are methods in which top management affords
operating managers some limited participation in budget setting.
For example, even though it maintains ultimate budget setting
responsibility, top management may obtain information from
operating managers, solicit their ideas and suggestions, and/or
even ask them to generate and evaluate alternatives. Top manage-
ment may, of course, vary the extent to which it allows these
Inputs to influence the budgets it sets.
Finally, near the high end of the participation scale are
the so-called group decision methods in which top management
shares budget setting responsibility with operating managers;
that is, they generate and evaluate alternatives together and
attempt to reach agreement and consensus on the budgets set.^°
A comparison of this scale with the Vroom and Yetton taxonomy dis-
played in figure 2-2 and discussed earlier reveals a striking resem-
blance. The scale in effect casts the taxonomy in a participative
budgeting context. Thus, the alternative communication networks and
the variation of information transmitted found in the taxonomy surface
in this participation scale as well.
While this second Swieringa and Moncur study viewed budgeting in
a broad context, it does suggest the central role of communication in
budgeting. However, the alternative communication processes and
variations in information exchanged suggested by their participation
38 Ibid., pp. 21-22,
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scale went largely unexplored in this study.
The Milani Study
Milan! conducted a field study of relationships between partici-
pation in budgeting and foreman performance and attitudes toward the
company and the job. He defined participation as the extent to which
a subordinate is allowed to select his own courses of action. How-
ever, his measure was similar to Vroom's as it utilized a five point
Likert scale for each of the following questions: the foreman's
perception of the portion of the budget set; kind of reasoning pro-
vided by superiors when budget revisions occurred; frequency of budget
related discussions held with the superior; amount of influence on
the final budget; and the importance of the contribution to the budget.
These questions suggest that, just as Vroom earlier, Milani may have
been assessing the effects of communication on perceived influence.
He found weak associations between performance and perceived influence,
and stronger associations between the company and job-related atti-
tudes and perceived participation. ^^
39Ken Milani, "The Relationship of Participation in Budget
Setting to Industrial Supervisor Performance and Attitudes: A Field
Study," The Accounting Review L, no. 2 (1975): 274-28A (hereinafter
referred to as "Participation in Budget Setting").
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The Foran and DeCoster Study
Foran and DeCoster conducted a laboratory study of the effects of
participation, authoritarianism, and feedback on subjects' atti-
tudes about performance standards that they helped to establish. '^^
This research explicitly attempts to investigate the variation of
alternative communication processes in terms of communication net-
works. The approach is based on their view that:
The amount of participation and individual influence an
employee can exert is limited by the number of open communica-
tion channels available. In this respect, channeled and non-
channeled communication networks provide two forms of parti-
cipation. '^1
The researchers used the wheel network to simulate a hierarchical
organization and the all channel networic to simulate an organization
where all members could freely communicate. Thus this study attempted
to compare the effects of two alternative communication processes
as suggested by the studies comprising the shared control approach.
Foran and DeCoster found support for their hypotheses that
feedback about participation in general would reduce dissonance or
incongruence about the participative session and its outcomes, and
favorable feedback about participation would result in greater com-
mitment to the performance standards set. However, they found no
significant effects related to the independent variables of communica-
tion networks or the personality variable of authoritarianism.^'^
^^Michael Foran and Don T. DeCoster, "An Experimental Study of
the Effects of Participation, Authoritarianism and Feedback on Cogni-
tive Dissonance in a Standard Setting Situation," The Accounting
Review XL IX, no. A (1974): 751-762.
Allbid., p. 753. A2ibid., pp. 761-762.
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The absence of any significant effects due to the alternative
communication networks, on its face, suggests that the Foran and
DeCoster hypothesis that the wheel network is a constraint on partici-
pation is not supported, and thus contradicts the suggestion of the
studies relating to shared control. However, the prior research
suggests the wheel network is a no-participation condition whereby
the decision is imposed through a one-way communication process. Foran
and DeCoster note that their study actually allowed a psuedo-parti-
cipation condition to occur in their wheel network, since the same
variation in feedback was provided subjects in this network as in the
all channel condition. ^-^ Thus, the wheel become a two-way process and
the only difference to the subjects was the written communication
concerning feedback in the wheel versus verbal in the all channel.
Accordingly, the study failed to effectively vary the two alternative
communication processes, and thus the absence of significant differ-
ences is not surprising.
The Cherrington and Cherrington Study
Cherrington and Cherrington reported a study that attempted to
operationalize participation on a control dimension. In their view
one of the most important dimensions of budget participation is the
amount of control which participants exercise in the formation of a
budget. The researchers conducted a laboratory study to assess
^^ ibid ., pp. 761-762.
^'^David J. Cherrington and J. Owen Cherrington, "Appropriate
Reinforcement Contingencies in the Budgeting Process," Empirical
Research in Accounting: Selected Studies 1973 , supplement to the
Journal of Accounting Research XI (1973): 225-256.
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the independent variables of budget participation as control and rein-
forcement contingencies on subject satisfaction and performance.
The study utilized undergraduate business students in four person
groups on a paper construction task. Prior to the task, each group
was given facts concerning the nature of the task. The groups were
then randomly assigned to one of four conditions varying from one
extreme of no control to the other of total participant control:
1. Imposed - the performance standard the group was expected to
achieve was imposed on the group by the experiment "supervisor"
2. Lenient - the performance standard the group was to achieve was
set by the supervisor at an easily attainable level. The group
submitted estimates of the standard until the easy standard was
met or exceeded
3. Pseudo-participation - same conditions as lenient, except the
standard was difficult to achieve
h. Group-based - same conditions as lenient, except the first standard
estimate the group submitted was accepted, regardless of the
level of difficulty "^5
Thus the locus of control shifted from the supervisor in conditions 1
through 3 to the group in condition 4, rather than varying across
conditions, since the supervisor had total (prior) control in condi-
tions 1 through 3 and no control whatsoever in condition 4 concerning
the impact of the group estimate on the standard to be achieved.
Cherrington and Cherrington reported significant results for
the budget control variable on both the number estimated and the number
actually made of items in the paper construction task. For the number
estimated, the psuedo-participation condition was highest, followed
in order by the group based and lenient conditions.^" However,
45 Ibid., pp. 235-236. ^^ibjd., pp. 237-241
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Hofstedt criticized the experimental design at length, particularly
the experimental variation of the control dimension. In his view,
the interpretation of the experimental findings was severely limited
by the inadequacies of the design. ^^
Despite the deficiencies of the Cherrington and Cherrington study,
it does indicate an operational means to expand the sharing of
control between the two extremes on Heller's continuum of no control
and total subordinate control in a budgeting context. The study
effectively varied the one-way versus the two-way communication
process, and further, it provided the subjects the facts concerning
the problem as suggested by All and subsequent group decision styles
in the Vroom and Yetton taxonomy.
Conclusions
The preceding review of the research indicates that, in general,
a communication process approach is appropriate to investigate parti-
cipative budgeting questions. The specific suggestions of the research
are summarized below as the basis for the approach taken to the investi-
gation of participation bugeting questions in this study.
Studies related to participation as influence suggest that
persuasion as communication intended to influence choice of attitudes
or behaviors may provide the explicit linkage between participation
activity and subordinate influence on decisions made. Thus the
approach of this study provides a basis of the attributes of
^'Thomas R. Hofstedt, "Discussion of Appropriate Reinforcement
Contingencies in the Budgeting Process," Empirical Research in
Accounting: Selected Studies 1973
,
supplement to Journal of Accounting
Research XI (1973): 257-266.
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effective communication required by persuasion to develop a partici
pative budgeting model. The budget is established as the specified
purpose of participation, the nature of the information transmitted
is specified in the budgeting situation as the basis for effective
message construction, and the two-way communication process is
incorporated in the model to allow for interstimulation between
participants.
Studies related to participation as shared control suggest that
a two-way communication process is the means to Involve subordinates
in decision making, and the variation in shared control is accomplished
through the nature and extent of information exchanged within the two-
way process. Thus the approach of this study Incorporates the
information variations suggested by the prior research to specify the
nature of the information transmitted in the budgeting situation.
The two-way communication process suggested by the shared control
studies is consistent with the influence studies.
The Becker and Green research suggests a communication approach
to participation in budgeting and hypothesizes goal acceptance as an
outcome of subordinate involvement in the process. Thus their parti-
cipation concept is incorporated in the model of the study, and their
hypotheses are examined to provide the basis for an experimental test
of the model.
The next chapter reports the development of the participative
budgeting model based on this approach and the hypotheses drawn from




THE MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a participative
budgeting model and to construct a set of hypotheses concerning its
effects in terms of a communication process approach. The develop-
ment is based on the suggestions of prior participation-related
research and incorporates appropriate research from communication
theory to structure the communication process components and rela-
tionships in the model. The hypotheses are constructed from the Becker
and Green research in conjunction with studies in communication.
These hypotheses concern the question of whether more favorable atti-
tudes toward the budget result from participation in budgeting and
the question of how such attitudes result from this participation.
The Participative Budgeting Model
This section develops the model of the study in terms of a com-
munication process. Several underlying concepts are first discussed
to clarify the concept of participative budgeting used to develop the
model. These concepts are observational or empirically valid in the
sense that, as Kaplan phrases it, "they lend themselves to easy and
confident verifications."-*- The development of the model incorporates
Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry; Methodology for
Behavioral Science (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), p. 54.
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the appropriate operational aspects of these concepts.
Underlying Concepts
The Budget
The budget is top management's written quantitative plan for the
allocation of resources to attain organizational objectives for a
given time period. Kohler's Dictionary for Accountants defines the
budget as:
A financial plan serving as a pattern for and control over
future costs; any estimate of future costs; a systematic plan
for the utilization of resources.
Similarly, Hanson views the budget as a formal statement by management
of its plans for a given time period which will be used as a guide
o
during that period.
Imbedded within this view are control and motivational issues.
Stedry discusses Kohler's definition, noting:
Implicit within the definition is a plan indicating require-
ments at some future date to provide information for subsequent
decisions and possible guiding them; and control criteria of cost
or performance which will be compared with actual data or opera-
tions, thus facilitating evaluations and possibly encouraging or
even enforcing some measures of efficiency. These separate func-
tions need not be mutually exclusive nor, in practice, is it
unusual for both to be represented in a single document.^
Ronen and Livingstone consider that planning, control, and moti-
vational issues are inherent in budgets. They view the interrelation-
^Eric L. Kohler, Dictionary for Accountants (Ath ed .
,
Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970).
-^Ernest I. Hanson, "The Budget Control Function," The Accounting
Review XL I, no. 2 (1966): 239-2A3.
^Andrew C. Stedry, Budget Control and Cost Behavior (Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1960), p. 9.
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ships among these issues as reason for explicit consideration of moti-
vational issues in the planning and control processes.^
The Budgeting Process
The budgeting process is defined as the organizational planning
activities required to develop the budget. This view is a limited one,
as the general notion of budgeting encompases both planning and control
functions. The Accountants' Handbook terms budgeting as:
The act of intelligently planning future activities and
making regular measurements of the success with which those
plans are being carried out.
6
Becker and Green note that budgeting in the early 1900 's was viewed
primarily as an instrument of control, with techniques stemming from
governmental accounting practices. During the 1930 's the budget came
to be viewed as a financial plan as well. A simple budget cycle
evolved in that budgets were imposed, performance occurred, and the
comparison of performance against budget influenced the next budget.
The general view of budgeting thus involves the activities of the
budget cycle.
The present study is limited to the planning function due to the
complexity of the budgeting process suggested by the general view of
budgeting and the issues inherent in the use of budgets. However, this
limited view is not intended to imply that the motivational and control
^J. Ronen and J. L. Livingstone, "An Expectancy Theory Approach
to the Motivational Impacts of Budgets," The Accounting Review L, no. 4
(1975): 671-685.
/I
The Accountants' Handbook, Ath ed., ed. by Rufus Wixon (New York;
Ronald Press Company, 1961), p. 4-2.
^Becker and Green, "Budgeting and Employee Behavior," p. 393.
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issues are ignored in the planning function. Rather, this focus is
seen as a necessary initial step to allow an eventual systematic
exploration of these issues.
The Planning Function
The planning function is defined in A Statement of Basic
Accounting Theory . The statement views planning as primarily, if not
entirely, a decision making activity concerning choices between alter-
natives. Four stages are identified within the planning function:
recognizing and defining the problem; searching for alternative solu-
tions; evaluating the alternative solutions, and selecting the alterna-
Q
tive based on the results of evaluation.
The statement points out that each of the planning stages
requires information. For defining the process, information is required
to permit not only an awareness of its existence, but an understanding
of cause and effect. Searching for alternative solutions requires
information on the structure and processes involved in the particular
problem areas. Evaluating the alternatives is closely linked with
the search stage but involves more explicit and detailed information
concerning the effect of each alternative on the organization. The
selection of an alternative involves decision models which influence
the information needed throughout the planning process. The statement
also indicates that, while a range of problems may be encountered by
the planning function, the same stages should always be present in
American Accounting Association, A Statement of Basic Accounting
Theory (Sarasota, Fla. : American Accounting Association, 1966), p. 45.
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the approach to solving the problem. Thus budgeting as a planning
process should always involve these stages and require the associated
information.
Participation
The present analysis adopts the Becker and Green concept of
participation introduced in the previous chapter as:
Conceptually divisible into process and content. Process is
the act of participating with the possible consequences stemming
from the act. . . The act of participating enables the partici-
pants to know one another, communicate and interact with one
another.
. .
Content is the dicussion topic. -^^
This view of participation implies several participants, and as the
act enables communication and interaction to occur among these parti-
cipants, this process view clearly involves the opportunity for communi-
cation.
The Communication Process
McLeod and Chaffee note that although there are many defini-
tions of communication, almost all agree that at least two people must
be involved in it. Chambers states that communication as a physical
process takes place when signals are transmitted from a source to a
receiver through a channel linking the source with the receiver, and




10Becker and Green, "Budgeting and Employee Behavior," p. 396,
Hjack M. McLeod and Steven H. Chaffee, "Interpersonal Approaches




establishing in the mind of another what one has observed. '^ Thus, as
discussed in the previous chapter, communication involves the elements
of source, receiver, signal transmission, and channel.
The two-way communication process, also discussed in the previous
chapter, allows for the persons in the process to alternate between
sender and receiver roles, and thus communicate with each other. By
contrast, the one-way process maintains persons in sender or receiver
roles, with no provision for alternation or feedback. -'-^ Thus the two-
way process is necessary for interactive communication to occur.
A Participative Budgeting Concept
Taken together, the above concepts establish the basis underlying
the model of the study. Budgeting is a decision making activity
directed toward the selection of the budget as a resource allocation
plan. The budget, as top management's plan, implies its involvement in
budgeting. The review in the previous chapter established participa-
tion as subordinate involvement in decision making. Given budgeting
as a decision making activity, subordinate involvement in budgeting is
implied by a participation approach. Thus, the participants in the
process are management and subordinates, and to the extent they effec-
tively communicate with each other concerning the budget, the basic
elements of an interactive communication process are defined in a
budgeting context. Thus participative budgeting is defined as an
1 o
Chambers, Accounting, Evaluation, and Economic Behavior
,
pp. 166-167.
13This view assumes communication is only occurring in one mode,
such as verbal or written. In an interpersonal setting, nonverbal com-




interactive or two-way communication process involving management and
subordinates in the planning function to develop the budget.
This concept specifies the budget as the purpose of the communi-
cation and provides for interstimulation between management and sub-
ordinates. Thus this concept provides for two of the attributes of
effective communication as persuasion suggested by the participation
as influence studies. Further, the interactive communication activity
corresponds to the Becker and Green act or process of participation,
and the budget related communication corresponds to their content
of participation. The operational aspects of this participative
budgeting concept suggested by those underlying it are incorporated
in the model of the study discussed below.
The Model of the Study
Given the underlying participative budgeting concept, the model
development specifies the roles of the participants and incorporates
the informational requirements of the planning function in this inter-
active communication process to establish a proposed operational model.
The role specification in the two-way communication process is the
means suggested by the shared control research to involve subordinates
in the decision making process and the information requirements relate
to the means suggested by this research to vary the sharing of control.
The information requirements also provide the basis for effective mes-
sage construction as the third attribute of communication as persuasion
suggested by the influence research.
The Bales and Strodtbeck group problem solving model from com-
munication research is used to aid the specification of participant
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roles and varying information requirements.-'-'^ This model is used to
recast the planning function stages as phases and the information
requirements as messages or interactions. Then the model is related
to the Vroom and Yetton decision style taxonomy to specify the parti-
cipant roles.
Phases
The Bales and Strodtbeck model consists of three phases involving
variations in the nature and extent of interactions among group mem-
bers in a problem solving situation. These phases and the associated
interactions are:
Orientation - In this phase it is assumed that each member of
the group has some relevant facts about the problem to be solved.
In addition, however, each member has some degree of ignorance and
uncertainty about the problem solving situation. Thus, the phase
of orientation entails the distribution of information among the
members. Interactions specifically involve asking for and receiving
information.
Evaluation - In this phase, it is assumed that members will
attempt to harmonize differences in opinions and interests with the
purpose of reaching a solution. Interactions involve expressing
feelings, giving opinions, and developing an analysis.
Control - Directional interactions occur at this phase. Inter-
actions designed to pressure members into line and toward a group
decision are common. Ideas, suggestions, and possible alterna-
tives are weighed and ranked in terms of the group's task.-^-*
These phases correspond closely to the stages of the planning
function. The orientation phase corresponds to the first planning
stage of recognizing and defining the problem. The evaluation phase
^'^Robert F. Bales and Fred L. Strodtbeck, "Phases in Group





includes the second and third stages in planning; searching for, and
evaluating, alternative solutions. As noted earlier, the second and
third planning stages are closely linked by information requirements.
The control phase corresponds to the final planning stage of alterna-
tive selection. Thus, these phases are considered to represent the
planning function in the model.
Messages
The nature of the discussion of interactions within each phase
of the group problem solving model corresponds to the information
requirements of each stage of the planning function. In terms of a
budgeting situation, interactions in the orientation phase concern the
information required to recognize and understand the resource alloca-
tion problem. The interactions in the evaluation phase focus on the
search for and evaluation of alternative resource allocation plans.
The control phase interactions weigh and rank the alternatives, thus
corresponding to the selection of a particular plan or budget. This
characterization of the discussion within each phase of the problem
solving model is considered an appropriate depiction of the budgeting
related information exchanged in the interactive communication between
participants in the planning phases to develop the budget.
Participant Roles
The participative budgeting concept involves both management and
subordinates in the decision-making activity of the planning function.
Since the budget which results is management's plan, as Becker and
Green point out, "only management itself can determine whether it is
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worthwhile to initiate or continue the participation segment of the
budget cycle. "-^" Thus, the management role is clearly the initiating
one.
This management role is suggested by certain alternatives from
the Vroom and Yetton taxonomy of decision styles which can be readily
linked to the Bales and Strodtbeck model phases. The appropriate alter-
natives, with the associated problem solving phase or phases in paren-
these, are:
Autocratic II - The manager obtains the necessary information
from the subordinates, then decides on the solution to the problem
himself. He may or may not tell the subordinates what the problem
is in getting the information from them. The role of subordi-
nates is clearly one of providing information, rather than gener-
ating or evaluating alternative solutions. (Orientation Phases)
Consultative II - The manager shared the problem with sub-
ordinates as a group, collectively obtaining ideas and suggestions.
Then the manager mayor may not be influenced by the subordinates
as he makes the decision. (Orientation and Evaluation Phase)
Group II - The manager shares a problem with the subordinates
as a group. Together, generation and evaluation of alternatives
occurs and the attempt is made to reach agreement (consensus)
on a solution. The manager does not try to influence the group
to adopt his decision. The group decision is accepted and imple-
mented. (Orientation, Evaluation, and Control Phases)
These decision style alternatives clearly provide the initiating role
for management. In addition, the nature of subordinate involvement
is specified in each alternative, and the information focus of each
alternative corresponds to those of the associated phase or phases.
Finally, and importantly, the alternatives allow for interactive com-
munication between management and subordinates.
The participants, their roles, the phases of the planning
16Becker and Green, "Budgeting and Employee Behavior," p. 401.
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function and the discussion topic within each phase are displayed in
figure 3-1 to depict the participative budgeting model. The model is
set within the general framework of the management functions of plan-
ning and control to clarify its relationships to other aspects of
the general budgeting process not considered in this study.
In figure 3-1 the management functions of planning and control
are drawn from A Statement of Basic Accounting Theory . •^'^ The solid
arrows in the diagram depict the relationships that typically exist
in a managerial accounting setting. The management and subordinate
information evaluation models and decision models depicted are assumed
to exist and operate in a participative budgeting situation. However,
they are not directly considered in this study. Also, the control
phase of the group problem solving process is labeled as joint decision
making to allow the term control to retain its usual meaning as a
management function in an accounting context.
The shaded area contains the participative budgeting model.
The dashed arrows depict the nature and extent of interactive communi-
cation that may be initiated by management over the phases of the plan-
ning function and hence the extent of allowed subordinate involvement
in the budgeting process. As the decision style labels on the dashed
arrows joining the phases indicate, subordinate involvement in a particu-
lar phase implies involvement in previous phases. For example,
involvement in the evaluation phase means involvement occurs in the
orientation phase as well. The interactive communication between manage-
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ment and subordinates is depicted by the two-way communication channel
joining them in each phase. In a multi-person setting, this interactive
communication occurs through an all-channel network.
The participative budgeting model components and relationships
could each be systematically examined as well as the overall operation
of the model itself to assess the activity and effects of the inter-
active communication over the planning function phases. Further,
these studies could be conducted over a broad range of organizational
settings. Given that the model itself is only a proposed operational
one at this point, however, it is considered appropriate to conduct a
limited test of its operation and effects. Thus, the empirical effort
of this study relies on the well established concepts underlying the
model as a basis to expect its mechanical operation, and focuses on
the effects of the interactive communication on subordinate attitudes
toward the budget. Thus, the hypotheses deal with the linkage
between participation and attitudes in the assumption underlying the
rationale for the use of participative budgeting, and as seen in the
next section, relate directly to the Becker and Green participation
concept underlying the model.
Hypotheses of the Study
In this section, hypotheses concerning the effects of the interac-
tive communication in participative budgeting are constructed as the
basis for an empirical test of the model. The hypotheses are based
on the Becker and Green research which proposes several attitude
related outcomes from participation in the decision-making process.
Their outcomes are analyzed in terms of attitude change models drawn
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from consistency theory in communication research to establish the
theoretical propriety for whether favorable subordinate attitudes
toward the budget can be expected to result from participation in the
budgeting process. Then, a recent communication effects models related
to consistency theory is discussed and utilized to hypothesize how
subordinate attitudes toward the budget may result from participative
budgeting.
Attitudes
The Becker and Green outcomes involve subordinate attitudes
toward each other as well as toward the budget. Thus, these outcomes
are somewhat complex and are beyond the scope of the empirical investi-
gation conducted in this study. However, they are fully analyzed con-
ceptually in terms of the effects of an interactive communication
process below. This analysis demonstrates that the focus on subordi-
nate attitudes toward the budget, though limited, is appropriate for
the present study.
The Becker and Green Outcomes
As discussed earlier, the Becker and Green participation concept
may be viewed in terms of an interactive communication process which
they regard as directed toward the content of management's goals. In
the discussion below these goals are considered to be incorporated
into management's plan for the allocation of resources as the budget.
Becker and Green reviewed the Lewin studies and concluded:
The group discussion method allows the group to assess the
standards of all other members so that, if the group apparently




Viewing cohesiveness as individual attraction to the group or the amount
of 'we' feeling generated as a result of association with others, they
propose the following conditions as a definition for successful partici-
pation:
(1) providing the opportunity for enough interaction so that
a cohesive group can emerge and (2) directing the interaction so
that each participant's analysis of the content will enable him
to accept as his own those goals adopted by the group.-*-"
This definition serves as the basis for their expected outcomes from
participation.
Becker and Green consider that the process, or act of partici-
pating, leads to cohesiveness, and that participant analysis of the
content, or discussion topic of management's goals, results in the
generation of positive or negative attitudes toward these goals. These
results interact to produce one of the following outcomes:
1. High cohesiveness with positive attitudes (goal acceptance), a
condition of maximally efficient motivation
2. Low cohesiveness with positive attitudes, an unlikely, but possible
condition that probably would result in efficient performance
3. Low cohesiveness and negative attitudes, a condition resulting
from unsuccessful participation that would tend to depress pro-
duction within the limits of the integrity or conscience of each
individual
A. High cohesiveness and negative attitudes, a condition most condu-
cive to a production slowdown ^^
The first outcome, the successful participation result, displays several
linkages of the assumption underlying the rationale for the use of parti-
1 R
Becker and Green, "Budgeting and Employee Behavior," p. 396.
l^Ibid., p. 397. ^^ Ibid . , p. 397.
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cipation. In particular, the linkage between participation and
high cohesiveness and positive attitudes is assumed to lead to in-
creased motivation.
The Becker and Green description of these outcomes indicate the
relative desirability and, to some extent, the relative probability
of each. Each outcome is a particular combination of participant
attitudes toward each other and participant attitudes toward the
goals or budget. Thus, communication research in the area of con-
sistency theory dealing with attitude change is considered appro-
priate to establish a theoretical basis from which to ascertain
whether these attitude interactions would likely result from parti-
cipation as interactive communication. A brief overview of consis-
tency concepts is provided below a background to analyze these atti-
tude outcomes.
Consistency Concepts
Zajonc discusses several concepts that, taken together, provide
an appropriate means to analyze the effects of communication on atti-
21
tudes. The concepts of interest are the balance principle of Heider,
the strain toward symmetry concept of Newcomb, and the congruity
principle of Osgood and Tannenbaum. Common to these concepts is the
notion that a person tends to organize his thoughts, beliefs, atti-
tudes, and behaviors in meaningful ways.
Heider developed the balance principle in terms of the attitu-
^-'-Robert B. Zajonc, "The Concepts of Balance, Congruity and
Dissonance," Public Opinion Quarterly XXIV, no. 2 (1960): 280-296,
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dinal relations thought to exist between two persons and an object.
The principle assumes that the first person P has attitudes toward a
second person and toward the object X that are either favorable
or unfavorable. If all three attitudes are favorable, or if any two
are unfavorable and the third is favorable, a condition of balance
is said to exist. Imbalance exists if all three attitudes are
unfavorable, or if any two attitudes are favorable and the third is
unfavorable. The balance principle holds that an unbalanced situa-
22tion produces psychological tension to restore balance. Figure 3-2
shows the possible balanced and unbalanced states for P that may
exist.
Fig. 3-2. Balanced and Unbalanced States
Balanced States
yV A
























F. Heider, "Attitudes and Cognitive Organization," Journal
of Psychology XII (19A6) : 197-112.
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The balance principle does not consider either the strength of
the attitudes held in the situation or the direction of any attitude
change. Also, the means used to restore balance are not specified.
However, this balance paradigm was utilized by both Newcomb and Osgood
and Tannenbaum.
Newcomb based his approach to the study of interpersonal rela-
tionships on the unbalanced states in Heider's concept and specified
communication as a potential means to achieve balance. He postulates
that in unbalanced states these is a "strain toward symmetry" or com-
munality. He considered P as oriented toward both and X, and the
degree of strain as a function of any discrepancy between attitudes
held by P toward and X. This strain may be reduced through com-
munication between P and 0. This concept involves both persons
directly and hence suggests that relationships between persons rela-
23tive to the object may be affected by communication.
Osgood and Tannenbaum developed their congruity principle as
an extension of the balance principle by utilizing communication as a
means to achieve balance. This principle predicts the direction and
extent of attitude change when P, holding attitudes or evaluations
concerning and X, is confronted with an assertion (that is a message
or signal) made by regarding X. This congruity principle holds
that any changes in the evaluations of and X held by P are always in
the direction of increased congruity within the prevailing frame of
reference. That is, if the assertion is congruent with present
Theodore M. Newcomb, "An Approach to the Study of Communica-
tive Acts," Psychological Review LX (1953): 393-404.
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attitudes, a stable or balanced state exists. If the assertion is
incongruent, imbalance exists, and either or both attitudes will
change as necessary toward congruency and balance. Zajonc notes
there is a good deal of empirical evidence supporting the predictions
of the congruity principle.'^-'
Analysis of Outcomes
The outcomes of Becker and Green can be readily cast in terms
of the balance paradigm for analysis. In a simplified context, if
P is one subordinate, is another subordinate, and X is the set of
management's goals or budget, then attitudes are depicted as follows.
The attitudes held by P toward are symbolized by P -> 0, the atti-
tudes held by P toward X as P -^ X, and the attitudes held by toward
X as 0->X. These relationships create the balance paradigm components
viewed from P's perspective.
The possible directions of each attitude are drawn from the
Becker and Green description of the outcomes. High cohesiveness
,
or individual attraction to the group, suggests positive attitudes
held by P toward 0, depicted now as P -^ 0. Low cohesiveness suggests
P ^ 0. Becker and Green discuss participant goal acceptance directly
in terms of positive attitudes, depicted as P -^ X, and -> X, and
depressed production in terms of negative attitudes, or P -> X and
^ X.
^Charles E. Osgood and Percy H. Tannenbaum, "The Principle
of Congruity in the Prediction of Attitude Change," Psychological
Review LXI I (1955): 42-55.




The attitude components and possible directions are summarized
in figure 3-3. Each attitude component and its direction in the
balance paradigm within the cells of the matrix correspond to the
process-content interaction forming the cell. Then, in terms of the
balance principle the state of each outcome is classified as either
balanced or unbalanced. If a balanced state, the outcome is con-
sidered a valid possibility in terms of consistency theory. If an
unbalanced state, the outcome is considered unlikely and the use of
the congruity principle theoretically determines the direction of
attitude changes necessary to achieve a balanced state.
Cell A of figure 3-3 depicts the outcome of low cohesiveness
and negative attitudes as unbalanced. Thus it is an unlikely end
result from participation. According to the congruity principle,
communication should create a change in either or both attitudes,
from P's perspective, to a positive direction to achieve balance.
If P -> changes, increased cohesiveness results. If P ^ X changes,
goal acceptance occurs.
Cell B depicts the outcome of low cohesiveness and positive
attitudes as unbalanced. Accordingly, it is also considered unlikely
as an end result of participation. As Becker and Green state that
this outcome is unlikely, their viewpoint is confirmed by consis-
tency theory. If P -> changes, increased cohesiveness results, and
a P -> X change results in a shift to goal rejection in terms of the
predicted changes possible from the congruity principle for this out-
come.
The consistency prediction that the low cohesiveness outcomes
depicted in Cells A and B are unlikely supports the Becker and Green
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Fig. 3-3. The Becker and Green Process-Content Interactions





























































view that increased cohesiveness can easily result from participation.
Thus, to the extent the predictions of consistency theory hold, the
examination of questions related to subordinate attitudes in parti-
cipative budgeting need not be primarily concerned with whether more
favorable subordinate attitudes toward each other result.
Cell C depicts the high cohesiveness and negative attitude out-
come as a balanced state. Therefore it is a likely result in terms
of consistency theory. Shaw summarizes the empirical evidence sup-
porting this possibility . "^^ Reported studies generally demonstrate
that high cohesive groups are much more effective in achieving goals
they set for themselves than are low cohesive groups. However, there
is no guarantee that the group goals are the same as management's.
Becker and Green note that this outcome is most conducive to a pro-
duction slowdown.
Cell D depicts the high cohesiveness and positive attitude out-
come as a balanced state. Therefore it is also a likely result. The
Cell D outcome is the successful participation condition, but it is
not clear whether it is more or less likely than the outcome depicted
in Cell C. Thus, in contrast to subordinate attitudes toward each
other, the questions related to subordinate attitudes toward the
budget, in terms of consistency theory predictions, appear to be the
primary concern. Given that both of the high cohesiveness outcomes
are balanced, the question becomes whether more or less favorable
subordinate attitudes toward the budget result from participative
Marvin E. Shaw, Group Dynamics: The Psychology of Small
Group Behavior
,




budgeting. Thus, this question is one addressed by the empirical
effort in this study.
The Becker and Green discussion does not specify the precise
nature of the subordinate attitudes toward the budget as their con-
ceptual development focuses on the linkage of goal acceptance with
increased aspiration levels. For this reason, attitudes toward the
budget are drawn from the research reviewed in the previous chapter.
Subordinate Attitudes Toward the Budget
The present study investigates whether the following subordi-
nate attitudes toward the budget are more favorable as a result of
participative budgeting; satisfaction with the budget, commitment
to the budget, and perceived correctness of the budget.
The satisfaction with the budget or other decisions made has
been the major attitude investigated in prior research. Heller noted
senior level managers reported satisfaction of their subordinates as
a major reason for the use of participation and the field studies
of Morse and Reimer, Vroom, Milani and Swieringa and Moncur all found
27
aspects of satisfaction positively related to participation.
Several laboratory studies of participation included satisfac-
tion as a dependent measure. Hoffman and Maier found individual
satisfaction was related to perceived influence on the outcomes of
9 7
Heller, Managerial Decision-Making ; Morse and Reimer, "Experi-
mental Change of a Major Organizational Variable;" Vroom, Some
Personality Determinants of the Effects of Participation ; Milani,
"Participation in Budget-Setting;" Swieringa and Moncur, "The






group decisions on several problem tasks. Cherrington and Cherring-
ton used a satisfaction measure to assess the results of their parti-
cipative budgeting experiment as well as a subsequent performance
measure.^" Foran and DeCoster utilized a satisfaction dimension in
their dependent measure. They developed a commitment factor includ-
irig the dimensions of willingness to change, perceived correctness,
and perceived satisfaction to assess the effects of participation
on acceptance of a standard. The satisfaction dimension achieved
the highest loading on the factor, but Foran and DeCoster found no
significant effects of the opportunity to participate in communi-
30
cation networks on the commitment dimension.
The subordinate commitment and perceived correctness attitudes
are drawn from an examination of the commitment factor in the Foran
and DeCoster research. Foran and DeCoster point out that the
limited number of observations in their study did not meet the recom-
mended test for the use of factor analysis and their test instrument
31
was new. This suggests that the satisfaction, perceived correct-
ness, and commitment dimensions of the factor may be viewed separately.
The question of whether more favorable subordinate attitudes
result from participative budgeting raises the question of how this
L. Richard Hoffman and Norman R. E. Maier, "Quality and
acceptance of problem solutions by members of homogeneous and hetero-
geneous groups," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology LXII,
no. 2 (1961): AOl-407.
29Cherrington and Cherrington, "Appropriate Reinforcement
Contingencies in the Budgeting Process."





phenomenon occurs. Becker and Green propose that a participant's
analysis of the content of the process will enable him to see that
the goal is accepted by the others in the group. As this content
consists of the information exchanged in the planning function phases,
the means to assess the effects of interactive communication on parti-
cipant analysis is discussed below. This analysis is then related to
the attitudes toward the budget.
Communication Effects on Subordinate Attitudes
Given the interactive communication of participative budgeting,
the McLeod and Chaffee coorientation model is considered appropriate
33to assess the effects of this communication. The essence of this
model is a series of relationships between individuals concerning
the object of communication and each other. This model is discussed
below in terms of the information exchanged in the phases of the
planning function. This discussion forms the basis to utilize the
coorientation relationships to hypothesize how subordinate attitudes
toward the budget result from the allowed interactive communication
in participative budgeting.
The Coorientation Model
The coorientation model expands the balance principle discussed
earlier to consider both individuals simultaneously. This expansion
allows the development of relationships between individuals that may
Becker and Green, "Budgeting and Employee Behavior," p. 397.
33





be affected by coramuncation between them.
Concept
The coorientation concept in a participative budgeting context
utilizes an object "X" as the budgeting situation, person "A" as
management, and person "B" as the subordinate. The description
changes the earlier balance paradigm labels of P and to A and B
since both persons are simultaneously considered in this model. The
management-subordinate relationship depicts the participants in the
budgeting process. Figure 3-4 presents a sequence of diagrams to
1 . u . 34outline the coorientation concept.
Diagram 1 in figure 3-4 depicts person A. A is assumed to have
the following perceptions in this budgeting situation. First, A
perceives facts or attributes concerning the budgeting situation X.
For example, A determines that $1,000 is available for operations
this period. Secondly, A perceives evaluations about the budgeting
situation facts. For example, A may think that $1,000 is insuffi-
cient for the coming period. Thirdly, A perceives facts or attri-
butes concerning the other person B. For example, A knows B is his
subordinate. Finally, A perceives evaluations about B. For example,
A thinks B is the poorest performing subordinate working for him. In
Diagram 1, the solid arrow from A to X contains the facts or attri-
butes and the evaluations concerning the budgeting situation. The
solid arrow from A to B contains the facts or attributes and evalua-
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The coorientation concept further assumes that A can estimate
the same perceptions that he holds In the budgeting situation for the
other person B. Diagram 1 shows these estimates of B's perceptions
by A as the dashed arrows.
Diagram 2 depicts person B. The same sequence of perceptions
Is assumed for B. Since both A and B are assumed to have perceptions
concerning the budgeting situation, A and B are said to be coorlented
to the budgeting situation. An observer outside this system sees
the budgeting situation and the participants as displayed in Diagram
3. The observed can see the status of the attributes and evaluations,
both actual and estimated, held by each participant, and importantly,
can see the effects of any changes in the system which may be created
by communication between A and B.
Measurement Model
McLeod and Chaffee construct a measurement model from the
coorientation concept based on matching certain of the attributes and
35
evaluations held by individuals as displayed in Diagram 3. The
relationships of interest for this study involve the attributes and
evaluations held by participants concerning the budget. Figure
3-5 displays this measurement model in terms of these budgeting
related attributes and evaluations.
The matchlngs or relationships in the measurement model are
considered variables. As shown in figure 3-5, the attributes of
^^Ibid., p. A84,
The consideration of participant attributes and evaluations
relative to each other may prove to be a means to assess cohesiveness
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each participant are characterized by what each thinks the facts of
the budgeting situation are. The evaluations are characterized by
how each thinks the resources available in the budgeting situation
should be allocated. The specific matchings or relationships as
variables are shown by the dual pointed arrows. The matching of A's
and B's attributes is considered understanding. The matching of A's
and B's evalutions is termed agreement. The matching of A's own
evaluation with his estimate of B's evaluation is considered con-
congruency for A. Congruency for B is constructed similarly. The
matching of A's estimate of B's evaluation with B's actual evaluation
is termed accuracy for A. Accuracy for B is constructed similarly.
The effects of communication on these attribute and evaluation
based relationships can be assessed by observing the state of these
relationships, exposing the system to communication, and measuring
the extent of any changes. In terms of the content of discussion
topics of the phases of the participative budgeting model, attributes
are the budgeting problem data discussed in the orientation phase,
evaluations are the alternative resource allocation plans identi-
fied and analyzed in the evaluation phase, and are also the basis for
an alternative selection in the joint-decision making phase. Thus,
to the extent effective communication occurs between management and
subordinates in the budgeting process, its effects on the partici-
pant attributes and evaluations can be measured in terms of any changes
in the coorientation measurement model relationships. Given the
explicit linkage between these relationships and the content of the
planning function phases, these coorientation measurements are con-
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sidered an appropriate means to assess participant analysis of that
content.
Participant Analysis of the Content
The effect of communication on participant analysis of the
content is hypothesized to occur in the phase or phases of the parti-
cipative budgeting model where the communication initiated by manage-
ment specifically relates to the attributes and evaluations comprising
the variables used to assess the participant analysis. The discussion
below outlines the specific changes hypothesized for each coorienta-
tion variable over the participative budgeting model phases. The
changes in the orientation phase are contrasted to a budgeting situa-
tion where no interactive communication is allowed by management.
The changes in the evaluation phase are then contrasted to those in
the orientation phase, and the changes in the joint decision making
phase to those in the evaluation phase.
Orientation
In the orientation phase, the content is the discussion topic of
the facts of the budgeting situation. Thus, the communication
initiated by management concerns attributes of the situation held by
participants. Understanding is the only coorientation variable based
on a matching of attributes, so participants may achieve a signifi-
cantly greater understanding of the budgeting situation in this phase
relative to individuals in a no participation setting. No changes
in the other variables are expected since these measures are based




McLeod and Chaffee note that the effect of communication on
understanding has not been investigated much in the literature. They
explain that some theorists view understanding as a criterion to
determine whether communication really occurred. That is, a measure
of understanding is used to determine whether one person really
established a signal in the mind of another. Others theorize that
understanding is necessary before other outcomes can result from com-
munication. If two persons share neither the same comparison objects
(that is, are not cooriented) nor the attributes concerning these
objects, other outcomes cannot result from communication.-^' This
intervening role of understanding is the view adopted in the present
study. That is, understanding is considered part of the subordinate
analysis of the content, rather than the end result of communication.
Evaluation
In the evaluation phase, the content is the discussion topic of
searching for and evaluating alternative resource allocation plans
for the budgeting situation. As discussed in the development of the
model, subordinate involvement in this phase implies that they were
also involved in orientation. Thus discussion concerning attributes
must occur prior to discussion of evaluations to be consistent with
the model, and accordingly, the results for understanding expected in
orientation should obtain in the evalution phase as well.
The variables of accuracy, congruency, and agreement are based
37
McLeod and Chaffee, "Interpersonal Approaches to Communica-
tion Research," p. A86.

68
on the appropriate matchings of actual and estimated evaluations
held by participants as depicted in Figure 3-5. To the extent
evaluations are discussed in this phase, changes in these variables
may result as both actual and estimated evaluations may be affected
by communication. On the other hand, McLeod and Chaffee argue that,
inasmuch as evaluations are the products of so many kinds of indi-
vidual experiences, they are unlikely to be changed very much by
38
communication alone.
Accuracy should be achievable through communication alone as
it requires only the exposure of evaluations. Wackman points out
that the research results of information exchange studies in small
groups support the proposition that communication increases
39
accuracy. Therefore a significant increase in accuracy in per-
ceiving other participant's evaluations is hypothesized to occur in
this phase relative to the orientation phase and a no participation
setting.
Congruency, in contrast to agreement and accuracy, is an
intrapersonal variable and the effects of communication on congruency
are indirect. Given these conditions, McLeod and Chaffee note that
40
the effects of communication on congruency are difficult to predict.
Since both actual evaluations toward the budgeting situation and the
estimates of the other participants' evaluations may change, the best
3^Ibid.
^^Daniel B. Wackman, "Interpersonal Communication and Coorien-
tation," American Behavioral Scientist XVI, no. 4 (1973): 544.
'^^McLeod and Chaffee, "Interpersonal Approaches to Communica-
tion Research," p. 485.
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prediction for congruency is from consistency theory. Any change
that occurs is toward balance or increased congruity relative to other
attitudes held. Thus, by itself, any specific change in congruency
is difficult to predict.
Agreement is not likely to result from communication alone,
since one or the other participants would have to change evaluations
if these were any disagreements initially. A substantial body of
communication research in the area of persuasion has assessed the
issues related to attitude change. As discussed in the previous
chapter, persuasion is communication intended to modify the intended
receiver's attitudes or behaviors in some predetermined manner.
Wackman notes that research in persuasion has dealt with factors
such as characteristics of source-receiver relations (for example;
credibility, power), characteristics of messages (for example; primacy,
recency, semantics, active-passive verbs), and characteristics of
receivers (for example; sex, intelligence).^-^ Thus, the potential
factors affecting agreement are many and complex. Accordingly,
increased agreement is hypothesized to result from the interactive
communication in this phase relative to the orientation phase and
the no participation setting to the extent one participant persuades,
or is persuaded by, another participant.
McLeod and Chaffee note that these evaluation based variables
are quite likely to be interrelated among themselves. Since
^-'-Wackman, "Interpersonal Communication and Coorientation ,
"
pp. 541-542.
^^Jack M. McLeod and Steven H. Chaffee, "The Construction of
Social Reality," The Social Influence Processes , ed. by J. Tedeschi
(Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1972), p. 64.
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communication may affect both the actual and estimated evaluations
held by participants, and if so, does it simultaneously, the simul-
taneous changes among the evaluation based variables are difficult
to predict. However, if any two move in given directions, the third
can be predicted, or if one is held constant, effects of communica-
tion on the other two can be determined. Thus, while a change in
congruency is difficult to predict by itself, increases in accuracy
and agreement will result in corresponding increase in congruency.
Joint Decision Making
In this phase, the content is the same discussion topic as in
the evaluation phase. Accordingly, the same results for understanding
accuracy, congruency, and agreement in the evaluation phase should
also occur in this phase.
The only difference between the joint decision making and
evaluation phases is that consensus is reached among participants
on the final budget. Consensus may be the capstone required in the
process to lead to significant changes in the evaluation based
variables if such changes do not result in the evaluation phase.
This effect is suggested by the Bales and Strodtbeck model descrip-
tion of the interactions in the control phase. On the other hand,
increases in these variables may not result as consensus is not
the same as agreement or congruency. Chaffee and McLeod point out
consensus may be conformity inasmuch as:




Conformity can take place for a variety of reasons, in-
cluding purely instrumental acquiescence without any corres-
ponding changes in cognitive structure. A person, in other
words, can publicly conform to a group standard without pri-
vately believing that what he is doing corresponds to a
veridical perception of reality. '^^
Thus while a person may publicly conform, the coorientation variables
of congruency and agreement may indicate that the individual's real
perceptions in the situation are quite different.
Subordinate Content Analysis and Budget Attitudes
Given the focus on subordinate attitudes toward the budget as
a hypothesized result of participation, the coorientation variables
that represent the subordinate analysis of the content of the parti-
cipative budgeting process are hypothesized to be positively related
to more favorable subordinate attitudes toward the budget. Since
the coorientation variables are explicitly linked to the appropriate
content of the planning function phases, if these significant rela-
tionships do emerge, a mechanism through which the more favorable
attitudes result is established by the coorientation model. The
more attributes are shared (evidenced by increased understanding),
the more common the basis among participants to proceed to evalua-
ting the situation. The more correctly a subordinate perceives other
participants' evaluations (increased accuracy); the more he thinks
the other participants evaluate the situation as he does (increased
congruency) ; and the more he in fact evaluates the situation the same
way as other participants (increased agreement), the more likely




he will think the budget is correct, be committed to it, and be
satisfied with it.
The hypotheses concerning whether more favorable subordinate
attitudes toward the budget and how these attitudes result from
participative budgeting are summarized in figure 3-6. Since the
coorientation variables are hypothesized to lead to the more favor-
able attitudes, the attitude results are hypothesized to occur in
the same phase or phases of the budgeting process as the changes in
the coorientation variables.
Summary
In this chapter, a general participative budgeting model is
developed in terms of an interactive communication process and
hypotheses are constructed as a basis for an empirical test of
some of the effects of this model operation. By incorporating the
suggestions of the prior research and basing the model on well
established budget related concepts, a strong conceptual foundation
is provided for consideration of the communication process as the
explicit linkage between the activity of participative budgeting and
its effects.
The model is seen as generally applicable to any budgeting
situation. While any particular situation is likely to be unique,
the budgeting model includes a well-known general approach to
analyzing the situation while the alternative decision styles within
the model afford management a flexible approach to initiating the
participation with subordinates to develop the budget.
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budgeting process are limited to questions concerning subordinate
attitudes toward the budget. This limited focus is due to the
inherent complexity of the budgeting process itself and the broad
range of questions suggested by the assumptions underlying the
rationale for the use of participative budgeting. Thus, the empiri-
cal effort of the study investigates only whether more favorable
subordinate attitudes toward the budget result from participative
budgeting and how such attitudes result from this process. Also,
this effort places major emphasis on the effects of interac-
tive communication on subordinate attitudes, and only limited attention
is given to the operation of interactive communication within the
participative budgeting model itself. Reliance is placed on the
established concepts of budget, budgeting, planning, and communi-
cation underlying the model. By contrast, the Becker and Green out-
comes based on their participation concept, which also underly the
model, have not been tested in a budgeting context. Also, Foran
and DeCoster found no significant effects related to communication
networks in their budgeting related study. Thus the effects of the
process are considered the appropriate focus.
In the next chapter, the experimental design and methodology '
establish a budgeting situation in terms of upper levels of an organi-
zation. The participant roles in the process are from the top two
levels of a typical organization structure. Since the budget is
top management's plan, top management is always involved as one
participant. Which subordinates to involve is ultimately a managerial
policy decision, but one which may be guided by the results of this
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and similar studies. As this experiment is the initial investi-
gation of the model, the logical approach is considered to limit the
participative budgeting process to two adjacent levels in a typical
organization. Then the conclusions of this study may be used as
the basis to develop further studies involving other levels to
provide results that may prove useful for managerial decisions con-




EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the design and
methodology employed in the experimental test of the hypotheses
developed in the previous chapter. The test involves laboratory
sessions with allowed interactive communication as the experimental
treatment in a simulated budgeting situation involving the upper
levels of an organization. The experimental procedures conform to
the elements of a post test only, control group design. Because
internal validity is of primary concern, the first section of the
chapter focuses on the validity requirements for the experimental
design and discusses those aspects of the methodology fulfilling
these requirements. The second section describes the sequence, pro-
cedures, materials, and instruments comprising the methodology of
the experiment.
Design
Since the purpose of the experiment is to test the hypotheses
of the study, the design must ensure that the interactive communica-
tion allowed as the experimental treatment in fact made the difference
in this specific situation. Campbell and Stanley note that internal
validity is the basic minimum without which any experiment is uninter-
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pretable. They identify eight classes of extraneous variables which,
if not controlled for, would otherwise produce effects confounded
with the effects of the experimental treatment. These variables
represent the effects of:
History, the specific events occurring between the first and
second measurement in addition to the experimental variable.
Maturation
,
processes within the respondents operating as a
function of the passage of time per se (not specific to the
particular events), including growing older, growing hungrier,
growing more tired, and the like.
Testing
,




in which changes in the calibration of a
measuring instrument or changes in the observers or scorers used
may produce changes in the obtained measurements.
Statistical regression
,
operating where groups have been
selected on the basis of extreme scores.
Biases resulting in differential selection of respondents
for the comparison groups.
Experimental mortality
,
or differential loss of respondents
from the comparison groups.
Selection-maturation interaction, or similar effects which
'
2
might be mistaken for the effects of the experimental variable.
The specific nature of each effect indicates that a proper
experimental treatment can minimize the effects of history; proper
subject selection and utilization can reduce the probability of
statistical regression and bias; an appropriate experimental task can
minimize the effects of maturation and mortality; and appropriate
iDonald T. Campbell and Julian C. Stanley, Experimental and
Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research (Chicago: Rand McNally




instrument design and use can minimize instrumentation and testing
effects. The discussion below details the aspects of the methodology
employed to minimize the possibility of these effects confounding any
obtained results.
The Experimental Treatment
The experimental treatment is participation as allowed interac-
tive communication. If this and only this communication occurs,
the observed results in the experiment can be explicitly linked to
the treatment. To ensure this linkage, a control group and treat-
ment groups are used in the experiment. The control group does not
receive the experimental treatment, that is, no participation as inter-
active communication occurs. Three groups receive an experimental
treatment. This treatment is given at three levels corresponding to
the phases of the participative budgeting process as follows:
Orientation - Individual members meet as a group and communi-
cation is allowed to the extent of discussing the facts of the
budgeting situation. The manager limits the communication to
these facts. Then the manager makes the resource allocation
decision and informs the subordinates of the budget decision
made.
Evaluation - Individual members meet as a group and communi-
cation is allowed to the extent of discussing both the facts of
the budgeting situation and individual evaluations concerning
alternative resource allocations. The manager limits the com-
munication to these topics. Then the manager makes the resource
allocation decision and informs the subordinates of the budget
decision made.
Joint Decision Making - In addition to the communication
allowed on the topics at the evaluation level, the group at
this level jointly makes the decision on resource allocation.
By contrast, the manager makes the resource allocation decision alone
and imposes it on the control group.
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The linkage between the interactive communication treatment
and the results exists if the results obtain in the treatment groups
and not the control group. If the results occur in the control
group along with the treatment groups, then interactive communication
cannot be said to be the cause of any observed results.
Subjects
Procedures for subject selection and assignment to conditions
in the experiment have important implications for internal validity
concerning statistical regression and bias effects. A sample repre-
sentative of the population minimizes the possibility for statistical
regression. Random assignment of subjects to experimental conditions
is considered by Campbell and Stanley as the most adequate assurance
of lack of initial bias between groups.-^ Also, McLeod and Chaffee
note that the balance paradigm underlying the coorientation concept
views the individuals on equal footing. However, differing roles,
purposes, prior experiences, and communication potential mean that
the individuals should be expected to hold somewhat different percep-
tions of the coorientational situation. They likewise suggest an
approach to control for this asymmetry is random assignment of persons
to experimental conditions.
The present experiment utilizes students as subjects. The
only requirement for student volunteers was either senior or graduate
student status in business administration. Thus, the possibility of
^Ibid., p. 15,




statistical regression effects is considered minimal, as no selec-
tion criterion based on extreme scores or qualifications was utilized.
Also, as described later in the methodology, students were randomly
assigned to the experimental conditions to preclude the effects of any
bias.
The Experimental Task
Birnberg and Nath discuss four characteristics of importance
for the experimental task:
1. Mental or physical skills required
2. Intrinsic interest in the task
3. Subject's familiarity with the task prior to the experimental
situation
A. The level of difficulty of the task^
These characteristics suggest that the task and the subject must be
compatible. Utilization of students as subjects suggests that the
task should require mental skills, be problem-oriented, and be at a
level of difficulty and familiarity consistent with the capabilities
of the student population represented in the sample.
The task must also be consistent with the participative
budgeting model. Thus, the task must allow for varying interactive
communication in a budgeting situation and result in the adoption
of a resource allocation plan.
An appropriate task can reduce the dangers of maturation and
experimental mortality effects. One would expect that reasonably
^Jacob B. Birnberg and Ragan Nath, "Laboratory Experimentation




appropriate time requirements and level of difficulty and the intrin-
sic interest of an appropriately selected task minimize the occurrence
of any significant maturation processes and any subject withdrawal
during the experiment.
Given the mulitiple considerations for the experimental task,
a specific task was developed for this study utilizing the IBM Manage-
ment Decision Game. The game itself involves participants taking
roles in a simulated organization which operates in a three industry
economy. Each industry is oligopolistic and contains three firms.
The objectives of each organization in the game are to maximize its
profits and its share of the industry market each period of play.
Participants decide how much of the available resources should be
allocated to production, marketing, and research activities each
period, and what prices to set in each market.
The task, described in more detail later, is based on this
game for the following reasons. First, the game is a learning tool
and has been used in both industry and higher education. Thus, the
game is generally suited to the student population utilized.
Secondly, the game is flexible. A wide variety of situations
can be developed with the mathematical models comprising the game.
Further, the amount of information provided participants can be varied.
Thus, both the level of difficulty and the time required to play the
game, or parts of the game, can be geared directly to the student
" IBM Management Decision Making Laboratory (White Plains, N.Y,








Thirdly, the game involves participants making decisions con-
cerning the planned allocation of resources for the upcoming time
period. Thus the game setting corresponds to the participative
budgeting model in that the multiple participant roles Involve deci-
sion making and can be cast in an interactive communication context.
A decision making task has not been used in prior laboratory
research in participative budgeting. Cherrington and Cherrington
used a physical task of paper model construction and the related
mental task of estimating the production standard for the physical
o
task. Foran and DeCoster utilized a standard setting context, con-
sisting of estimating completion times for building a candy house
kit, making paper flowers, assembling a cube, and arranging geometric
9forms. However, Foran notes:
There is some question as to whether we should have used a
standard setting paradigm. An information processing or deci-
sion making paradigm might have been better. 1*^ (emphasis added)
Thus, the use of this decision making task expands the range of
situations operationalized for the examination of participative
budgeting.
Cherrington and Cherrington, "Appropriate Reinforcement Con-
tingencies in the Budgeting Process," p. 233.
^Foran and DeCoster, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of
Participation," p. 757.
-"-^Michael Foran, "An Experimental Study of the Effects of Parti-
cipation, Authoritarianism and Feedback on Cognitive Dissonance in a
Standard Setting Situation: A Reply," The Accounting Review LII,




Appropriate instrument development and use can minimize the
effects of instrumentation and testing. Changes in the instruments
that produce the instrumentation effect are avoided in the present
experiment by the use of pretested instruments drawn from the IBM
game procedures and rules. The instruments thus correspond to the
activities required in the experimental task. Because of this cor-
respondence, however, successive uses of these instruments in the
same session are likely to produce a testing effect. That is, the
use of any of the test instruments before the experimental task
would likely make subjects sensitive to the instruments, such that
they may concentrate on the instrument related items during the task.
Then a use of the test after the task would be biased by this sensi-
tivity. Campbell and Stanley consider a post-test only use of the
instrument appropirate in this type of situation. Thus, this
approach is adopted to avoid the possibility of the testing effect.
The Post-Test Only, Control Group Design
Among the various aspects of the experiment discussed above are
the needs for the experimental treatment to involve several conditions
for varying interactive communication, the subjects to be randomly
assigned to these conditions, and a post-test only use of the instru-
ment. These needs can be incorporated into a post-test only, control
group design. Campbell and Stanley point out that this design allows
'-'-Campbell and Stanley, Experimental And Quasi-Experimenta l
Designs for Research
, p . 26.
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for the control of all sources of internal validity .-'-^
The specific design employed is of the following forrat^^
CONDITION 1: R Xl Ol
CONDITION 2: R X2 °2




Condition 1 is the control group;
Conditions 2-4 are the experimental treatment groups;
R is the random assignment of subjects to the four conditions;
Xi is the control, or no treatment;
X2 is the experimental treatment of the orientation phase;
X3 is the experimental treatment of the evaluation phase;
X^ is the experimental treatment of the joint decision making
phase;
0^ 2 3 4 ^^^ observations made by a post test in each
condition of the experiment.
These conditions, treatments, and observations are described below
in the methodology of the experiment.
Methodology
The experiment involves materials and test instruments developed
from the IBM Management Decision Game utilized over the four condi-
tions. Figure 4-1 displays an overview of the laboratory sessions
comprising the experiment.
As shown in figure 4-1, each laboratory session consists of
four major steps. The first step establishes the setting for the
12 Ibid., pp. 25-27.
l^This design is based on the general form of design 6
described by Campbell and Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimen-
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subjects with Packet A. The second step Is the control or experimen-
tal treatment provided through instructions in Packet B. The third
step involves the collection of data for the measurement of the com-
munication effects in terms of the coorientation model through the
test instruments in Packet C. The final step measures the subordi-
nate attitudes toward the budget decided upon in the session. Instru-
ments in Packet D obtain these measures as well as some other data
to aid in analyzing the results of the experiment. Each of these
steps and the associated materials are discussed below. The full
range of experimental materials are provided in the appendix.
Setting
The laboratory setting is designed to typify an organizational
environment in which the participative budgeting model may operate.
At the same time it incorporates the design considerations discussed
above. The setting consists of the budgeting situation, individual
participants, the organizational relationships, and the experimen-
tal task. Each of these is discussed below.
The Budgeting Situation
The budgeting situation is the experimental baseline, or common
starting point for all subjects. This situation is contained in
Packet A, displayed in pages 181 - 192 of the appendix. Packet
A, developed from the IBM game, describes the operating environment
of an organization, details a five year financial history for this
organization, and outlines periodic resource allocation and pricing
decisions required. The pricing decisions are included to add realism
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to the game setting, although the focus is on the resource alloca-
tion decisions required.
Subjects
A total of thirty-two graduate and senior level undergraduate
students in business administration were volunteer participants in
the experiment. Subjects received $5.00 as compensation for the two
hour session. These thirty-two subjects were randomly paired to form
sixteen groups for the sessions. A third member of each group was an
accomplice. These individuals were assigned to one of three organi-
zation positions described in Packet A; the president, the vice presi-
dent for production, and the vice president for sales. The accomplice
was always assigned the president position, and the two subjects
were assigned the vice president positions. However, the subjects
were not informed the president role was that of an accomplice.
The Accomplice
The accomplice controlled the experimental sessions. An under-
graduate student served as the accomplice to minimize the possibility
of subjects perceiving the accomplice as having higher status apart
from the president position. This person was given extensive
briefings to become thoroughly familiar with the budgeting situation
and the necessary procedures in each step of the experiment.
The same person controlled all of the subject groups to preclude
the possibility of a confounding effect on the results from the use of
several accomplices. Thus, the experiment involved sixteen separate





The three organization positions filled by the accomplice and
the subjects were delineated in Packet A. This three person organi-
zation allov>7S an expanded use of the coorientation measurement model.
The two person exemplar in the coorientation model discussed as part
of the participative budgeting model development displayed variables
based on two sets of relationships, those being the perceptions of
each individual relative to the other concerning the budgeting situa-
tion.
A three person coorientation situation involves a greatly ex-
panded range of perception relationships. In terms of the organi-
zational positions described, six sets of relationships are possible
concerning the budgeting situation:
SET THE PERCEPTIONS OF
One: The President
Two : The President
Three: The Vice President
for Production
Four: The Vice President
for Production
Five: The Vice President
for Sales
Six: The Vice President
for Sales













Since the president position is taken by the accomplice, the first
two sets of relationships are not considered. The third and fifth
sets allow the observation of the subjects' perceptions relative to
the accomplice in the budgeting situation. Similarly, the fourth and
sixth sets allow the observation of each subject's perceptions rela-
tive to the other subject concerning the budgeting situation. Thus,
the experiment allows the observation of both subordinate-management
relationships and subordinate-subordinate relationships. The specific
relationships observed are discussed in connection with the measure-
ments obtained with Packet C later in the chapter.
The Task
Each subject was required to conduct an analysis of the budgeting
situation contained in Packet A. Based on the analysis, the subject
was then required to recommend a resource allocation plan and pricing
strategy for the organization to improve both profits and market share
in the coming period. However, before the subject developed the
recommendation, the experimental treatment was administered, depending
on the condition to which the subject was assigned.
Conditions
Packet B provided specific instructions to the subject con-
cerning the task, the responsibilities of his role, and the budgeting
procedures used in the firm. These instructions established which
one of the four conditions of the experiment the subject had been
assigned. The control condition allowed no interactive communication
while the three treatment conditions varied the type and extent of
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communication as specified by the corresponding phases of the
participative budgeting model. The procedures within each condition
are outlined below and provided in detail in the appendix.
The conditions also involved two types of communication net-
works. The no interactive communication condition involved a wheel
type network with one-way communication channels from the accomplice
to each subject. The three interactive communication conditions
employed an all channel network with two-way communication channels
linking the accomplice and each of the subordinates.
Condition 1 - The Control Group
Condition 1 is the control group. Thus no interactive communi-
cation was allowed between the subjects or with the accomplice. The
subjects randomly assigned to this condition reported individually
to the session. The subject was informed that other subjects were
also taking part in the same session in other rooms, and the necessity
for the physical separation would be explained in a few minutes. The
subject was then given a copy of Packet A.
After reading Packet A, the subject was provided Packet B
structured for the control condition. This packet assigned the sub-
ject to his or her specific position as one of the vice presidents
in a physically dispersed organization. Hence, the members were in
different locations (rooms). Specific instructions were then given
to carry out the responsibilities of the position. For example.
Packet B as received by a subject assigned the sales vice president
position was as follows.

91
SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR FIRM
You are now the newly employed Vice President for Sales.
Recall that the organization chart of your firm, provided earlier,
defines your position as reporting directly to the president.
The company's production facilities are located in area 2, your
home area. The company headquarters and main sales offices are lo-
cated in area k of the geographical market , but in different cities.
Thus the vice president for sales and the president of the company
are in different cities, and the vice president for production is in
a different area. Because of the physical separation of the person-
nel in your firm, the following procedures have been established for
making the area and plant decisions.
First, the president and each vice president receive copies
of the reports available. (Your copy of the reports is provided in
Packet A.) All personnel receive the same information in these
reports. Each person conducts a thorough analysis of the information
in these reports individually, as each person is in a different loca-
tion.
After completing the analysis, each vice president makes recom-
mendations to the president concerning the area decisions and the
plant decisions required for the coming year. These recommendations
are forwarded to the president by the use of a standard budget form.
(The form is located at the end of the packet.) This standard form
has proven very useful in the past as an accurate means to forward
recommendations to the president. The possibility of errors is
greatly reduced since the same format is utilized by all personnel.
YOUR ROLE
As the Vice President for Sales, your primary responsibility
is to maximize the sales revenue and the overall market share of the
company in the industry. The company president has established the
overall goal of the firm as the maximizing of profits and is very
concerned with the performance of the Sales Division, For example,
over the last five years the market share of the company has not
increased much, if at all. Sales revenue has been highly variable.
These problems are reflected in the declining profit picture over the
last three years.
Given this situation, your analysis should be directed toward
determining the cash needed for your marketing efforts and the
pricing strategy required to Increase sales revenues and market share
position in the industry. At the same time you should ensure that
your marketing and sales plans are consistent with the capabilities
of the Production Division. Production is expected to minimize the
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unit cost of producing the product. Since the Vice President for
Production is in another location, it is not possible to communicate
directly. However, recall that both of you have exactly the same
information in your reports.
To meet your responsibilities, you should now take the following
steps in the order given.
First, determine the cash required to significantly increase
sales revenues and market share. At the same time, be sure to con-
sider the implications of your sales plans for the production effort.
While making these determinations, you may refer back to the reports
provided in Packet A as often and as much as you wish. You may take
up to forty-five minutes to make these determinations.
Secondly, after you decide how much cash you need, take out
the budget form located at the back of this packet. The form is in
duplicate and contains a glossary of brief descriptions of the
effects of each decision that you should expect. Completely fill out
the budget form. That is, you should indicate what you think (1)
the unit price charged in each area should be, and (2) the appro-
priate amount of cash for marketing in each area and each plant
decision should be. The last balance sheet available (year 5) indi-
cates that your firm has $10,957 for operations in the coming year.
Your cash allocations to the various functions requiring cash must not
exceed this amount. Also, note the budget form does have a comments
section. You may utilize this section to provide any additional
recommendations you feel the president should receive.
Thirdly, after you have completely filled out the budget form,
submit the form to the president. (This is accomplished by giving
the form to the session administrator, who will take the form to
the president.) Retain the duplicate of the budget form as you will
need the form for later use. Also, hand in Packet A at this time to
the session administrator. After turning in the budget form (origi-
nal) and Packet A you will receive Packet C as a replacement for
Packet A. Upon receipt of Packet C, please open the packet and follow
















A. TOTAL MARKETING $ (
B. PLANT IMPROVEMENT $
C. PRODUCTION $
D. RESEARCH - $
TOTAL EXPENDITURES $
ices should be in dollars only)
Areas 1-4)
TOTAL EXPENDITURES CANNOT EXCEED $10,957




Thus, in the control condition, the subject never saw or communicated
with the other subject. The subject initially may have thought that
written communication with the president (the accomplice) occurred
when the budget recommendation was submitted. However, the subject
was informed in step four of the session that the president had made
the final resource allocation decision without considering the sub-
jects' recommendations.
Condition 2 - Orientation
The second condition allowed actual interactive communication
among the subjects and the accomplice. This communication was limited
to discussion of the facts of the budgeting situation, thus corres-
ponding to the orientation phase of the participative budgeting model.
Each subject reported individually to the session and was joined
by the other subject and the accomplice. The experimenter introduced
the three individuals to each other and asked them to sit wherever
they wished around a square conference table. Then each individual
was given copies of Packets A and B. Thus the subjects had no reason
to suspect the third person was an accomplice. The group was informed
that after reading Packet A each person should proceed to Packet B
containing the specific role assignment and responsibilities, and
further, the person who happened to receive the president assignment
would conduct the remainder of the session according to the instruc-
tions in the packet as the experimenter would not be present during
the session. The group was informed the purpose of this procedure
was to avoid the possibility that anyone might feel uncomfortable
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in carrying out their responsibilities in front of the experimenter.
After reading Packet A, subjects and the accomplice proceeded
to Packet B as in the control condition. However, in this condition
the description of the firm eliminated the physical dispersion of
facilities, and added the following to the budgeting procedures:
Secondly, a meeting of all personnel is held. This meeting
has proven very useful in the past as a means to ensure that
everyone knows what the facts are in the situation facing the
firm.
The subjects' position responsibilities included the following
additional one:
Secondly, the president will convene a meeting with the vice
presidents after the analysis is completed. The purpose of the
meeting each period is to ensure that everyone knows what the
facts of the situation facing the firm are. Thus, you provide
the president and the other vice president with the facts that
you have determined from your analysis of the reports. In
turn, you are likely to receive some new facts from the other
persons at the meeting. This meeting will take about thirty
minutes
.
The procedures for the subjects after the meeting were basically
the same as those in condition 2.
The Packet B given to the accomplice contained the agenda for
the session. In this condition, the agenda was limited to the accom-
plice asking the subjects what they thought the facts were. The
accomplice specifically asked the questions described later in Packet
C but not in the same order or in the same format. The accomplice
was also free to answer any questions related to the facts posed by
either subject. However, as much as possible, any answer came only
after "paging through Packet A," or asking the other subject if
he or she knew the answer.
After the meeting, the three group members remained in the room
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and the subjects followed the Instructions in Packet B to conduct
any remaining analysis necessary and then submit their budget recom-
mendations. The accomplice, following the instruction in Packet B,
appeared to be conducting an analysis while awaiting the recommenda-
tions. Then, upon turning in the budget recommendations to the accom-
plice, subjects received Packet C.
Condition 3 - Evaluation
This condition expanded the interactive communication allowed
to correspond to the evaluation phase of the participative budgeting
model. Thus, this communication included discussion of the facts
of the budgeting situation and individual ideas, suggestions, and
opinions regarding alternative resource allocations.
As in condition 2, each subject was joined at the beginning
of the session by the other subject and the accomplice. Packets A
and B were provided as in condition 2 as well.
Packet B differed from the one in condition 2 in describing
the firm's budgeting procedures as follows:
Secondly, a meeting of all personnel is held. This meeting
has proven very useful in the past as a means to accomplish the
following: ensuring that everyone knows what the facts are in
the situation facing the firm; and allowing the exchange of
ideas, suggestions, and alternatives among individuals concerning
the decisions to be made.
The subjects' position responsibilities included the following
modification to the meeting procedures:
Secondly, the president will convene a meeting with the vice-
presidents after the analysis is completed. The purpose of the
meeting each period is to ensure that everyone knows what the
facts of the situation facing the firm are, and to allow the
exchange of ideas, alternatives, and suggestions among the
individuals in the company. Thus, you should provide the
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president and the other vice-president with any facts you have
determined from your analysis of the reports. In turn, you are
likely to receive some new facts from these persons. Similarly,
you should exchange ideas, suggestions, and alternatives that
the firm might consider as actions for the coming year. This
meeting will take about forty minutes.
The procedures for the subjects after the meeting were the same as
those in condition 2.
The accomplice conducted the discussion of the facts in the
same manner as in condition 2. In addition, the accomplice ensured
that each subject specifically indicated what his or her thoughts
were on how the resources should be allocated and what prices should
be charged. The accomplice also indicated her own thoughts concerning
these actions. After the meeting, the same procedures as in condition
2 were carried out.
Condition 4 - Joint Decision Making
This condition corresponded to the joint decision making phase
of the participative budgeting model. Interactive communication
allowed in condition 3 was permitted to the same extent in this condi-
tion. Then the decision on the final resource allocation plan was
jointly reached by the accomplice and the subjects.
The same procedures as in conditions 2 and 3 were used to start
the session. However, the Packet B description of the firm modi-
fied the budgeting procedures as follows:
At the conclusion of the meeting, the budget form is jointly
filled out by the president and the vice presidents.
The subjects' position responsibilities included the following
additional one at the end of the meeting:
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Thirdly, at the end of the meeting, you will jointly decide
each area decision and plant decision for year 6. To accomplish
this, take out the budget form located at the back of this packet.
Attached to the form is a glossary of brief descriptions of the
effects of each decision. Completely fill out the budget form.
That is, you should record on the form what you jointly decide
with the other members of the firm as to (1) the area prices
and (2) the marketing expenditures in each area and the plant
decisions required. The cash allocations to the various func-
tions may add up to but not exceed the $10,957 available cash
balance as of the end of year 5.
The accomplice role in this condition did not include the final
decision authority. However, the accomplice had to make sure that a
joint decision was reached within the time allowed. After the
meeting, each group member was provided Packet C.
Measurements
The procedures in Packets A and B took approximately ninety
minutes of the session in each condition. The remaining thirty
minutes were used to obtain measures for the subordinate content
analysis and attitudes toward the budget. During these procedures
no verbal communication was allowed, thus minimizing the effects of
history.
Subordinate Analysis of the Content
Packet C, displayed in pages 203 - 212 of the appendix was
designed to obtain data for the variables representing subordinate
content analysis hypothesized to change as a result of the allowed
interactive communication. These variables are the coorientation
model relationships of understanding, accuracy, congruency, and
agreement. Each subject's responses relating to the perceptions of
the attributes and evaluations of the budgeting situation needed for
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these variables were recorded immediately after the experimental
treatment (or lack of it) through the questions in Packet C.
Procedures
The procedures varied slightly across conditions to obtain
the measurements. In condition 1 the experimenter returned to the
room at the appropriate time to collect the subject's budget recom-
mendation and provided the subject a copy of Packet C. In conditions
2 and 3, the instructions to the accomplice directed her to collect
the subjects' budget recommendations and distribute copies of Packet
C to the subjects and herself, thus maintaining the accomplice ruse.
In condition 4, since each person had a copy of the jointly decided
budget, the accomplice instructions directed only the distribution of
packets.
The copies of Packet C distributed were coded so that the accom-
plice made sure she received a dummy copy in the distribution. Her
packet in conditions 2 and 3 contained budget decision forms and
blank paper rather than the questions asked of the subjects. Thus
while the subjects were working through the questions, the accomplice
made the budget decision and filled out the forms for distribution
to the subjects as part of Packet D in the final step of the experi-
ment. The accomplice was free to make any decision she felt appro-
priate in each of the sessions corresponding to the first three condi-
tions. Then during the rest of the time allotted for Packet C, the
accomplice wrote out brief comments concerning the session for possi-
ble anecdotal evidence in analyzing the results. In condition 4,
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since the budget already had been jointly determined, the accom-
plice recorded her actual evaluation concerning the budget for that
session and any comments concerning the session events. Thus the
accomplice was always as busy as the subjects.
Variables
As noted above, the three person coorientation setting allows
an expanded set of perception relationships to construct variables
that may be affected by communication. The present analysis uses
the subject's perceptions of the attributes or facts of the budgeting
situation relative to those of the accomplice to construct a measure
of understanding. The actual evaluations of how resources should be
allocated and the estimates of the accomplice's evaluation as are
used to construct one set of accuracy and congruency relationships
and an agreement relationship. The actual evaluations and the esti-
mates of the other subject's evaluations held by each subject are
matched as appropriate with those of the other subject to construct
a second set of accuracy and congruency relationships. The specific
relationships and the data sources used to measure these relationships
are described below.
Understanding . Questions 1 through 14 in Packet C are based
on selected facts of the budgeting situation. In general, these
questions deal with the position of the firm in the industry, the
past pricing strategy, trends established over the five year history,




Subjects in all four conditions responded to these fourteen
questions. A measure of understanding was developed by matching
each subject's responses with those of the accomplice that had been
recorded prior to the experiment. Since the accomplice knew the
correct responses, this matching resulted in finding how many of the
subject responses were correct. Thus, this measure not only indi-
cated the degree to which the subject was cooriented to the budgeting
situation with the accomplice but also showed the extent to which the
subject correctly perceived the situation in terms of these questions.
Evaluation based variables . The instruction in Packet B had
required each subject in conditions 1 through 3 to submit a budget
recommendation. This written recommendation served as a measure of
each subject's own evaluation. To capture the estimates of the other
evaluations by each subject, subjects in these conditions were asked
to respond to the following questions in Packet C.
15. The other vice president in your firm also submitted a budget
recommendation to the president. In the space provided below,
estimate what you think the other vice president recommended
to the president
(Copy of Budget Form)
16. In a few moments, you will receive the final decision the
president made on the budget. In the space below, indicate
what you think the president will finally decide
(Copy of Budget Form)
The resource allocation plan or budget imposed by the accomplice
provided the president's evaluation in these conditions.
Since subjects and the accomplice jointly decided the resource
allocation plan adopted in condition 4, the necessary data were
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captured somewhat differently. Each subject's own evaluation and
estimates of the other evaluations were captured by subject responses
to the following questions:
15. Recall that the decisions were jointly made by the members of
your firm. In the space provided below, indicate what you
personally think the decisions should be
(Copy of Budget Form)
16. Same format as 15, but relative to the other vice president.
17. Same format as 16, but relative to the president.
As mentioned, the actual e\/aluation of the accomplice was captured
while the subjects were working through Packet C, thus providing the
president's evaluation.
The observations in each condition were appropriately matched
in terms of the coorientation measurement model to construct two
sets of accuracy and congruency relationships and an agreement rela-
tionship. Figure 4-2 summarizes the specific relationships and
data sources for each condition. The subordinate-superior relation-
ship of congruency matches the subject's actual evaluation with the
estimate of the accomplice evaluation; accuracy matches the subject's
estimate of the accomplice evaluation with the accomplice's actual
evaluation; and agreement matches the subject's actual evaluation
with the final budget. The subordinate-subordinate relationships are
constructed similarly for congruency and accuracy.
The jointly decided budget was utilized instead of the accom-
plice's actual evaluation in condition 4 for agreement because the
accomplice could not impose the budget plan in this condition. In a
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plan. However, as it turned out, in all but one of the condition
4 sessions, the jointly decided plan was essentially the same as the
accomplice's actual evaluation.
Subordinate Attitudes Toward the Budget
After completing Packet C, subjects received Packet D. Subordi-
nate satisfaction with the final budget, commitment in terms of
willingness to change the budget and perceived correctness of the
budget were measured by responses to Likert-scaled questions in
Packet D. The packet, displayed in the appendix and outlined below,
varies slightly between the control and the experimental conditions.
In the control condition only, the individual subject
received the written budget decision from the accomplice prefaced
by the following statement:
The decisions made by the president for year 6 are attached
to this sheet. The president of your firm made these plant and
area decisions independently - that is, the recommendations of
the vice presidents for sales and production were not considered
in making these decisions.
Thus, this statement notified the subject that no communication
occurred with the accomplice. Subjects in the experimental conditions
received statements appropriate to their conditions, and all subjects
responded to the following questions:
1. If given the opportunity, to what degree would you now change
the cash allocations made and the prices set to meet your respon-
sibilities in this firm?
A. Not at all.
B. Very little.
C. To some degree.
D. To a considerable degree.
E. To a very great degree.

105




C. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.
D. Pretty satisfied.
E. Very satisfied.
3. How much do the decisions on cash allocations and prices as
finally made represent the ones that you now believe to be
correct?
A. Basically what I consider correct.
B. Fairly close to what I consider correct.
C. Somewhat close to what I consider correct.
D. Fairly different from what I consider correct.
E. Very different from what I consider correct.
Other Data
Several other questions were asked of subjects at the end of
the session as aids to interpret the results of the experiment. One
question was designed to determine the effectiveness of the experi-
mental treatment. Subjects in conditions 2 and 3 were asked:
How much weight or influence do you feel your budget recom-
mendations had on the president's final budget decision? (Please
circle the appropriate number)
.
12 3 4 5
None A Little A Fair A Consi- A Great
Amount derable Deal
Amount
Subjects in condition 4 were asked:
How much say or influence did you have on the final decisions made?
A. None.
B. Some, but not as much as the other persons.
C. About the same as the other persons.
D. Somewhat more than the other persons.
E. A lot more than the other persons.
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All subjects were also asked to provide cumulative grade point and
major field data.
The session then concluded with a debriefing. Subjects were
not informed, however, that the president was an accomplice. The pur-
pose of the experiment was explained and subjects were informed that
they might be requested to participate in another session (however
none were). Each subject was then compensated $5.00 and the session
was over.
Summary
This chapter describes the design and methodology of the
experiment used as a basis to test the hypotheses developed in the
previous chapter. The procedures developed in terms of the post
test only, control group approach allow the results of the analyses
of observations in the next chapter to be unambiguously linked to
the experimental treatment of interactive oDmmunication.
The sixteen laboratory sessions conducted in the experiment
each involved two subjects to allow thirty-two observations on the
variables of interest. In the three person budgeting situation of
the experiment, the specific variables measured are:
Subordinate Analysis of the Content ;
Understanding
Accuracy in perceiving che other
vice president
Accuracy in perceiving the president
Congruency with the other vice
president
Congruency with the president
Agreement with the final budget

107





Each of these variables is considered a response variable to the
experimental treatment of participation as allowed interactive com-
munication.
In the next chapter, analysis of variance statistical pro-
cedures are described and utilized to determine whether significant in-
creases occurred in each of these response variables as a result of
the variation in the experimental treatment. Then correlation
analysis is described and used to determine linear relationships
between these response variables. The results of these statistical
analyses are used to test the study hypotheses that more favorable
subordinate attitudes result from participative budgeting and that
the coorientation model describes the mechanism enabling these more





The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the analysis of the
results obtained from the laboratory sessions of the study. The first
section of the chapter discusses analysis of variance techniques and
their use in assessing the hypothesized effects of the participative
budgeting process on subordinate analysis of the process content and
attitudes toward the final budget. The second section discusses cor-
relation analysis and its applicability to assess the hypothesized
relationships between subordinate content analysis variables and the
attitudes toward the budget. The third section discusses findings
related to the other data collected in the experiment.
The Effects of Participation
as Interactive Communication
The allowed variation in the nature and extent of the interac-
tive communication over the three phases of the participative
budgeting model was hypothesized to lead to significantly increased
levels or states of the coorientation variables representing the
subordinate content analysis and significantly more favorable atti-
tudes toward the final budget. Bales and Strodtbeck point out that
the phases of their group problem solving model, which underly the
model of the study, consist of qualitative changes in the nature and
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extent of interactions. Thus the use of the single factor, fixed
effects analysis of variance model is considered appropriate to
analyze the data obtained in the experiment. Neter and Wasserman note
that this general model can be used to assess the effects of either
quantitative or qualitative independent variables. This model is
discussed below.
Statistical Methodology
The single factor fixed effects analysis of variance (ANOVA)
model is a statistical model generally used to test the statistical
relation between an independent variable, or factor, and a dependent
variable. The factor may be either quantitative or qualitative, and
take on several particular forms or levels. In the present analysis
the variation in the allowed interactive communication as the experi-
mental treatment in the laboratory sessions is considered a qualita-
tive participation factor with four levels corresponding to the four
conditions in the experimental design-
To facilitate the use of the ANOVA model in the analysis below,
the factor levels, subjects, and observations are denoted by indices
as follows. The participation factor is indexed by j = 1^ . . .4
corresponding to the four experimental conditions. The eight subjects
assigned to groups within each condition are indexed by i = 1 , . . .^8.
Taken together, the indices represent a particular observation on the
-•-Bales and Strodtbeck, "Phases in Group Problem Solving," p. 485.
^John Neter and V/illiam Wasserman, Appjj^d Linear Statistical




^th subject at the . th factor level, denoted by Y-j^^
. The total
4
number of observations is denoted by N-j' = S^n^ or the number of
J-1
^
subjects at each level summed across levels. In this analysis,
Nx = 32.
The ANOVA model can now be stated in terms of the present
analysis as:




Y-i^ is the observed value of a response variable in the .th
-"-J 1
trial for the -th level of participation. The response
variable, in turn, is each of the subordinate content analysis
variables and the attitudes toward the budget.
u. is a constant component common to all observations and
includes the effect of the information in Packet A provided
to all participants concerning the budgeting situation.
t. is the effect of the • th level of participation.
e-j^^ are independent error terms assumed to have a normal
distribution with a mean of zero and a constant variance across
levels, denoted N(0,a2).
-j^
= 1. . . .8 subjects at each level or condition.
-j
= 1 is the no participation condition;
•
= 2 is the orientation condition;
.
= 3 is the evaluation condition;
.
= 4 is the joint decision making condition.
This model is used below to analyze the measures obtained for
each of the subordinate content analysis and attitude variables toward
the budget.'^ Each of these variables is considered a response variable
(Y^-j), in turn, and labelled as follows:
^The data sources for each response variable is identified in





2 Accuracy in perceiving the other
vice president.
3 Accuracy in perceiving the president.
4 Congruency with the other vice president,
5 Congruency with the president.
6 Agreement with the final budget.
7 Satisfaction with the final budget.
8 Perceived correctness of the
final budget.
9 Coiranitment to the final budget.
The F Test
One key aspect of analysis using an ANOVA model involves the use
of the F ratio. This ratio compares the variance between groups to
the variance within groups. This ratio result is interpreted in a
sampling distribution of F under the null hypothesis, or no signifi-
cant differences between groups. If the probability value of the ob-
served ratio is less than or equal to the criterion set for statis-
tical significance, the null hypothesis of no effects of the indepen-
dent variable is rejected.
In this study the criterion, or significance level C<, for the
individual response variables has been set at a probability level of
.05. Given the four levels of the study, and the thirty-two subjects
an F ratio greater than 2.95, determined from the table of the F
distribution becomes the critical value. An observed F ratio for
any response variable of greater than 2.95 allows rejection of the
^The mathematical development of the F test is demonstrated





null hypothesis of no significant differences among the four levels.
Thus, the specific decision rule to decide between:
Ci: ti = t2 = t3 = t^ = 0, and
C2: not all tj = 0,
where t. is the effect of participation is:
variance between group s
If F* = variance within groups <_ 2.95, conclude C-^;
otherwise conclude Co.
Thus, for each response variable, C^ is the null hypothesis that no
significant differences exist across levels. C2 is the alternative
hypothesis that participation does have an effect.
Estimation of Factor Effects
The F test is an initial step to determine whether detailed
analysis of the factor level effects is warranted. If the F test
allows the rejection of the null hypothesis for a given response
variable, then several effects of the participation factor are of
interest to assess the hypothesized results from the participative
budgeting model. Six statements involving pairwise comparisons of
factor effects (t^) are of interest:
1. Whether the effect of allowing Interactive communication in the
orientation phase differs from the effect of allowing no interac-
tive communication at all. This compares condition j = 2 with
condition j = 1
2. Whether the effect of allowing interactive communication in the
evaluation phase differs from the effect of no interactive com-
munication. This compares condition j = 3 with condition j = 1
3. Whether the effect of the joint decision making phase differs
from the effect of no interactive communication. This compares
condition j = 4 with condition j = 1
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4. Whether the effect of the evaluation phase, which includes
discussion of both attributes and evaluations, differs from the
effect of the orientation phase, which allows discussion of
attributes only. This compares condition j = 3 with condition
J = 2
5. Whether the effect of the joint decision making phase differs
from the effect of the orientation phase. This compares condi-
tion j = 4 with condition j = 2
6. Whether the effect of the joint decision making phase differs
from the effect of the evaluation phase. This analysis assesses
whether the reaching of a group consensus in addition to the
discussion of the attributes and evaluations has a different
effect than discussion only, by comparing condition j = 4 with
condition j = 3.
These comparisons allow the determination of whether participation
has any effects and, if so, in what budgeting process phase or phases
the effects occur.
Several techniques are available to conduct this analysis of
factor effects. The appropriate method for the present study is the
Tukey method of multiple comparisons. This method applies when:
all factor level sample sizes are equal, in this case Nj = 8 for
j = 1. . . . 4; and the comparisons of interest involve the set
of all pairwise comparisons of factor level means, in the present
study, the six statements above.
The Tukey method allows the construction of a confidence inter-
val for each pairwise comparison such that all confidence intervals
hold simultaneously. For a confidence coefficient of (1 - <^) all
pairwise comparisons in the family or set will be correct in (1 - °<)
100% of the families when repeated sets of samples are selected and
Q
all pairwise confidence intervals are calculated each time. For
^Ibid., p. 473. ^Ibid., p. 474.
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the present analysis, a confidence coefficient has been set at
(1 _ oc) = .90. Then the family of six comparisons can be said to
hold simultaneously such that 90% of the comparisons so constructed
will contain the true comparisons in repeated samplings.
The procedures involved in the Tukey method utilize the stu-
dentized range distribution. This distribution relates to the number
of factor levels and the sample size in the ANOVA model. ^ The stu-
dentized range distribution has been tabulated, and given the four
factor levels, thirty-two subjects and the family confidence coeffi-
cient of .90, the appropriate value for the simultaneous confidence
interval construction is 3.40.-*-^
The confidence intervals for the six statements are constructed
as follows. Let Y..: be the sample mean for the ^th factor level, and
D = Y.j - Y.j' be the difference or comparison of any two factor
level sample means. Then S^(D) = S^(Y.j) + S^(Y.y) is the sample
variance associated with D. The multiple comparison confidence
intervals for all pairwise comparisons u. - u.' with a family confi-
dence coefficient of .90 are:
Where;
D-T-S(D)£Uj-u."£D + T-(SD)
u. - u/ is the difference between any two
true factor level means, with u- = u. + t-
from the ANOVA model.
^Ibid. ^Qlbid . , Table A-9.




D = Y.j - Y.j is the unbiased estimate of the difference
S(D) = /S2(D)
1
T = /2 (3.40) where 3.40 is the appropriate value noted above
from the studentized range distribution. The T value is 2.40.
The specific format of this family of contrasts is displayed in
figure 5-1. As the factor effects are assessed repetitively later,
each set is displayed in final form in the format of figure 5-1.
Model Assumptions
Several assumptions underlying the ANOVA model must be satisfied
to consider the model as the appropriate one for the analysis. They
are:
1. Each of the probability distributions at each factor level is
normal and has the same variance
2. The observations for each factor level are random observations
from the corresponding probability distributions and are statis-
tically independent of the observations for any other factor
level 12
The validity of the first assumption is assessed to determine the
appropriateness of the ANOVA model. For each of the response varia-
bles, the test of the equal variance assumption is made initially
in the analysis below. If the variance is not constant, transforma-
tions to establish constancy are often effective in establishing the
normality of the error term distribution. The test used for assessing
the equality or constancy of variance across levels is the Hartley
13
test. This test is based on the ratio of the largest sample
variance obtained over the four conditions, denoted max(S.2) and the
J




GENERAL FORM OF THE FAMILY OF CONFIDENCE INTERVALS
FOR DIFFERENCES IN FACTOR LEVEL MEANS
RESULTING FROM PARTICIPATION:
90% FAMILY CONFIDENCE COEFFICIENT
Orientation to No Participation D -2.40S(D) ^ U2 - U, ^ D + 2.40S(D)
Evaluation to No Participation D -2.40S(D) <^ U - U < D + 2.40S(D)
Joint Decision Making to D -2.40S(D) ^ U^ " U^^ 1 ^ + 2.40S(D)
No Participation
Evaluation to Orientation D -2.40S(D) 1 U^ - U2 1 D + 2.40S(D)
Joint Decision Making to D -2.40S(D) 1 U^ - U^ 1 D + 2.40S(D)
Orientation





llest, denoted min(S.2), where j is the particular factor level.
This ratio is the test statistic:
H* = max(Sj^)
rain(Sj2)
The test statistic is compared to the distribution of H which
has been tabulated when C-|^ holds. The F test is not much affected
by unequal variances if the factor level sample sizes are equal, as
long as the differences are not unusually large. Hence, a fairly low
level of significance may be justified. -^^ Since the present study
meets this condition of equal sample sizes, an c< = .01 is considered
appropriate. Given the four factor levels, a sample size of eight
within each level and oC= .01, the critical value of H becomes 14. 5. -'-^
The specific decision rule to decide between
C^: o 1 = ^2 ~ '^ 3 ~ '^ L'y ^^^
C^ : Not all o^ • are equal
2
where a -: is the variance at factor level . is
J J
If H* <_ 14.5, conclude Cj^;
otherwise conclude Co.
The test statistic to assess the validity of the normal distri-
bution assumption is based on a correlation of the residual terms
with their normalized scores at each factor level. The critical cor-
relation coefficient given n:: = 8 is .903 at a significance level of




.05. This significance level for the normality test is
taken because the Hartley test is quite sensitive to departures from
the assumption of normal populations.-'-^ Thus, to decide between:
C-^: The residual terms are normally distributed; and
C2 : The residual terms are not normally distributed is:
if the correlation coefficient is ^ .903, conclude C^^; otherwise C2.
The independence and randomness of error terms assumption was
controlled for by the experimental design. Subjects were only used
once and were randomly assigned to conditions. The same accomplice
was in all the sessions, but the order of the sessions was randomized
with respect to the four conditions.
The methodology related to the F test, estimation of factor
effects, and the ANOVA model assumptions is utilized below as appro-
priate to assess the effects of the allowed interactive communication
as the participation factor.
-'-"This test is described by Thomas A. Ryan, Jr., Brian L.
Joiner and Barbara F. Ryan in the MINITAB II Reference Manual .
The test consists of the correlation of the residual values with
their equivalent values that would be expected from the same sample
size drawn from a standard normal distribution (that is, N(0,1)).
The test is described as similar to the Shapiro-Wilk test and a
very powerful test for normality, pp. 43-A5.




Subordinate Analysis of the Process Content
The six relationships drawn from the coorientation model in
the previous chapter to represent subordinate analysis of the content
of the participative budgeting process are analyzed below as res-
ponse variables to interactive communication.
Understanding (Response 1)
A measure of subordinate understanding of the budgeting situa-
tion was computed by matching subject responses to the questions
described in the previous chapter with those of the accomplice.
Each response was weighted equally and the number of responses that
matched was summed to provide the measure of understanding.
The summary of sample data and the related analysis of variance
for this measure are displayed in Tables 5-1 and 5-2 respectively.
Since the attained correlation coefficient leads to the conclusion
that the residual terms are normally distributed at each level, and
the Hartley test (H* = 8.0 < 14.5) leads to the conclusion that the
sample variances across levels are equal, the ANOVA model is consi-
dered appropriate. The F test (F* = .02 < 2.95) leads to the conclu-
sion that there is no factor effect for understanding.
The major inference from these results for understanding is that
Packet A was the only significant means of communicating the facts to
subjects. The hypothesis that orientation and subsequent conditions
or phases would achieve greater understanding than the no participa-










Sample Test Standard H* Test
Level Size Mean Statistic Deviation Variance Statistic
1 8 11.75 .998 3.85 14.82
2 8 11.62 .988 3.25 10.56 8.0
3 8 11.87 .991 1.36 1.85
































in these conditions had no apparent effect on changing subjects'
perceptions of the facts as tested. On the other hand, these
results suggest that subjects at each level started the budgeting
process from the same point, as the sample mean and variation at
each level correspond so closely to each other. Thus it may be
inferred that the information provided in Packet A successfully
instituted the experimental setting or baseline in each of the four
conditions.
Accuracy (Responses 2 and 3)
Accuracy in perceiving the other vice president and in perceiving
the president were measured as follows. Each subject's estimate of
the other subject's evaluation and the accomplice's evaluation was
recorded in terms of dollar amounts allocated to the various func-
1 Q
tions as discussed in the previous chapter. Then, any difference
between the dollar amount for each function as estimated by the sub-
ject and the other person's actual recorded dollar amount was com-




This measurement approach casts a decrease in the value of
the total difference as an increase in the value of the coorientation
relationship. The absolute value was taken to preclude cancella-
tions of amounts and to facilitate square root and logarithmic
transformations needed in the analysis.
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Accuracy in Perceiving the Other Vice President (Response 2)
The summary of sample data and the related analysis of variance
of the measure for subject accuracy in perceiving the other vice
president are displayed in Tables 5-3 and 5-4 respectively. A square
root transformation of the original measurement was necessary to
establish constancy of variance. The transformed data meet the tests
for the normal distribution and equality of variance assumptions and
the F test allows the conclusion that there is a significant factor
effect. Thus the family of pairwise comparisons of factor levels for
this accuracy relationship is displayed in Table 5-5.
The comparisons in Table 5-5 demonstrate that accuracy in per-
ceiving the other vice president is a nondecreasing variable over the
four levels. With a family confidence coefficient of 90%, interac-
tive communication in general leads to greater accuracy than no par-
ticipation, as shown by the comparisons of the orientation, evaluation,
and joint decision making conditions to the no participation condi-
tion; evaluation does not lead to greater accuracy than orientation,
as the confidence interval contains zero, but joint decision making
leads to greater accuracy than either orientation or evaluation.
These results do not support the hypothesis that the significant
increase in accuracy would occur in the evaluation phase. Instead,
an initial significant increase occurs in orientation, and a second
significant increase occurs in joint decision making.
These results indicate that, even though interactive communica-




SUMMARY OF SAMPLE DATA FOR SUBORDINATE ACCURACY IN PERCEIVING





Sample Test Standard H^' Test
Level Size Mean Statistic Deviation Variance Statistic
1 8 69.6 .989 7.1 50.4
2 8 46.0 .974 9.9 98.0
9.26
3 8 38.5 .912 21.6 466.6







ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SQUARE ROOT TRANSFORMED DATA
FOR SUBORDINATE ACCURACY IN PERCEIVING


























CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR DIFFERENCES IN SQUARE ROOT
TRANSFORMED FACTOR LEVEL MEANS FOR SUBORDINATE
ACCURACY IN PERCEIVING THE OTHER VICE PRESIDENT:
90% FAMILY CONFIDENCE COEFFICIENT
Pairwise Comparison (Factor Levels) Confidence Interval
Orientation to No Participation (2,1) -A1.2 <. U2 - U^j^ :< - 6.0
Evaluation to No Participation (3,1) -48.7 :! U2 - Uj^ £ -13.5
Joint Decision Making to No Participation (4,1) -73.7 :i U^ - U2 <_ -38.5
Evaluation to Orientation (3,2) -25.1 <. U3 - U2 ^ 10.1
Joint Decision Making to Orientation (4,2) -50.1 :! U^ - U2 ^ -14.9
Joint Decision Making to Evaluation (4,3) -42.6 <. U^ - U^ <. - 7.4
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subjects to estimate each other's position with greater accuracy than
no interactive communication at all. Thus, the sharing of the facts
evidently leads to some insights by each subject as to what the other
is thinking. The lack of a further significant increase in the
evaluation phase suggests that, since many ideas and suggestions may
be exchanged, each subject may not be exactly sure which of the
evaluations exposed best represents the one actually held by the
other subject. However, the mean response in the evaluation phase is
greater than the orientation phase, suggesting that the exposure of
evaluations may lead to increased accuracy. The significant increase
in joint decision making indicates that as the final evaluations are
considered, each subject can perceive more correctly the position
of the other subject relative to earlier phases and no participation
at all.
The multiple comparisons demonstrate that the all channel com-
munication network facilitates increased accuracy in perceiving the
other subject, as the three conditions which used this network each
achieved significantly greater accuracy than the control group, which
was limited to the wheel network.
Accuracy in Perceiving the President (Response 3)
The summary of sample data and the analysis of variance for
the measure of subject accuracy in perceiving the president are
displayed in Tables 5-6 and 5-7 respectively. A logarithmic transfor-
mation of the original measurement was necessary to meet the tests




SUMMARY OF SAMPLE DATA FOR SUBORDINATE ACCURACY IN PERCEIVING





Sample Test Standard H* Test
Level Size Mean Statistic Deviation Variance Statistic
1 8 3.378 .978 .410 .168
2 8 3.217 .973 .337 .114
6.8
3 8 2.945 .983 .385 .148







ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF LOGARITHMIC TRANSFORMED DATA

























The F test allows the conclusion of a significant factor effect.
The family of comparisons for this accuracy relationship is displayed
in Table 5-8.
The comparisons in Table 5-8 demonstrate that, contrary to the
other accuracy relationship, while accuracy does not decrease over
the first three levels, only joint decision making leads to a signi-
ficant increase. These results do not support the hypothesis that
accuracy would significantly increase in the evaluation phase. How-
ever, the means over the four levels are in the direction of increased
accuracy, and the results do demonstrate that accuracy in perceiving
the president does significantly increase in the joint decision making
phase.
The findings suggest that the joint decision making phase is
necessary for the subjects to be more certain of the president's
evaluation
,
just as for the accuracy in perceiving the other vice
president. In the evaluation phase, since the president makes the
decision alone, subjects may well have thought that the final deci-
sion would be somewhat different than the suggestions and ideas dis-
cussed, since the president would perhaps be "thinking it over"
before deciding. In the orientation phase, it was not expected that
subordinates would accurately perceive the president's position, as
no evaluations were discussed.
Taken together, these obtained results link interactive communi-
cation in the joint decision making phase to accuracy. Significant




CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR DIFFERENCES IN LOGARITHMIC
TRANSFORMED FACTOR LEVEL MEANS FOR ACCURACY IN
PERCEIVING THE PRESIDENT:
90% FAMILY CONFIDENCE COEFFICIENT
Pairwise Comparison (Factor Levels) Confidence Interval
Orientation to No Participation (2,1) - .820 < 1^2'^! - ''^^^
Evaluation to No Participation (3,1) -1.092 ^ U^-U^^ <. .226
Joint Decision Making to No Participation (4,1) -3.568 <_ U^-Uj^ <. -2.250
Evaluation to Orientation (3,2) - .931 <. U3-U2 ± .387
Joint Decision Making to Orientation (3,2) -3.407 <. U^-U2 ^ -2.089
Joint Decision Making to Evaluation (4,3) -3.135 <_ U^ U3 <. -1.817
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such communication, and were not found in its complete absence.
Congruency (Responses 4 and 5)
Congruency with the other vice president and congruency with
the president were measured by comparing the subject's own evalua-
tion in terms of the dollar amount allocated to each function with the
estimate of the other person's evaluation concerning the allocation
of resources. The measure was computed in the same manner as for
accuracy.
Congruency with the Other Vice President (Response A)
The summary of sample data and the analysis of variance for
the measure of subject congruency with the other vice president are
displayed in Tables 5-9 and 5-10 respectively. A square root trans-
formation of the original measurements was necessary to meet the
tests for the normality distribution and the constancy of variance
assumptions. The normality assumption is not met for the evaluation
condition at the established significance level. However, Neter
and Wasserman point out that the fixed effects ANOVA model is not much
affected by departures from normality, provided the departure is not
of extreme form.'^-'- Given that the departure is limited to one level,
the ANOVA model is considered appropriate. The F test leads to the
conclusion that there is no significant factor effect for congruency
with the other vice president.





SUMMARY OF SAMPLE DATA FOR SUBORDINATE CONGRUENCY WITH THE



































ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SQUARE ROOT TRANSFORMED DATA FOR





















F: 2.95Total 31 12542
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These results are consistent with the hypothesis that congru-
ency by itself would be difficult to predict, although the general
direction of the means points toward increased congruency over the
four levels. The lack of a singifleant factor effect indicates that,
while interactive communication was found to lead to significant in-
creases in each subject's perception of the other vice president's
evaluation, (accuracy), it did not result in a significant change in
evaluations by each subject to be congruent with the other vice
president. Thus, subjects were not able to persuade each other to
change evaluations to any significant degree.
Congruency with the President (Response 5)
The summary of sample data and the analysis of variance of
the measure for subject congruency with the president are displayed
in Tables 5-11 and 5-12 respectively. A logarithmic transformation
of the original measurement to meet the tests for the normal distri-
bution and constancy of variance assumptions leads to the same
conclusions as those for congruency with the other vice president.
Thus despite the departure from normality in the third condition,
the ANOVA model is considered appropriate to analyze the data. As
the F test leads to the conclusion of a significant factor effect,
the family of comparisons is displayed in Table 5-13.
The comparisons in Table 5-13 demonstrate that the signifi-
cant factor level is joint decision making relative to the orienta-




SUMMARY OF SAMPLE DATA FOR SUBORDINATE CONGRUENCY WITH THE





Sample Test Standard H* Test
Level Size Mean Statistic Deviation Variance Statistic
1 8 2.32 .937 1.13 1.27
2 8 2.89 .951 .45 .20
9.19
3 8 2.34 .892 1.05 1.11







ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF LOGARITHMIC TRANSFORMED DATA FOR


























CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR DIFFERENCES IN LOGARITHMIC
TRANSFORMED FACTOR LEVEL MEANS FOR SUBORDINATE
CONGRUENCY WITH THE PERSIDENT:
90% FAMILY CONFIDENCE COEFFICIENT
Pairwise Comparison (Factor Levels) Confidence Interval
Orientation to No participation (2,1) -.67 £ U2 - Uj^ _< 1.81
Evaluation to No Participation (3,1) -.65 i U3 - U][ <. 1.83
Joint Decision Making to No Participation (A,l) -2. 38 <. U4 - U, :< .10
Evaluation to Orientation (3,2) -1.79 <, V^ ~ ^2 - '^^
Joint Decision Making to Orientation (4,2) -2 . 95 <. U^ - U2 ^ - • 47
Joint Decision Making to Evaluation (4,3) -2.40 £ U4 - U3 :< .08
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ency with the president relative to any other level, including
no participation. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis
that congruency, by itself, is difficult to predict. The limited
results obtained indicate that interactive communication as opera-
tionalized in this study may not be particularly functional in
achieving congruency. That is, persuasion of participants by each
other did not occur relative to the lack of participation but to
an earlier phase of the budgeting process. On the other hand, the
significant result obtained for joint decision making viewed in
conjunction with the comparisons of joint decision making and each
of the other two conditions, does suggest that this phase has the
most potential of the three phases of the participative process to
bring about the necessary changes in participant evaluation so that
each person is in fact congruent with the budget decision made.
That is, the opportunity for mutual persuasion exists in the joint
decision making phase.
Agreement (Response 6)
Subject agreement with the final budget was measured by com-
paring each subject's own evaluation concerning the resource alloca-
tions to be made with tlie final budget adopted. This measure was
computed in a manner similar to that for accuracy and congruency.
The summary of sample data and the analysis of variance for the
measure of subject agreement with the final budget are displayed in
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Sample Test Standard H* Test
Level Size Mean Statistic Deviation Variance Statistic




















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF SQUARE ROOT TRANSFORMED DATA FOR

























the original measurements was necessary to meet the tests for the
normal distribution and equality of variance assumptions. The ANOVA
model is considered appropriate and as the F test leads to the con-
clusion of a significant factor effect, the family of comparisons
is displayed in Table 5-16.
The comparisons for agreement demonstrate that the interactive
communication in joint decision making leads to significantly increased
agreement over all other levels, thus supporting the hypothesis for
this phase concerning agreement. Also, the comparison of the
evaluation phase against the orientation phase suggests that the
exposure of alternative resource allocation evaluations may be helpful
in bringing about closer agreement than would exist in orientation
only, thus indicating that persuasion may have occurred to some
extent in evaluation as hypothesized for this condition.
Taken together, the results for subordinate analysis of the
content of the participative budgeting process indicate that the
coorientation model variables utilized to represent the subordinate
analysis captured several significant effects of the allowed interac-
tive communication in the experiment. These results indicate that,
in this setting, subordinate participation must occur in all three
phases of the budgeting process for significant increases in the
evaluation based variables to occur, since joint decision making in-
cludes the allowed interactive communication of earlier phases. The
results also indicate that the level of understanding, as measured in




CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR DIFFERENCES IN SQUARE ROOT
TRANSFORMED FACTOR LEVEL MEANS FOR SUBORDINATE
AGREEMENT WITH THE FINAL BUDGET:
90% FA^IILY CONFIDENCE COEFFICIENT
Fairwise Comparison (Factor Levels) Confidence Interval
Orientation to No Participation (2,1) -16.8 i. U2 - Uj <. 23.0
Evaluation to No Participation (3,1) -34.8 ^ U3 - U-^ £ 5.0
Joint Decision Making to No Participation (4,1) -58.2 <_ U4 - U^ ^ -18. A
Evaluation to Orientation (3,2) -37.9 ^ U3 - U2 ^ 1.9
Joint Decision Making to Orientation (4,2) -61.3 <_ U^ - U2 <. -21.5
Joint Decision Making to Evaluation (4,3) -43.3 <. U4 - U^ <_ -3.5
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affected by subsequent interactive communication in the time frame
provided.
Subordinate Attitudes Toward the Budget
Three subordinate attitudes toward the final budget were each
measured utilizing a five point Likert-type scale in the final step
of the experiment. The analysis of the measures obtained for sub-
ordinate satisfaction, perceived correctness, and commitment regarding
the final budget is discussed below.
Satisfaction (Response 7)
The summary of sample data and the analysis of variance for
the measure of subordinate satisfaction are displayed in Tables
5-17 and 5-18 respectively. The normal distribution and equality of
variance assumption tests are met, and the F test leads to the con-
clusion of no significant factor effects on satisfaction.
These results do not support the hypothesis that participa-
tion leads to increased satisfaction as a more favorable attitude
toward the budget. The mean response for satisfaction across condi-
tions, while suggestive only, indicates that if satisfaction does in-
crease, it would not do so until the joint decision making phase of
the process.
The analysis of the results of the attitude measures was
conducted with the same /\NOVA model and techniques used for the co-
orientation variables. Because the attitude scales may have only
ordinal properties the non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis one-way analysis
of variance procedures may be theoretically more appropriate.




SUMMARY OF SAMPLE DATA FOR SUBORDINATE SATISFACTION





Sample Test Standard H-'^ Test
Level Size Mean Statistic Deviation Variance Statistic




















ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SUBORDINATE SATISFACTION

























Perceived Correctness (Response 8)
The summary of sample data and analysis of variance for the
measure of perceived correctness of the final budget are displayed
in Tables 5-19 and 5-20 respectively. The ANOVA model assumption
tests are met and the F test leads to the conclusion of a signifi-
cant factor effect. Thus, the family of comparisons for perceived
correctness is displayed in Table 5-21.
The family of comparisons indicates that the joint decision
making phase leads to significantly increased perceived correctness
relative to no participation. These results support the hypothesis
that such a perception would occur in the joint decision making phase.
Also of interest is that the means consistently increase over the
three phases of the budgeting process, though not significantly so.
Commitment (Response 9)
The summary of sample data and the analysis of variance for
the measure of commitment to the final budget are displayed in Tables
5-22 and 5-23 respectively. Both tests for the ANOVA model assump-
tions are met. While the F ratio does not exceed the critical value
for the criterion level of<^= .05, the attained level of significance
23
for the observed F ratio is .057. This strongly suggests that
increased commitment results from participation, although the cri-
terion for rejection of the null hypothesis is not achieved in this
basis to utilize the parametric approach as the results are not likely
to be significantly different from those of the nonparametric test.
23




SUMMARY OF SAMPLE DATA FOR SUBORDINATE PERCEIVED CORRECTNESS




Sample Test Standard H'^ Test
Level Size Mean Statistic Deviation Variance Statistic
1 8 2.62 .998 1.06 1.12
2 8 2.87 .995 1.36 1.85
2.3
3 8 3.75 .999 .89 .79







ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR SUBORDINATE PERCEIVED CORRECTNESS


























CONFIDENCE INTERVALS FOR DIFFERENCES IN
FACTOR LEVEL MEANS FOR SUBORDINATE PERCEIVED
CORRECTNESS OF THE FINAL BUDGET:
90% FAMILY CONFIDENCE COEFFICIENT
Pairwise Comparison (Factor Levels) Confidence Interval
Orientation to No Participation (2,1) -1.53 ^ U2 - U-j^ <. 1.09
Evaluation to No Participation (3,1) - . 21 <. U3 - Uj^ ^ 2. 47
Joint Decision Making to No Participation (4.1) . 16 <. U^ - U-^ <. 2.84
Evaluation to Orientation (3,2) - .46 <. U3 - U2 ^ 2.22
Joint Decision Making to Orientation (4,2) - . 09 <. U4 - U2 <- 2 . 59









Sample Test Standard H* Test
Level Size Mean Statistic Deviation Variance Statistic














































experiment. Further, the consistent increases in the mean responses
for commitment over the three phases of the process suggest that if
commitment does change, It will increase over these successive phases
as a result of participation.
Taken together, the results for the attitude measures indicate
that perceived correctness is a significant response and strongly
suggest that commitment in terms of unwillingness to change the
budget is a response to participation in the joint decision making
phase of the budgeting process. Satisfaction with the budget, on the
other hand, does not appear to be a response. As Increased satisfac-
tion has been found to be a result in other participation studies,
however, the experimental task of this study may not have been suffi-
ciently long or ego-involving to lead to significantly Increased
satisfaction. On balance these findings provide affirmative support
for the question of whether more favorable subordinate attitudes
toward the budget result from participation in the budgeting process,
if participation as allowed Interactive communication occurs in all
three phases.
The next section of the chapter examines the relationships
between the subordinate content analysis and these attitudes as a
means to provide empirical evidence for how subordinate attitudes
toward the budget result from participation in budgeting.
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Relationships Among Response Variables
Within Groups
The subordinate analysis of the content of the participative
budgeting process was hypothesized to lead to more favorable sub-
ordinate attitudes toward the budget. The investigation above of
the significant differences in the coorientation variables repre-
senting this subordinate content analysis and these attitudes as
responses to participation with the ANOVA model and related proce-
dures focused on the mean responses of the groups at each factor level
or condition of the experiment. The relationships among these response
variables investigated in this section focuses on the variation of
these responses within each condition. The statistical method
employed to assess these relationships is discussed below.
Statistical Method
Since both many of the content analysis variables and the atti-
tudes toward the budget were determined to be responses to the
qualitative factor of participation, the exact nature of the statis-
tical relationship among these variables cannot be specified as might
be the case if participation were quantitative. However, the concep-
tual basis for the hypotheses that the subordinate analysis of the
content leads to more favorable attitudes was previously established,
and the use of a simple correlation technique is considered appro-
priate to establish the existence of relationships between these
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response variables. Correlation only characterizes the existence
of a relationship while saying nothing about the underlying reasons.
It only indicates that the variables vary together either positively
-, 24
or negatively. Thus the analysis of the relationships below relies
on the conceptual basis established earlier for the explanation of
any empirical evidence concerning significant relationships found by
the correlation between any two response variables. The technique
25
utilized is the Pearson product-moment correlation.
The Pearson product-moment correlation method calculates an
index, r, characterizing the degree of linear relationship between
two variables. This index provides the magnitude and the direction,
either positive or negative, of the extent to which these variables
tend to move together. The significance of the correlation index
can be tested by determining the probability that the value, and also
the direction, if desired, of any index found is due to sampling
error. The probabilities of index values for given sample sizes
have been tabled to allow the testing of the significance of the value
and the direction of correlation attained for a specified criterion
level of significance. As the analysis below is within each condi-
tion or level of the experiment, the sample size is eight. The
criterion significance level has been set at ^^= .05. Since the
^Frederick Williams, Reasoning With Statistics (New York;
Holt, Rinehard and Winston, Inc., 1968) pp. 127-128.
^^ Ibid .. pp. 130-136.
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response variables are hypothesized to vary in the same direction,
a one-tailed or directional test is considered appropriate. Given
these conditions, the critical value for the index r is +.549.^^
A sample correlation index greater than +.549 allows rejection of
the null hypothesis of no significant relationship between two
variables. Thus, the decision rule to decide between
C]^: Any two response variables are uncorrelated (p = 0) ; and
C^: Any two response variables are positively correlated
(p > 0); where p is the population correlation coefficient;
is
If r £+.549 conclude C, ;
otherwise conclude C„
.
A correlation index greater than .549 allows the conclusion that
the two response variables are related with a 95% confidence coeffi-
cient.
Conditions
The product-moment correlations within each condition or factor
level of the experiment are displayed in Tables 5-24 through 5-27.
Each significant correlation index is denoted by (*) . If an attained
correlation is significant in the negative direction, it is denoted
by (**) . Since the measurement techniques for the evaluation based
coorientation variables cast increasing values of these relationships
in terms of decreasing numerical values, the signs of these numerical
values were reversed to establish the same direction for the evaluation
2 f>
Biometrika Tables for Statisticians, Volume I , ed . by
E. S. Pearson and H. 0. Hartley (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1954), Table 13, p. 138.

TABLE 5-24
CORRELATION OF SUBORDINME CONTENT ANALYSIS
AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE BUDGET IN THE


































































































































































CORRF.Ij^.TION OF SIIRORDINATE CONTENT ANALYSIS
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AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE BUDGET IN THE
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Other Vice Pres. -.232 .851* .652*
Congruency with
the President -.353 .900* .700* .936*
Agreement with the
Final Budget -.A26 .726* .812* .9''t7* .933*
Satisfaction -.857** .372 .930* .A86 .531 .635*
Perceived Correctness -.903** .517 .839* .A 3/. .608'- .566* .872*
Commitment -.656** .551 .889* .726* .778* .857* .771* .78A*
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based variables as the understanding and attitude variables for
the correlation procedures.
Control (Factor Level 1)
Table 5-24 displays a matrix of the product-moment correla-
tions between all pairs of the nine response variables in the control
condition. Conceptually, these is no reason to expect any signifi-
cant relationships in this condition as subjects were in isolation
and no interactive communication occurred. However, because the
budgeting situation was relatively well structured to facilitate
the completion of the experimental task within the two hour time
frame, subjects could by chance estimate the other evaluations in
a range close to these of conditions allowing interactive communi-
cation. The actual results were that the means of the response
variables were generally the lowest in the control condition.
The results in Table 5-24 indicate that the more accurately
subjects estimated the president's actual evaluation, the more their
own evaluation agreed with the final imposed budget and the more they
were committed to it (that is, less willing to change it). The more
subjects happened to be congruent with each other, the more they
happened to be congruent with the president, and these variables were
related to perceived correctness of the imposed budget. Also, tlie
more subjects own evaluations agreed with the final budget, the more
they perceived it as correct and the more committed they were to it.
Finally, the three attitude measures were related to each other.
The significant relationships found, while due to variation
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around generally low mean values of the response variables, provide
a possible insight as to why "pseudo-participation" can occur so
easily. Even though no actual participation occurred, the fact that
individuals tended to view the budgeting situation in somewhat simi-
lar fashion was associated with more favorable attitudes toward the
budget. On the other hand, the results indicate to a considerable
extent that in the absence of allowed interactive communication, the
subordinate analysis of the content is extremely limited by the lack of a
basis to attribute evaluations to the other vice president or the
president. Thus, the significant relationships result solely from the
subjects drawing somewhat similar conclusions from Packet A in isola-
tion, and it is not expected that similar results would occur in
less structured situations.
Orientation (Factor Level 2)
Table 5-25 displays the matrix of correlations between all
pairs of the response variables for the orientation condition. The
means of the response variables were generally higher in the orienta-
tion condition and accuracy in perceiving the president was signifi-
cantly higher than the control condition. As only facts were dis-
cussed in orientation, the significant results displayed in Table
5-25 are considered attributable to similar evaluations which may
have resulted indirectly from the limited interactive communication.
Subjects who tended to be congruent with each other were also con-
gruent with the president. The more accurately subjects estimated
the president's evaluation the more they agreed with it as the final
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budget. However, in contrast to the control condition, these content
analysis variables did not relate to any of the attitude measures.
The three attitude measures again were significantly related to each
other, however.
The absence of any significant relationships between the
content analysis variables and the attitudes in the orientation phase,
in contrast to the control condition, suggests that the initiation
of the participation process may provide subordinates in orientation
a more realistic basis to assess both their roles and the content of
the budgeting process as opposed to subordinates in the control condi-
tion. In control, even though the subjects were informed their budget
recommendations were not considered, to the extent their evaluations
were similar to the final budget, they may have thought they could
have influenced the president and thus their limited analysis led to
,
more favorable attitudes. Allowing discussion of the facts in orien-
tation may have made each subject more aware of the limited possi-
bility for influence, and individuals may well have thought that
different alternatives should have been discussed. Hence, even as
a subject's own evaluation was more similar to the inposed budget,
little in the way of an external referent existed to assess whether
the budget was correct, and no commitment or satisfaction resulted.
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Evaluation (Factor Level 3)
The matrix of correlations of all pairs of response variables
in the evaluation condition is displayed in Table 5-26. The means
of the responses were, with some exceptions, generally higher in
evaluation than in the control or orientation conditions. As this
condition allowed both the discussion of the facts of the situation
and alternative ideas, opinions, and suggestions concerning the
resource allocations, the significant relationships displayed in
the table are to some extent surprising. The more subjects under-
stood the budgeting situation (that is, were cooriented with the
accomplice), the less committed they were to the budget. The more
accurately they perceived the president, the more they agreed with
the budget, but again were less committed to it. Subjects' congru-
ency with each other was significantly related to congruency with the
president and to agreement, but this congruency was negatively re-
lated to satisfaction with the budget adopted. Further, the more
subjects accurately perceived each other, the less committed they
became to the imposed budget. Finally, the relationships between
the attitudes found earlier in the control and orientation conditions
are not seen in this condition.
The relationships found in evaluation indicate that allowing
participation to the extent of discussing facts and alternative ideas
and suggestions, but then imposing the budget, may create a potential
problem. Since the findings indicate that to the extent each subor-
dinate in this condition more accurately perceives the other subordi-
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nate's evaluation, thinks more congruenty with the president,
agrees with the budget, and yet feels less committed to it and less
satisfied with it, it can be argued that in this condition the
subordinates don't particularly like to have their own budget im-
posed on them as the budget moves closer to what they recommended
before the final decision. Put another way, subjects may have felt
that all the president did was take their recommendation, change it
somewhat, and send it back as the imposed budget. Thus, the atti-
tudes toward the budget become less favorable.
Another possible explanation for these results is provided by
Bales and Strodtbeck. They note that over the phases of their
group problem solving process, both positive and negative social-
emotional reactions tend to increase in terms of tension versus its
release, solidarity versus antagonism, and agreement versus disagree-
ment. It is only at the end of the final phase that the positive
27
reactions reach their peak and the negative reactions are dispelled.
Thus, terminating the participation process at evaluation may well
leave subordinates in a state of conflicting feelings.
? 7
Bales and Strodtbeck, "Phases in Group Problem Solving,"
pp. 485-A89.
o o
This possibility may have important implications for the
cohesiveness question discussed in chapter three although not
considered in the experiment.
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Joint Decision Making (Factor Level 4)
The matrix of correlations of all pairs of response variables
for the joint decision making condition is displayed in Table 5-27.
The means of the response variables were all higher than those
in previous conditions and most of the significant differences were
found to be the result of this factor level. The many significant
relationships displayed in Table 5-27 are discussed below.
The negative significant relationships between understanding
and accuracy in perceiving the president and the attitudes toward
the budget are in the opposite direction than hypothesized. One
interpretation suggested by these results is that the negative rela-
tionship between understanding and accuracy implies that the subor-
dinate thinks the president should evaluate the budgeting situation
more in line with his own evaluation, since both are more cooriented
to the budgeting situation. However, the subordinate is wrong in
perceiving the president, and when the jointly decided budget is
reached through consensus, the final budget is not the one considered
to be optimal by the subordinate.
An alternative interpretation suggested by these results is
that the less a subordinate understands the situation, the more likely
he is to adopt favorable attitudes toward the budget, because he is
influenced by, and also more certain of, the president's evalua-
tion. This interpretation is supported by the fact that subordinate
accuracy in perceiving the president is strongly positively related
to the attitude variables and subject congruency with the president is
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related to perceived correctness and commitment.
The lack of any positive findings between understanding and
the evaluation based variables fails to support the hypothesized
relationships. However, the lack of a significant increase in
understanding while significant increases occurred for all of the
evaluation based variables in this condition is one explanation for
the absence of any relationships. Another possibility is that the
measure of understanding utilized in this study was inappropriate to
link the perception of facts to the evaluations of the budgeting
situation.
The evaluation-based content analysis variables are all
significantly related to each other except for the two accuracy
measures. These results demonstrate that, as discussed in the
conceptual development, as accuracy and agreement change, so also
does congruency, even though congruency by itself is difficult to
predict. Thus the joint decision making phase enables participants
to analyze the content of the process such that as they become more
accurate in perceiving each other's evaluations and more congruent
with each other's evaluations, they agree more on the final budget.
In effect, a mutual persuasion process occurs.
The evaluation-based variables representing subordinate analysis
of the content in general led to more favorable attitudes as hypothe-
sized for the variables based on the subordinate-president perspec-
tives. The more accurately subordinates perceived the president,
the more favorable were the attitudes toward the budget. The more
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congruent subjects were with the president, the more subjects
perceived the budget as correct and were committed to it. By con-
trast, accuracy and congruency relative to the other vice president
was significantly related only to commitment. Finally, the more
subjects agreed with the final budget, the more favorable the atti-
tudes and, in turn, the attitudes were significantly correlated with
each other.
These results indicate that, as Bales and Strodtbeck theorize,
the end of the final phase of the process is the key aspect of
achieving the favorable attitudes. The significant results suggest
that, if any negative reactions did arise in the evaluation phase,
they were dispelled in the joint decision making phase.
These evaluation-based variable linkages to more favorable atti-
tudes also suggest that subordinates are more influenced by the
president than each other, as only commitment was related to the
other subordinate related accuracy and congruency variables.
On balance, these findings in the joint decision making phase
provide considerable empirical evidence to explain how the more
favorable subordinate attitudes toward the budget result from
participation as allowed interactive communication.
Other Findings
Two other findings of interest concern the experimental treat-





Given the extensive consideration of perceived subordinate
influence on decisions made in prior research, subjects in the experi-
mental treatment groups were asked appropriate questions concerning
their perceived influence on the final budget. The responses are
analyzed below as a means to assess the effectiveness of the experi-
mental treatment on these groups.
Subjects in the orientation and evaluation conditions responded
to a question concerning how much influence they had on the final
budget. Subjects in the evaluation condition who could present ideas
and suggestions should have perceived more influence than subjects
in orientation who could discuss only the facts of the situation.
Thus, the F test described earlier, was used to decide between:
C-i : Perceived influence is the same in both the orientation,
and evaluation conditions; and
C2 : Perceived influence is not the same in both conditions.
The mean response for the evaluation condition of 3.63 corresponding
to "a considerable amount" on a five point Likert scale was found to
be significantly greater than the mean response of 2.75 corresponding
to a "fair to little amount" for the orientation condition at a
29
level ofC><.= .054 for the F test of the comparison of the two means.
^^The critical value for the F test at o^ = .05 for 1.14 degrees
of freedom is 4.61 while the F'^ from the ANOVA table was 4.57. The
attained significance level was found by interpolation in Table A-4
of Neter and Wasserman, Applied Linear Statistical Models . A direc-
tional T test of the two means revealed the evaluation condition mean
to be significantly greater than orientation at an «= .03.
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Thus, the experimental treatment was considered successful in these
conditions.
Subjects in joint decision making responded to a question about
their relative influence on the final budget. These subjects should
have perceived that they each had an equal voice in determining the
final budget. Six of the eight responses to the question were at
the Likert scale level of 3, corresponding to "about as much influ-
ence as the other members." The other two were at the 4 level, cor-
responding to "somewhat more than the other members." Thus the treat-
ment was considered successful in this condition as well.
Subject Selection and Assignment
The student volunteers used as subjects were asked to provide
their cumulative grade point average. This measure was analyzed
as a means to determine whether a homogeneous group had been selected
and assigned to the experimental conditions to minimize the possi-
bility of an initial selection bias. The ANOVA procedures were
used for this analysis and the summary of sample data and the analy-
sis of variance are displayed in Tables 5-28 and 5-29 respectively.
The tests of the assumptions underlying the ANOVA model are met and
the F test leads to the conclusion of no significant differences in
grade point average across groups. Thus, the subject selection
and random assignment to conditions was apparently successful in
minimizing the possibility of initial bias.
The grade point average for all seniors at the University








Sample Test Stanciard H^ Test
Level Size Mean Statistic Deviation Variance Statistic
1 8 3.03 .979 .28 .08
2 8 3.15 .972
.35 .12
3 8 3.22 .952 .34 .12 2,8


































This chapter describes the analysis of the results of the
study experiment that was designed to test hypotheses concerning
whether and how more favorable subordinate attitudes toward the
budget result from participation in the budgeting process.
The analysis of the experimental results provides empirical
evidence in support of several of the hypothesized effects of parti-
cipation as allowed interactive communication. These effects are
summarized in Figure 5-2. The significant increase in perceived
correctness of the budget coupled with the strong suggestion of an
increase in commitment to the budget by subordinates provides affir-
mative support for the question of whether more favorable attitudes
result from participation. The evaluation-based variables repre-
senting subordinate analysis of the content of participative
budgeting that significantly increased as a result of participation
were shown to be significantly associated with more favorable atti-
tudes in the joint decision making phase, thus providing empirical
evidence to support the conceptual basis for the explanation of how
these more favorable attitudes result from participative budgeting.
As most of the significant differences and the relationships
were found in the joint decision making condition, the full operation
of the participative budgeting model appears to be the key to gaining
more favorable attitudes toward the budget in this type of setting.
Limiting participative budgeting to the evaluation phase may create
undesirable relationships among the response variables. Limiting
participative budgeting to the orientation phase appears to be of
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limited value in terms of generating more favorable attitudes.
The findings concerning the experimental treatment and the sub-
ject selection and assignment provide supportive evidence for the
internal validity of the experiment. Thus, the empirical evidence
generated by the experiment is considered appropriate as the basis





This study was undertaken to develop a general model of par-
ticipative budgeting and to initiate a systematic exploration of its
operation and effects. A communication process approach, based on
prior research in participation concerned with subordinate influence
and with shared control of the decision making process by management
with subordinates integrated the managerial planning function, alter-
native decision style methods, and a group problem solving process
to develop a participative budgeting model. This model specifies
management and subordinate roles and interactive communication between
them over three phases to develop the budget. These phases are:
orientation, in which communication concerns the facts of the
budgeting situation; evaluation, in which alternative ideas, opinions,
and suggestions are discussed; and joint decision making, in which
consensus is reached on the final budget. This interactive communi-
cation as participation was hypothesized to enable subordinate
analysis of the content of the budgeting process which in turn would
lead to more favorable subordinate attitudes toward the budget.
The experimental operation of the model in a laboratory setting
varied the interactive communication between participants. The
results of the experiment, analyzed in the previous chapter, provide
the basis for the major conclusions and implications discussed below.
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The limitations and recomraended extensions of this research are
then outlined to conclude the report of the study.
Conclusions
The conclusions concern three major areas: the experimental
findings as they relate to the prior research discussed in chapter
two; implications concerning participant relationships that emerged
in the experimental setting; and implications for the viability
of the communication process approach to the investigation of parti-
cipative budgeting. These conclusions should be interpreted in the
context of the experimental setting. The same information packet
was provided to all participants and the experimental task was accom-
plished within a two hour time frame. Also, the budgeting situation
was fairly well structured to facilitate the completion of the task.
Thus the budget decisions that resulted over the four experimental
conditions are quite similar, and the likelihood of the budget deci-
sion as a confounding variable is not considered great. That is, the
results are considered to lead more directly to the conclusions below
than would be the case if the decisions had varied greatly over the
experimental conditions.
Relationship of Findings to Prior Research
Four major conclusions relate to the prior research. They
concern the Becker and Green research, the Foran and DeCoster study,
the research classified as the influence approach to participation
and the research considered as the shared control approach.
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Becker and Green Research
The experimental results support the hypothesis based on the
Becker and Green research that direction of the interaction process
to enable participant analysis of the content would result in more
favorable attitudes toward the budget. Most of the significant
effects of the allowed interactive communication on the content analy-
sis and attitude response variables and the significant relation-
ships between them occurred in the joint decision making phase of the
model. Thus the full operation of the participative budgeting model
is considered necessary in this setting to gain more favorable atti-
tudes toward the budget.
The unexpected relationships among the response variables that
occurred by limiting participation to the evaluation phase suggest
that, if increased cohesiveness also results from participation as
Becker and Green hypothesize, a potential problem may arise. Speci-
fically, if increased cohesiveness occurs in the evaluation phase,
the interaction of the subordinate positive attitudes toward each
other and negative attitudes toward the budget may create an unde-
sirable balanced state of attitudes from management's perspective.
Foran and DeCoster Study
The experimental results relate to the use of alternative com-
munication networks and elements of the commitment factor in the
Foran and DeCoster study. The experiment utilized the wheel and all
-"-The conceptual basis for this possibility is discussed in
chapter three. Supra pp. 5A-58.
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channel communication networks as did their study. The wheel
network was used in the control or no participation condition and
the all channel was used in each of the treatment conditions. By
not allowing the possibility of psuedo-participation to arise through
the occurrence of feedback in the wheel network, which happened in
the Foran and DeCoster experiment, the experimental results provide
support for their hypothesis that significant effects would be
related to the use of these alternative networks. Specifically, all
of the significant increases in the response variables of this
experiment occurred in the treatment conditions using an all channel
network.
The significant correlations between the attitudes toward the
budget that resulted in three of the four experimental conditions
provide empirical support for the Foran and DeCoster commitment fac-
tor which included these attitudes. These correlations are consistent
with their results since the factor analysis procedure they utilized
establishes which of several variables tend to move together and
9
thus may measure something in common. On the other hand, their
factor may obscure the relative strengths of these attitudes, as
perceived correctness was significantly greater, increased commit-
ment was strongly suggested and no strong effect existed for satis-
faction in this experiment.
2Williams, Reasoning with Statistics, p. 151,

170
Participation as Influence Research
The research concerning the perception of influence by subor-
dinates on the decisions made had strongly suggested, but never made
explicit, the linkage between this perception and interactive com-
munication. The assessment of the experimental treatment which
indicated an increase in the perception of influence by subordi-
nates corresponding to the controlled increase in allowed interactive
communication from the orientation to the evaluation phase demon-
strates this linkage.
Participation as Shared Control Research
The research concerning the sharing of control of the decision
making process by management with subordinates strongly suggested
communication network and information variation as the operational
means to this sharing of control. As all of the significant increases
in the responses resulted from the experimental treatment in all
channel networks, these results suggest further support for this
approach. Also, the perception by subordinates in the joint decision
making condition that they had about as much influence or somewhat
more influence as the other participants on the final budget suggests
that they may have felt their input was incorporated in the final
budget. Thus the control was apparently fully shared in the joint





The experimental results indicate that to some extent the accom-
plice in the role of president was influenced by the subordinates as
the imposed decisions in the orientation and subsequent phases did
vary somewhat. Thus the perception of influence reported in these
conditions is consistent with these results. The budgets adopted in
the sessions of the joint decision making condition were in fact
reached through consensus, and hence the relatively equal influence
perceived by subordinates is consistent with that result as well.
Two findings relative to the subordinate content analysis
variables suggest that the accomplice as president may have had
considerable influence on the subjects as subordinates. They concern
the significant correlations between the content analysis variables
and attitudes found in the joint decision making phase and the trans-
formations required to stabilize the variances in the measures of
accuracy and congruency.
The significant correlations between subordinate content
analysis variables relative to the president and the attitude varia-
bles were far more numerous than those between the same types of
response variables relative to the other subordinate and the same
attitudes. This suggests that subject evaluations were more influ-
enced by the accomplice than by each other in terms of the subsequent
effects on attitudes. The transformations required to stablize
the accuracy and congruency variances relative to the other vice
president were of a square root form while those for the same varia-
bles relative to the president were of a logarithmic form. These
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results suggest that subordinates reacted much more quickly to the
president than to each other over the three experimental treatment
conditions.
The implication of these results is that the accomplice was
effective in directing the participative budgeting process and the
influence that resulted was to be expected. This interpretation is
consistent with Maier's argument that regardless of problem solving
ability, a leader tends to exert a major influence on the outcome of
3
a discussion. This implication is also consistent with the Becker
and Green position that management should direct the participation
process.
Viability of the Communication Process Approach
Taken together, the experimental results demonstrate the via-
bility of a communication process approach to the study of partici-
pative budgeting. The experiment, while only a limited test of the
model, generated evidence supporting the hypothesized linkage between
subordinate analysis of the content of the budgeting process and more
favorable attitudes toward the budget. Importantly, no fundamental
flaws in the operation of the model and its related measurement
approach were exposed by this initial test. Thus, subsequent uses of
the approach are recommended as extensions of this research. However,
the limitations of the present study are first discussed below.
Norman R. F. Maier, "Assestsand Liabilities in Group Problem
Solving: The Need for an Integrative Function," Psychological Review




The limitations of this study concern three major areas: the
generalizability of the findings; the focus on the effects of the
communication process; and the test instruments used in the measure-
ment of the content analysis variables.
Generalizability
A major limitation is the lack of generalizability of the
experimental findings to real world settings. Many of the aspects
of this limitation, discussed below, were occasioned by the need to
establish a high degree of internal validity in the experimental
design. Otherwise, an unambiguous linkage of the significant differ-
ences in the response variables found in the experiment to the treat-
ment of participation could not have been made.
The experimental subjects were students as surrogates for subor-
dinate manager roles. While these individuals were close to graduating
and assuming managerial type positions in organizations, there is
little reason to expect that their behavior in a laboratory setting
4
would be similar to that of real world managers. Future replications
of this research could utilize managers in a laboratory in a real
world setting to permit more generalized findings of the results.
For a discussion of the general problem of surrogation, see
John W. Dickhaut, John L. Livingstone, and David J. H. Watson, "On
the Use of Surrogates in Behavioral Experimentation," Report of the
Committee on Research Methodology in Accounting, supplement to
volume XLWV of the Accounting Review (1962): pp. 455-471.
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The same budgeting information packet provided to all partici-
pants as the experimental baseline is not representative of most
real world situations, where budgeting information available to each
individual is likely to be quite different. Subsequent laboratory
replications of this study may vary both the amount and type of infor-
mation available to participants to better represent real world
settings. Field tests of the model may attempt to capture the actual
budgeting information available as part of the analysis.
The budgeting situation was fairly well-defined to facilitate
the completion of the experiment within the allotted two hour time
frame as well as to minimize the variability of the decisions made
as noted above. Real world situations are likely to be considerably
less structured. Thus, future replications may vary the complexity
of the situation as well as the time involved to better represent
real world situations.
The experimental budgeting activity was limited to a one-time
planning exercise within the budget cycle, with only historical
data provided as information about previous years. A real v/orld
participative budgeting process is likely to involve individuals who
were directly affected by the previous results and who will be
affected by the budget developed. Thus subsequent research may
expand the model to incorporate the control function and feedback
process to investigate the participative budgeting model in longi-
tudinal studies. Suggested expansions are discussed as part of




The analysis of the interactive communication activity in the
experiment focused on certain effects and assumed that the unobserved
activity comprising the operation of the process was constant across
laboratory sessions. This assumption was a primary underlying reason
for the use of the same accomplice in all sessions. The major
limitation imposed by this assumption is that confounding variables
may have arisen within the communication activity to effect the results,
The probability of this occurrence is not considered great, however.
The major practical reason for focusing on the effects of the
communication was that the methodology required to analyze communica-
tion activity itself was considered beyond the scope of this study.
However subsequent research may undertake such an analysis using the
appropriate methodology from the communications field.
Test Instruments
The test instruments used to measure the variables related to
subordinate analysis of the content were developed and pretested as
part of this research. However, the experiment was the first opera-
tional use of the instruments and consequently their validity is
limited. As the instruments were based directly on the information
provided participants in the experiment, logically the instruments
appeared to measure what they were designed to measure, on their face.
The nature of this activity is discussed by Bales and
Strodtbeck in "Phases in Group Problem Solving," pp. 488-489.
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However, this face validity needs reinforcement by subsequent research
to establish the construct validity of the instruments. That is, it
must be determined that participants really do understand the budgeting
situation, accurately perceive the other participants, are congruent
with them, and in agreement with the final budget.
The experimental results suggest the most serious construct
validity problem relates to the understanding measure. The general
lack of any significant relationships between understanding and the
other content analysis variables imply that the understanding measure
may have been inappropriate to assess subordinate understanding.
Extensions of the Research
The results of this study are considered primarily useful as
a basis for further research in three major areas beyond the replica-
tions suggested above to permit the generalizability of findings from
the use of the model to real world settings. These areas concern
the elaboration of the participative budgeting model, other applica-
tions of the coorientation model in accounting research and aspects
of the budget decision that result from the participative budgeting
process.
The validity aspects discussed here are drawn from the dis-
cussion by Stephen Issac and William B. MicheaL, Handbook in Research
and Evaluation (San Diego: Edits Publishers, 1975), pp. 82-83.
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Elaboration of the Participative Budgeting Model
The elaboration of the model developed in this research may
occur in two directions. First, participant information processing
models assumed to exist and operate within the participative budgeting
model may be explicitly investigated in subsequent research. For
example, the methodology of the Brunswick Lens model may be incor-
porated in the orientation phase to assess the degree of similarity
of perceiving the facts of the budgeting situation between partici-
pants in a more rigorous manner. Also, participant preference
functions and decision models may be incorporated in the evaluation
and decision making phases respectively to provide additional insights
concerning the effects of interactive communication as participation
in the budgeting process.
The second direction to elaborate the model may involve its
expansion to incorporate the activities of the control function in
the budget cycle. An initial extension in this direction may be to
incorporate a behavioral intention model to allow the assessment of
whether and how the more favorable attitudes toward the budget relate
to aspiration levels and motivation of subordinates to achieve the
Q
budget. Then these results may be extended into the analysis of
An example of how such an approach might be undertaken is
provided by William F. Wright in "Financial Information Processing
Models: An Empirical Study," The Accounting Review LII, no. 3 (1977):
pp. 676-689.
o
Such a model is developed at length by Martin Fishbein and
Icek Ajzen in Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior (Reading, Mass
Addison - Wesley Publishing Co.; 1975), pp. 298-308.
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subsequent budget related behavior in the control function.
Uses of the Coorientation Model
Other uses of the coorientation concept and measurement model
may be possible in both budgeting-related and other accounting
research. An immediate extension of this study may be the investi-
gation of whether increased cohesiveness results from participation
in the budgeting process and whether it interacts with the attitudes
toward the budget. Such a study may construct the appropriate
matchings between components of participant attitudes toward each
other as well as toward the budget and then use the measurement model,
Another budgeting related use of the coorientation model may
9be the investigation of the budgetary slack issue. Such a study
may investigate the direction of the differences in the various
matchings of participant actual and estimated evaluations as a pos-
sible means to determine whether slack is actually built into, or
thought to be built into, budget recommendations.
The use of the coorientation model may be appropriate in other
areas of accounting research that concern comparisons of judgements
between individuals. For example, research concerning auditor judge-
ment of internal control situations may find the coorientation model
useful to determine whether auditors who report different evaluations
concerning an internal control situation are cooriented to the facts
of that situation. If not, the variation in judgement may be found
9
The budget slack issue is discussed by Michael Schiff and
Arie Y. Lewin in "The Impact of People on Budgets," Accounting Review
XLV, no. 2(1970): pp. 259-268.
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attributable to the lack of coorientation.
Aspects of Budget Decisions
The present study was concerned with the attitudes toward the
budget as an indication of subordinate acceptance of the budget
decision. Subsequent research may seek other or refined measures of
subordinate acceptance. As a related extension, future studies may
investigate the effects of the participative budgeting process on the
quality of the budget decision. One approach to investigation of
decision quality may be to test the Vroom and Yetton normative model,
which deals with both decision quality and acceptance, in a participa-
tive budgeting setting.
In conclusion, Swieringa and Moncur state:
Even though the objective of budgeting is to influence
managerial behavior -. . .- our present knowledge of the
mechanism through which or by which budgeting influences that
behavior is at best incomplete . -'--'-
This study is considered to have taken the first step toward providing
this knowledge.
'^This model is based on the decision styles taxonomy incor-
porated in the model of this study. See Vroom and Yetton, Leadership
and Decision Making
,
for the model development and prescription for
its use.







This appendix provides the materials and instruments of the
experiment. The four packets are arranged in the sequence utilized in
the laboratory session. The variations of each packet across the four
conditions follow the basic packet and are identified as to their
specific conditions.
Packet A was provided to all participants in the format shown on
pages 181 through 192.
Packet B was used to provide subjects the procedures appropriate
to their assigned experimental condition. The packet shovm here is the
type provided a subject assigned the position of vice president for
production, as chapter four outlined the typical vice president for
sales position. The packet for condition 1 is shown on pages 193
through 1%; the condition 2 variations, pages 197-8; condition 3 vari-
ations, pages 199-200; and condition 4 variations, pages 201-202.
Packet C was used to record subject responses concerning the
facts of the budgeting situation and actual and estimated evaluations
concerning the budgeting situation held by participants. The packet
for conditions 1 through 3 is shown on pages 203-10; the condition 4
variation is shown on pages 211-213.
Packet D was utilized to record subject responses concerning
dependent measures and other data. The condition 1 packet is shown on
pages 214-217; the condition 2 and 3 packet included page 218 but did not
include page 214; and the packet in condition 4 included page 219




Thank you for taking the time to participate in this session
today. You are about to become involved in a laboratory session in
which you and the other participants will assume the roles of busi-
ness executives making decisions. The session has been designed to
simulate in many ways an organization environment that you may experi-
ence when employed as a manager in an organization. Similarly, the
decisions that will be made are similar in many ways to those you
will find made in actual business practice. The decisions involve
the allocation of funds within the organization and a pricing stra-
tegy in a highly competitive market.
One of the major aims of this project is to determine the use-
fulness of certain information in decision-making. The purpose of
this packet is to provide you with the information along with a
brief explanation of the organizational setting simulated in the
session. Thus, we would like you to take the next thirty minutes
to read through the following pages. After you have read this packet,
you will receive another packet which specifies the exact role we
would like you to take during the remainder of the session.




This session utilizes a simplified economy with three indus-
tries. Within each of these industries, three companies compete for
their share of the market within the industry; each company sells
the same basic product. To make this session one involving general
business principles, the product is not specifically defined. The
decisions which must be made are thus based on general business prin-
ciples rather than on specific knowledge concerning the production
and distribution of a particular product, or specific knowledge of
particular accounting and financial procedures.
Your company is firm 2 in a particular industry in this economy,






You will soon be asked to assume one of these roles, and the specific
responsibilities of your position will be detailed at that time.
Again, you company is one of three firms operating in a highly com-
petitive industry.
As the above organization chart might suggest, many simplifications
have been made here to reduce a real-life business situation to one
which can be handled during this session. One major simplification
is the requirement that the firm's operations in the market be
financed entirely from cash on hand. This is admittedly unrealistic
and results in a much larger amount of cash, compared with total
assets, than a firm would have on hand in real life. Similarly, some
of the usual percentage figures typically used for analyzing the
financial statements obviously will not be usable here. However,
it has been found that participants adjust quickly to the specific
frame of reference used in this laboratory session, and the experi-
ence becomes a surprisingly interesting one because of the realistic
business factors included. As this description progresses you will




GEOGRAPHICAL BREAKDOWN OF THE INDUSTRY MARKET
The industry market Is geographically divided into four areas
as shown below and any firm in the industry may sell its product in
any area of this market. Area 1 is the home area of firm 1, area
2 is the home area of firm 2 (your firm) , and area 3 is the home area
of firm 3; area 4 is an open market. Each firm has an advantage in
its own area, in that you will find later there are no transporta-
tion charges for the firm on any units sold in its home area. Such
charges are applied to units sold in competitors' areas and in the
open market area, area 4. The amount of the transportation charges
will be described below.
REPORTS AVAILABLE
You will soon be provided reports showing the economic condi-
tion of your company and the industry at the present time. There
are two kinds of reports: industry reports and confidential reports .
The industry report contains information of the type usually publushed
by firms and is available to the entire industry. Each firm's indus-
try report is identical. The confidential report contains the kind
of internal documents that usually would be available to managers
making the type of decisions your firm will be faced with during the
session. Some of the information in this report may not be generally
available to the public, and each firm's report applied only to its
own firm's operations. Both reports will be described in detail later.
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DECISIONS TO BE MADE
AREA DECISIONS
, After analyzing the reports, your firm will
make a set of decision. The first set consists of the area decisions.
For each marketing area, it must decide the unit selling price and
the amount of money to be spent on marketing
. The firm is free
to set any area price it desires and to spend any part of its avail-
able cash for marketing in any area. The amount of money spent on
marketing covers advertising, sales salaries, commissions, and other
items associated with the company's marketing effort.
The potential industry market in each area is a function of
product price, market research, and the total marketing expenditure
in the area. Thus, the potential market and each firm's share of
that market depend on the funds spent on these activities. Since
this is a competitive situation, the relation of marketing dollars
and research dollars (to be discussed shortly) of one company to the
other two in the industry is quite important for each area.
Also, the demand in the industry may vary up and down with the
business index as is likely to occur in normal periods of growth or
recession.
PLANT DECISIONS . Your firm must also decide how much money to
spend on plant improvement or expansion, production
,
and research .
Plant and equipment manufacturing capacity may be increased
at a cost of $20,000 for each 1,000 units of product. The increased
capacity becomes available at the end of the year in which the expen-
diture is made. Overall plant capacity depreciates at a fixed rate
of 2% per year. The effect of the depreciation occurs at the end of
the year. Plant capacity can be calculated by dividing the plant
cost by $20. For simplicity, both plant and equipment have been
lumped together. To maintain plant capacity at a given level from
year to year, cash equal to depreciation must be allocated to plant
improvement.
Production expenditures cover materials, labor, and the indirect,
or overhead, costs of producing the units each year. To simplify
the situation, plant depreciation is not considered part of the over-
head costs of production. Thus, all overhead costs are cash costs in
your firm. Because of the nature of the production process, it is
necessary to produce units in lot sizes of 1,000 units.
Research expenditures may have a positive effect on the poten-
tial market by improving the desirability of your product. These
expenditures may also result in decreases in production costs by
discovery of new technology or improved processes. Thus, research




This section presents the information available to your firm
which will provide the basis for the decisions to be made shortly.
The information is presented as a five year summary of industry and
confidential reports.
You will probably find it quite easy to deal with most of the
information presented in the reports, as the financial statements
are primarily cash based. However, if you encounter any difficulty
with any of the items as you read through the reports, you may
utilize a glossary of terms provided at the end of the reports. The
terms are arranged in the same order in which they appear in the
reports. Your firm, firm 2, is highlighted in the industry report.
Please take a few minutes to carefully look over these reports, since
they will serve as the basis for the decisions which will be made very
shortly.
You will receive your specific role assignment after you have
looked over the reports provided on the following pages. As you read
these reports, the years should be read from left to right; that
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.147 152 151 166 167
141 134 132 128 146
$ 280 $ 360 $ 415 $ 390 $ 450
Firj'i 1 $40.00 $42.00 $44.00 J43.00 S-16.00
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ORDERS 14 10 2 2 2
SALES 14 10 2 2 2
PRICE Ca\RGED $40.00 $41.00 $44.00 $46.00 $41.00
UNIT DELIVERCD COST 36.49 36.97 36.51 36.17 40.01
SALES REVENUE 556 419 98 86 76
MARKETING 10 10 10
TRANSPORTATIOM 28 20 4 4 4
AREA 2 (HOME AREA)
ORDERS 114 132 138 63 101
SALES 114 132 133 63 99
PRICE $42.00 $43.00 $44.00 $50.00 $43.00
UNIT DELIVERCD COST. 34.49 34.97 34.51 34. 17 3n.oi
SALES KEVEjnjE 4768 5684 5372 3164 4270
MARKETING 352 400 425 565 400
TRANSPORTATION
AREA 3
ORDERS 14 8 3 2 2
SALES 14 8 3 2 2
PRICE $40.00 $41.00 $44.00 $46.00 $41.00
UI-IIT DELIVERED COST 36.49 36.97 36.51 36.17 40.01
SALES REV?:^^JE 550 347 121 94 96
.•(AP-KETING 10 10 10
TRANSPORTATION 28 17 6 4 5
AREA 4
0PJ5ERS 89 100 147 65 161
SALES 89 100 14 3 65 158
PRICE $42.00 $43.00 $44.00 $50.00 $43.00
UNIT DELIVtRED COST 35.49 35.97 35.51 35.17 39.0 1
SALES REVZNT'E 3749 4237 6271 3239 6780
mapj;eting 301 350 425 565 400
TRANSPORTATION 89 100 143 65 158
PRODUCTION' PEPOPT





































































































J 2 3 4 5
REVKN\ICS i 9623 J 10737 $12363 $ 6583 $11221
COST OF UNITS SOLD 7948 8762 9697 4509 9928
TRANSPORTATION 145 137 153 73 166
MAkKETIN'G 673 770 850 1150 800








TOTAL EXPENSES 89(>0 11022












OLD BMJ\::CE $ 9053 $ 9153 $10169 $11484 $ 6214
ADDi pj:vexues 9623 10737 12363 6583 11221
DEDUCTi rPODUCTIO^J 8955 8158 8990 9023 5413
TR/\N3P0RTATI0N 145 137 153 73 166
MARKETING 673 270 850 1150 800
pxsea.rch 100 100 104 150
PLANT IMP. 124 124 224 1160
TAXES 327 432 727 2 57 100
NB^ BALANCE $ 9153 $ W'SiS $11404 $ £214 $10957
BAL'.NCE SHEET ASSETS
CASH $ 9153 $10169 $11484 $ 6214 $10957
INVENTORY 1312 707 4514
PLANT
1
5220 5240 5359 6412 6203
OLD PLANT 5200 5220 5240 5359 64 12
ADD IMPROVEMENT 124 124 224 1160
DEDUCT DEPRECIATION {104J (JP4) JJS15.) ( \ov (178)




NOTE: While analyzing the reports, please bear in mind that most
figures are shown in even thousands of dollars and there may be some




An indication of the overall trend of the economy.
If it changes in a positive direction, the economy is expanding, and
the number of potential orders will increase. If it changes in a
negative direction, the economy is contracting, and the number of
potential orders will decrease.
Balance Sheet
Cash. The total amount of money on hand at the end of the year.
Inventory
.
The total value of the units remaining on hand at the
end of the year. The value of this inventory depends on the cost
of producing the units included in it.
Plant Inves tment . The value of the firm's plant at the end of the
year. The value of the plant depreciates at the rate of 2% per year
in this industry.
Total Assets . The sum of cash, inventory and plant investment.
Total Market Survey
Total Orders
. The total of all orders received by all firms doing
business in each area.
Total Sales . The total of all orders filled in each area. If there
are fewer sales than orders in any area, some firm or firms are not
producing enough to fill the orders.
Total Marketing . The total amount of money spent in the area indi-
cated by all the firms doing business in that area.
Area Analysis . Orders, sales, and marketing expenditures by area
indicated as totals for the firms doing business, in that area. Also
unit prices are separately stated as charged by each firm.
Firm Sale Prices . The unit price charged by each firm for each area







The total number of orders received by your firm in the
areas indicated during the periods covered by the report.
Sales
.
The total number of units sold by your firm in the areas
indicated for the period covered. If this figure is less than
orders, your firm is underproducing and/or pricing too low.
Unit prices
.
The decisions that your firm made in the previous year.
Unit delivered cost
. The unit cost of production plus the cost of
transporting the units to the areas in which they were sold.
Sales Revenue
. The total amount of money your firm received for the
sales it had in each of the areas indicated.
Marketing . The total amount your firm decided to spend on marketing
in each area during the previous period.
Transportation . The total cost of transporting units sold. The cost
of transporting units sold is as follows: units sold in your home
area incur no transportation costs; units sold in area 4 incur a
charge of $1.00 per unit sold. Units sold in competitor areas incur
a charge of $2.00 per unit.
Production Report
Inventory . The quantity, unit cost, and total value of unsold units
at the end of the year. In the next year, these units are sold first.
Plant Capacity . The quantity of units your plant could produce at
full capacity, the unit cost at capacity, and the total cost of full
capacity production. To increase plant capacity you must invest in
plant improvement. To determine plant capacity for any year, divide
the plant value by $20.
Current Production . The quantity of units produced during the year
indicated, their unit cost, and their total value.
10$ Less . The same data as current production at a level of 10%
fewer units.
10% More . The same data as current production at a level of 10% more






The total amount of cash received from the sale of units
each year.
Cost of Units Sold
.
The production cost of the units sold. The cost
of unsold units appears as inventory in the balance sheet.
Transportation
.
The cost of transporting units sold. This charge is
$1.00 per unit to area A, and $2.00 per unit to competitor areas.
Marketing
.




The amount your firm decided to spend on research each year,
Depreciation
. An expense computed at the rate of 2% of plant each
year.
Total Expense
. Total costs of operation each year.
Profit Before Taxes
. Revenue minus total expense.
Taxes . 50% of the profit before taxes.
Net Profit . Profit before taxes minus taxes.
Cash Statement
Old Balance . The amount of cash at the beginning of each year.
Revenue. Total cash received from the sale of units each year.
Production Cost . Total cost of production incurred each year. This
figure includes the cost of producing the unsold units in inventory.
Transportation . The cost of transporting units actually sold each
year.
Marketing
. The amount spent on marketing each year.
Research . The amount spent on research each year.
Plant Improvement . The amount spent to maintain or expand plant
capacity each year.
Taxes. The amount of taxes paid each year.
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New Balance . The amount of cash your firm has to conduct business
for the next year. This balance cannot be negative; that is, the
firm cannot borrow money.
Balance Sheet . Individual items are defined in the industry report
section of the glossary.
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SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR FIRM
You are now the newly employed Vice President for Production.
Recall that the organization chart of your firm, provided earlier,
defines your position as reporting directly to the president.
The company's production facilities are located in area 2,
your home area. The company headquarters and main sales offices
are located in area 4 of the geographical market, but in different
cities. Thus, the vice president for sales and the president of the
company are in different cities, and the vice president for produc-
tion is in a different area. Because of the physical separation of
the personnel in your firm, the following procedures have been
established for making the area and plant decisions.
First, the president and each vice president receive copies
of the reports available. (Your copy of the reports is provided
in Packet A. ) All personnel receive the same information in these
reports. Each individual conducts a thorough analysis of the infor-
mation in these reports on his own, as each person is in a different
location.
After completing the analysis, each vice president makes recom-
mendations to the president concerning the area decisions and the
plant decisions required for the coming year. These recommendations
are forwarded to the president by the use of a standard budget form.
(The form is located at the end of the packet.) This standard form
has proven very useful in the past as an accurate means to forward
recommendations to the president. The possibility of errors is
greatly reduced since the same format is utilized by all personnel.
YOUR ROLE
As the Vice President for Production, you primary responsibility
is to minimize the production costs per unit in both the short run
and over the long run. The president has established the overall
company goal as the maximizing of profits, and is very concerned with
the performance of the Production Division. For example, the unit
production cost in year 5 was almost as high as the unit price
charged in two areas, and was higher than the unit price charged
in the other two areas. This situation is causing severe profita-
bility problems for the company.
Given this situation, your analysis should be directed toward
determining the cash needed for each of the plant decisions to bring
about a turnaround in production cost per unit. At the same time you
should ensure that the production operations and decisions are consis-
tnet with the requirements of the Sales Division. The Sales Division
is expected to maximize sales revenue and increase the firm's market
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share of the industry. Since the Vice President for Sales is in
another location, it is not possible to communicate directly. How-
ever, recall that both of you have exactly the same information in
your reports.
To meet your responsibilities, you should now take the fol-
lowing steps in the order given.
First, determine the cash required to significantly reduce the
unit production cost. At the same time, be sure to consider the
implications of your production plans on the sales effort. While
making these determinations, you may refer back to the reports
provided in Packet A as often and as much as you wish. You may
take up to forty-five minutes to make these determinations.
Secondly, after you decide how much cash you need, take out
the budget form located at the back of this packet. The form is
in duplicate and contains a glossary of brief descriptions of the
effects of each decision that you should expect. Completely fill
out the budget form. That is, you should indicate what you think
(1) the unit price charged in each area should be, and (2) the
appropriate amount of cash for marketing in each area and each plant
decision should be. The last balance sheet available (year 5) indi-
cates that your firm has $10,957 for operations in the coming year.
Your cash allocations to the various decisions requiring cash must
not exceed this amount. Also, note the budget form does have a
comments section. You may utilize this section to provide any addi-
tional recommendations you feel the president should receive.
Thirdly, after you have completely filled out the budget form,
submit the form to the president. (This is accomplished by giving
the form to the session administrator, who will take the form to
the president.) Retain the duplicate of the budget form as you will
need the form for later use. Also, hand in Packet A at this time
to the session administrator. After turning in the budget form
(original) and Packet A you will receive Packet C as a replacement
for Packet A. Upon receipt of Packet C, please open the packet and




















C. PLANT IMPROVEMENT $_
D. RESEARCH $
TOTAL EXPENDITURES
(A thru D) $
TOTAL CASH AVAILABLE $10,957






Unit Price . The price per unit to be charged in an area. Unit prices
in each area are competitive. If your firm's prices are too high,
you may not sell many units. If it is too low, your firm may have
more orders than it can fill. The number of orders in an area
is influenced by the marketing expenditures in that area and by
the overall level of research conducted by your firm.
Marketing . The amount to be expended on the company's sales effort.
Too little marketing will result in no orders. Too much marketing
may result in more orders than can be filled. The firm's mar-
keting effort must be competitive in each area to obtain orders.
PLANT DECISIONS
Plant Improvement . Expenditures to counteract depreciation and
possibly expand plant capacity. Expenditures result in a cash
outlay, but due to construction lead time, the increased capacity
is not available for a year.
Production . Expenditures to produce the product. Amounts required
to achieve various levels of production are shown in the production
reports.
Research. Expenditures for research and development. These expendi-
tures should have a long range effect on both the desirability of
your product and the cost of producing the product. The research
effort must be competitive.
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SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR FIRM
You are now the newly employed Vice President for Production.
Recall that the organization chart of your firm, provided earlier,
defines your position as reporting directly to the president.
All of the company's facilities are located in area 2, your home
area. The following procedures have been established in your firm as
an aid to making the plant and area decisions.
First, the president and each vice president receive copies of
the reports available. (Your copy is provided in Packet A.) All
personnel receive the same information in these reports. Each indi-
vidual initially conducts a thorough analysis of the information in
these reports. Based on this analysis, each individual may determine
facts that may be important for the decisions to be made.
Secondly, a meeting of all personnel is held. This meeting has
proven very useful in the past as a means to ensure that everyone
knows what the facts are in the situation facting the firm.
Thirdly, after the meeting, each vice president makes recom-
mendations to the president concerning the area and plant decisions
required for the coming year. These recommendations are forwarded
to the president by the use of a standard budget form (located at the
end of this packet). This standard form has proven very useful as an
accurate means to forward recommendations to the president. The pos-
sibility of errors is reduced greatly since the same format is used
by all personnel.
YOUR ROLE
As the Vice President for Production, your primary responsi-
bility is to minimize the production costs per unit in both the
short run and over the long run. The president has established the
overall company goal as the maximizing of profits, and is very con-
cerned with the performance of the Production Division. For example,
the unit production cost in year 5 was almost as high as the unit
price charged in two areas, and was higher than the unit price charged
in the other two areas. This situation is causing severe profita-
bility problems for the company.
Given this situation, your analysis should be directed toward
determining the cash needed for each of the plant decisions to bring
about a turnaround in production cost per unit. At the same time
you should ensure that the production operations and decisions are
consistent with the requirements of the Sales Division. The Sales
Division is expected to maximize sales revenue and increase the firm s
market share of the industry.
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To meet your responsibilities, you should now take the following
steps in the order given.
First, you should ensure that you have analyzed the reports
thoroughly enough to know the nature of the situation facing the firm.
You may have already accomplished this as you read through Packet A.
If not, you may take up to fifteen more minutes to analyze the reports
in Packet A.
Secondly, the president will convene a meeting with the vice
presidents after your analysis is completed. The purpose of the
meeting each period is to ensure that everyone knows what the facts
of the situation facing the firm are. Thus, you provide the president
and the other vice president with the facts you have determined from
your analysis of the reports. In turn, you are likely to receive
some new facts from the other persons at the meeting. This meeting
will take about thirty minutes.
Thirdly, after the president adjourns the meeting, you return
to your division. There you determine the cash that is needed to
significantly reduce the unit production cost. At the same time, be
sure to consider the implications of your production plans on the
sales effort. While making these determinations, you may refer back
to the reports in Packet A as much and as often as you wish. You may
take up to fifteen minutes to make these determinations.
Fourthly, take out the budget form located at the back of this
packet. The form is in duplicate and contains a glossary of brief
descriptions of the effects of each decision. Completely fill out the
budget form. That is, you should indicate what you think (1) the
unit price charged in each area should be, and (2) the appropriate
amount of cash for marketing in each area and each plant decision
should be. Your cash allocations to the various functions may not
exceed the $10,957 available cash balance as of the end of year 5.
Also, note the budget form does have a comments section. You may
utilize this section for any additional recommendations you feel the
president should receive.
Finally, submit the completely filled out form to the president.
Sign the form as "VP - Production." Retain the duplicate of the
budget form. Also, hand in Packet A at this time to the president.
Upon turning in your budget form and Packet A, you will receive Packet
C as a replacement for Packet A. Upon receipt of Packet C, please
open the packet and follow the instructions given inside the packet.
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SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR FIRM
You are now the newly employed Vice President for Production.
Recall that the organization chart of your firm, provided earlier, de-
fines your position as reporting directly to the president.
All of the company's facilities are located in area 2, your
home ara. The following procedures have been established in your
firm as an aid to making the area and plant decisions.
First, the president and each vice president receive copies
of the reports available. (Your copy is provided in Packet A.)
All personnel receive the same information in these reports. Each
individual initially conducts a thorough analysis of the information
in these reports. Based on this analysis, each individual may deter-
mine facts that may be important for the decisions to be made and
may think of alternatives that may be helpful in making the decisions
for the upcoming year.
Secondly, a meeting of all personnel is held. This meeting
has proven very useful in the past as a means to accomplish the
following: ensuring everyone knows what the facts are in the situa-
tion facing the firm; allowing the exchange of ideas, suggestions,
and alternatives among individuals concerning the decisions to be
made; and reaching a consensus on the decisions to be made among the
individuals at the meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting, the
budget form (located at the end of this packet) is jointly filled
out by the president and the vice presidents.
YOUR ROLE
As the Vice President for Production, your primary responsibility
is to minimize the production costs per unit in both the short run
and over the long run. The president has established the overall
company goal as the maximizing of profits, and is very concerned with
the performance of the Production Division. For example, the unit
production cost in year 5 was almost as high as the unit price charged
in two areas, and was higher than the unit price charged in the other
two areas. This situation is causing severe profitability problems
for the company.
Given this situation, your analysis should be directed toward
determining the cash needed for each of the plant decisions to bring
about a turnaround in production cost per unit. At the same time
you should ensure that the production operations and decisions are
consistent with the requirements of the Sales Division. The Sales
Division is expected to maximize sales revenue and increase the firm's
market share of the industry.
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To meet your responsibilities, you should now take the following
steps in the order given.
First, you should ensure that you have analyzed the reports
thoroughly enough to know the nature of the situation facing the
firm. You may have already accomplished this as you read through
Packet A. If not, you may take up to fifteen more minutes to analyze
the reports in Packet A.
Secondly, the president will convene a meeting with the vice
presidents after your analysis is completed. The purpose of the
meeting each period is to ensure that everyone knows what the facts
of the situation facing the firm are, and to allow the exchange of
ideas, suggestions, and alternatives among the individuals in the
company. They, the members of the firm jointly decide on the alloca-
tion of the available cash and the prices in each area. Thus, you
should provide the president and the other vice president with wny
facts you have determined from your analysis of the reports. In turn,
you are likely to receive some new facts from these persons. Similarly,
you should exchange ideas, suggestions, and alternatives that the
firm might consider as actions for the coming year. This meeting will
last about sixty minutes.
Thirdly, at the end of the meeting, you will jointly decide
each area decision and plant decision for year 6. To accomplish
this, take out the budget form located at the back of this packet.
Attached to the form is a glossary of brief descriptions of the
effects of each decision. Completely fill out the budget form. That
is, you should record on the form what you jointly decide with the
other members of the firm as to (1) the area prices and (2) the mar-
keting expenditures in each area and the plant decisions required.
The cash allocations to the various functions may add up to but not
exceed the $10,957 available cash balance as of the end of year 5.
Finally, check with the other members of your firm to make
sure that your budget forms are filled out the same way. Retain the
budget form and hand in Packet A to the president at this time. Upon
turning in Packet A, you will receive Packet C as a replacement for
Packet A. Upon receipt of Packet C, please open the packet and follow
the instructions given inside the packet.
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SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF YOUR FIRM
You are now the newly employed Vice President for Production.
Recall that the organization chart of your firm, provided earlier,
defines your position as reporting directly to the president.
All of the company's facilities are located in area 2, your
home area. The following procedures have been established in your
firm as an aid to making the area and plant decisions.
First, the president and each vice president receive copies
of the reports available. (Your copy is provided in Packet A.) All
personnel receive the same information in these reports. Each indi-
vidual initially conducts a thorough analysis of the information in
these reports. Based on this analysis, each individual may determine
facts that may be important for the decisions to be made and may
think of alternatives that may be helpful in making the decisions for
the upcoming year.
Secondly, a meeting of all personnel is held. This meeting has
proven very useful in the past as a means to accomplish the following;
ensuring everyone knows what the facts are in the situation facing
the firm; allowing the exchange of ideas, suggestions, and alterna-
tives among individuals concerning the decisions to be made; and
reaching a consensus on the decisions to be made among the indivi-
duals at the meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting, the budget
form (located at the end of this packet) is jointly filled out by
the president and the vice presidents.
YOUR ROLE
As the Vice President for Production, your primary responsi-
bility is to minimize the production costs per unit in both the short
run and over the long run. The president has established the over-
all company goal as the maximizing of profits, and is very concerned
with the performance of the Production Division. For example, the
unit production cost in year 5 was almost as high as the unit price
charged in two areas, and was higher than the unit price charged in
the other two areas. This situation is causing severe profitability
problems for the company.
Given this situation, your analysis should be directed toward
determining the cash needed for each of the plant decisions to bring
about a turnaround in production cost per unit. At the same time
you should ensure that the production operations and decisions are
consistent with the requirements of the Sales Division. The Sales
Division is expected to maximize sales revenue and increase the firm's
market share of the industry.
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To meet your responsibilities, you should now take the following
steps in the order given.
First, you should ensure that you have analyzed the reports
thoroughly enough to know the nature of the situation facing the firm.
You may have already accomplished this as you read through Packet A.
If not, you may take up to fifteen more minutes to analyze the reports
in Packet A.
Secondly, the president will convene a meeting with the vice
presidents after your analysis is completed. The purpose of the
meeting each period is to ensure that everyone knows what the facts
of the situation facing the firm are, and to allow the exchange of
ideas, suggestions, and alternatives among the individuals in the
company. Then, the members of the firm jointly decide on the alloca-
tion of the available cash and the prices in the area. Thus, you
should provide the president and the other vice president with any
facts you have determined from your analysis of the reports. In turn,
you are likely to receive some new facts from these persons.
Similarly, you should exchange ideas, suggestions, and alternatives
that the firm might consider as actions for the coming year. This
meeting will last about sixty minutes.
Thirdly, at the end of the meeting, you will jointly decide each
area decision and plant decision for year 6. To accomplish this, take
out the budget form located at the back of this packet. Attached to
the form is a glossary of brief descriptions of the effects of each
decision. Completely fill out the budget form. That is, you should
record on the form what you jointly decide with the other members of
the firm as to (1) the aera prices and (2) the marketing expenditures
in each area and the plant decisions required. The cash allocations
to the various functions may add up to but not exceed the $10,957
available cash balance as of the end of year 5.
Finally, check with the other members of your firm to make
sure that your budget forms are filled out the same way. Retain
the budget form and hand in Packet A to the president at this time.
Upon turning in Packet A, you will receive Packet C as a replacement
for Packet A. Upon receipt of Packet C, please open the packet and
follow the instructions given inside the packet
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Now that you have submitted your budget recommendation to the
president, please wait for a few minutes while the president makes
the final decision on the cash allocations and the pricing strategy.
While you are waiting, we would appreciate your giving some responses
to a few questions. Your responses will be very helpful in deter-
mining the effectiveness of the format and content of the reports
that were provided in Packet A as decision making aids.
In responding to some of the questions below, you may find
your copy of the budget recommendation form useful. Please feel free
to refer to it as necessary.
Please do respond to each question. The purpose of these
questions is to gather information and what you think is of pri-
mary importance for this project. As you respond to these questions,
keep in mind the position you hold in the firm, and the responsi-
bilities of that position.
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For each question or statement below, circle the letter of the
response that you think is most appropriate. Work through the ques-
tions as quickly as you can. Remember, what you think is what is most
important in answering these questions.




D. Fluctuating up and down.
2. As of the end of year 5, my firm's ranking in the industry in





3. As of the end of year 5, my firm's ranking in the industry in





A. As of the end of year 5, my firm's ranking in the industry in





5. Over the last five years, my firm's share of the market as a
percentage of the total sales made in the industry in each geogra-




C. Increased, than varied
downward and upward
D. Decreased, than varied
upward and downward
E. Cannot recall.
AREA 1 AREA 2 AREA 3 AREA
A A A A
B B B B
•ie
1. C C C C
1. D D D D
E E E E
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6. Over the last five years, my firm's pricing strategy in an area
can best be characterized or described as: (Please make four
responses to this statement - one for each area)
A. A price leader; for the AREA 1
most part, my firm's A
prices were higher than
those set by the other
two firms.
B. A price follower; for B
the most part, my firm's
prices were lower than
those set by one or
the other firm.
C. A price competitor; for C
the most part, prices
charged by each firm
were the same.














8. Which one of the following lines on the graph or phrases best
describes the general relationship between marketing expenditures











9. Which one of the following lines on the graph or phrases best
describes the general relationships between the production level and
the total cost of that production level?





10. Which one of the following lines on the graph or phrases best
describes the general relationship between the production level and
the unit production cost?
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11. Which of the following lines on the graph or phrases best
describes the general relationship between units sold in each area
and the unit sales price?
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12. Over the most recent three years, net profit has
A. Increased.
B. Decreased.
C. Stayed relatively constant.
D. Fluctuated widely from year to year,
E. Cannot recall.







14. In general, in each of the last five years, most of the








15. The other vice president in your firm also submitted a budget
recommendation to the president. In the space provided below, esti-














A. TOTAL MARKETING $ (Areas 1-4)
PLANT DECISIONS
B. PRODUCTION $
C. PLANT IMPROVEMENT $
D. RESEARCH $
TOTAL EXPENDITURES (A thru D) $
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16. In a few moments, you will receive the final decision the presi-dent made on the budget. In the space below, indicate what you















A. TOTAL MARKETING $
PLANT DECISIONS
B. PRODUCTION $
C. PLANT IMPROVEMENT $
D. RESEARCH $
TOTAL EXPENDITURES (A thru D) $
(Areas 1-4)
Question 16 completes Packet C. Please check to make sure that
you responded completely to each of the preceding questions. You will
receive a copy of the president's final decision along with a final
packet. Packet D. Please open Packet D when you receive it and follow
the instructions inside to conclude the session for today.
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15. Recall that the decisions in your firm were jointly made by
the firm members. In the space provided below, indicate what you






















16. In the space below, indicate what you think the other vice



























17. In the space below, indicate what you think the president of






















The decisions made by the president for year 6 are attached
to this sheet. The president of your firm made these plant and area
decisions independently - that is, the recommendations of the
Vice-president for Sales and the Vice-president for Production were






























Along with this packet, you received a copy of the final budget
decision as made by the president of your firm. Take a few moments
to look over the final decision made. Then, as you recall the speci-
fic responsibilities of your position in this firm, please indicate
your responses to the three questions below by circling the letter
of the response that best describes your feelings about the final
decision made .
1. If given the opportunity, to what degree would you now change
the cash allocations made and the prices set to meet your respon-
sibilities in this firm.
A. Not at all.
B. Very little.
C. To some degree.
D. To a considerable degree.
E. To a very great degree.




C. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.
D. Pretty satisfied.
E. Very satisfied.
3. How much do the decisions on cash allocations and prices as
finally made represent the ones that you now believe to be correct?
A. Basically what I consider correct.
B. Fairly close to what I consider correct.
C. Somewhat close to what 1 consider correct.
D. Fairly different from what I consider correct.
E. Very different from what I consider correct.
The next two questions ask you for some background data that
may be very useful in analyzing the results of this session.
1. Please list your classification and major field.
2. Please indicate your cumulative grade point average;
Instructions for concluding the session are on the next page.
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Thank you for your time and effort in participating in this
session. We hope that you found the experience an interesting and
informative one. We ask that you please not discuss the nature of
the session, however, with any of your friends for the next few
days. Other persons are scheduled to participate in the project
in the next few days, and prior knowledge on their part of the
nature of the session would greatly weaken the potential value of
the project.
At this time, one of the persons working on this project will
compensate you $5.00 for your participation and will answer any




How much weight or influence do you feel your budget recommen-
dations had on the president's final budget decision? (Please circle
the appropriate number)
.
1 2 3 4 5






19. If given the opportunity, to what degree would you now change
the jointly determined cash allocations and prices set to meet your
responsibilities in this firm?
A. Not at all.
B. Very little.
C. To some degree.
D. To a considerable degree.
E. To a very great degree.
20. How satisfied are you with the jointly determined cash alloca-
tions and prices set?
A. Very dissatisfied.
B. Pretty dissatisfied.
C. Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.
D. Pretty satisfied.
E. Very satisfied.
21. How much do the jointly determined decisions on cash alloca-
tions and prices represent the ones that you now believe to be
correct?
A. Basically what I consider correct.
B. Fairly close to what I consider correct.
C. Somewhat close to what I consider correct.
D. Fairly different from what I consider correct.
E. Very different from what I consider correct.
22. How much say or influence did you have on the final decisions
made.
A. None.
B. Some, but not as much as the other persons.
C. About the same as the other persons.
D. Somewhat more than the other persons.
E. A lot more than the other persons.
The next two questions ask you for some background data that
may be very useful in analyzing the results of this session.
1. Please list your classification and major field:
2. Please indicate your cumulative grade point average;
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